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FORWARD FROM THE FORUM ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF AZERBAIJAN 
 
A High Level Forum on the Economic and Social development of Azerbaijan was held in Baku 
on October 21, 2009.  The Forum was co-chaired by Mr. Artur Razi-zadeh, Prime Minister of the 
Azerbaijan Republic and Ms. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Managing Director of the World Bank. The 
purpose of the Forum was to discuss strategies for Azerbaijan’s growth in the post crisis period.  
Distinguished external participants included Mr. Garret FitzGerald, former Prime Minister 
(Toiseach) of Ireland; Professor Ricardo Hausmann, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University; Mr. Ivan Miklos, Parliamentarian of the Slovak Republic and Former Deputy Prime 
Minister, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Economic Development; and Prof. Ed Walsh, 
Founding President of the University of Limmerick, Ireland. Distinguished Azeri participants 
included Mr. Yagub Eyyubov, First Deputy Prime Minister; Mr. Abid Sharifov, Deputy Prime 
Minister; Mr. Elchin Afandiyev, Deputy Prime Minister; Mr. Ali Hasanov, Deputy Prime 
Minister; Mr. Ziyad Samadzade, Chief, Parliament Economic Policy Standing Commission;  Mr. 
Shahin Mustafayev, Minister of Economic Development;  Mr. Samir Sharifov, Minister of 
Finance; Mr. Fuzuli Alakabrov, Minister of Labor and Social Protection of Population; Mr. 
Elman Rustamov, Chairman,  Central Bank of Azerbaijan; Mr. Shahmar Movsumov,  Executive 
Director, State Oil Fund;  Mr. Rufat Aslanli,  Chairman, State Securities Committee;  Mr. Mail 
Rahimov, Head of Economic Policy Department of Executive Office of the President; Mr. 
Shahin Sadigov, Head of Economic and Financial Credit Policy Department, Cabinet of 
Ministers, and Mr. Ismail Sadikhov,  Head of Department of Science, Culture, Public Education 
and Social Issues at the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan Republic.  
The discussants at the Forum set out a central thesis that summarized Azerbaijan’s 
diversification challenges. If Azerbaijan wishes to develop an upper middle-income economy of 
about $20,000 per capita (in $PPP terms) in 10 years, it will have to do so by expanding its non-
oil exports (as has been accomplished by some commodity-rich and by EU accession 
comparators). While oil exports will, at best, be able to cover half of the country’s export 
revenue needs, the non-oil exports will have to cover the other half, at least; this implies that the 
country will have to increase its non-oil exports per capita by almost 50 times in 10 years. This 
dramatic increase can only be achieved with substantial non-oil FDI inflow –as has been 
demonstrated by Ireland and Slovakia.  
In order to adapt Azerbaijan’s growth model, from “oil driven” at a time of booming oil 
revenues, to “non-oil driven” after the global crisis sharply drove down oil prices and led to 
severely contracted GDP growth rates for the region, the country’s macroeconomic policies, its 
business environment, and its human capital policies will need to be completely aligned with the 
goal of developing non-oil exports and attracting Foreign Direct Investment.  At the same time,   
fiscal policy will need to be more predictable and public spending will have to be less ambitious 
in order to support a stable macroeconomic environment and a less appreciated exchange rate.  
The government’s policy on business environment will have to be more dynamic and aggressive 
aimed at removing all the obstacles (infrastructure, knowledge or regulatory shortcomings) that 
 ii 
 
hinder non-oil exporters and turn away potential foreign investors. In essence, Azerbaijan will 
have to earn an international reputation as a choice destination for non-oil FDI, as measured by 
the US$ invested and number of investors attracted. The country’s tertiary level education policy 
will also have to be adjusted, so that training establishments respond directly to the needs of 
enterprises –with many degrees and curricula driven by business needs. Azerbaijan will have to 
balance these new requirements against the need for some reliance on domestic markets, as its 
own circumstances dictate. 
Adapting Azerbaijan’s growth model to the changing circumstances will require that the 
government also adjust its role, from provider of infrastructure (something that was critical 
before the global crisis) to enabler and facilitator of non-oil exports (and of FDI).  Sustainable 
per capita growth will require not only more exports, but exports of higher value added products. 
Research shows that countries become as rich as their export competitors are. That is to say, 
when countries produce export items that are produced by richer countries, they too get richer. 
The implication of this research is that while Azerbaijan can increase its export revenues in the 
short term by exporting tomatoes and nuts, learning to export higher value added products (i.e. 
products that countries with higher income than itself produce and consume), such as air 
conditioners, high quality confectionaries, or software, is what is really needed for Azerbaijan to 
develop a sustainable non-oil economy and to establish itself among the upper middle income 
countries. At the same time, experience has shown that it is very difficult for governments to 
identify the potentially successful non-oil export products. Given that fact,  the only good policy 
for the government to follow is to: (a) work on improving the business environment across the 
board to make the country more attractive to domestic and foreign investors; and (b)  
aggressively resolve problems, once they are identified by investors. The government has the 
power to convene all the public agencies that can resolve administrative or infrastructure 
bottlenecks pose to investors –it should make use of that “convening power”. In short, the 
government needs to create the conditions for the private sector to operate freely. 
The analysis presented in this Country Economic Memorandum identifies challenges that 
Azerbaijan must address in order to ensure that the country’s per capita income continues to rise.  
The report also contains many recommendations and examples from other countries.  These are 
offered in the hope that they help the country to achieve its bold and ambitious goals for the next 
decade. 
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PREFACE 
The World Bank is engaged in a large partnership program with Azerbaijan intended to assist the 
country achieve its development objective of becoming an upper middle income economy and 
further its gains in poverty reduction by insuring long-term sustainability and diversification of 
its economic activities. While the bulk of the World Bank program involves co-financing of 
critical social and economic infrastructure, the remainder of the program involves dialogue and 
knowledge-sharing to strengthen institutions and polices that help Azerbaijan transition to a 
market-based economy with a more diversified and sustainable economic base.  The non-lending 
products of the Bank that have supported the partnership with Azerbaijan include technical 
assistance services and analytical reports such as this one. In the implementation of the 
partnership strategy, the Bank and the government stand to benefit from collaboration with other 
development partners. Already, fruitful exchanges of views have taken place with them during 
the preparation of this report. 
The report’s main message, which has become more relevant as the global economy has fallen 
into a deep slump,  is that Azerbaijan needs to devote more efforts to pursue diversification 
(primarily measured by non-oil exports)  aimed at reducing its dependence on oil revenue  and 
ensuring  sustainability of its hard-earned gains in poverty reduction. Furthermore, it must also 
focus on attracting foreign knowhow and strengthening of market institutions-- important 
ingredients for meeting the challenge. To this end, gradual but consistent fiscal adjustment is 
required to decrease the role of the state in the economy and to ensure fiscal sustainability. At the 
same time, modernization of public administration needs to be a top priority; this refers 
especially to agencies that deal with the private sector as those reforms need to drive 
improvements in the private sector environment. The government also needs to assure that public 
utilities-- like electricity and telephone-- are financially viable and they continue to improve their 
level of service to enterprises and households. Undoubtedly, the global crisis requires prudent 
support of the financial sector.  But the report points out that the country’s financial 
infrastructure needs further development (as was the case in the pre-crisis situation). Azerbaijan 
needs to also pursue upgrading of the skills of its labor force if it is to be competitive in the 
medium term.  Globally, we see that while countries prepared stimulus packages to support their 
economies, the measures for improving each economy’s efficiency abound (note the 
modernization of Chile’s competitiveness group or the investments directed to improve the 
energy efficiency of US or European economies).  Against this backdrop, Azerbaijan must 
prepare for a more competitive global economy after the crisis. The report also recommends that 
the government strengthen its coordination of different agencies so that implementation of 
existing and of new polices is evaluated against their potential benefits to diversification; 
monitoring progress made on diversification is also highly recommended. 
The report is the result of more than a year of work that took place between October 2007 and 
December 2008 aimed at strengthening the economic management of Azerbaijan and improving 
its competitiveness.  Much of the time after that has been taken on additional consultations on 
the findings and on securing a high quality (technically sound) translation. Most of the work was 
undertaken under the aegis of the Country Economic Memorandum (CEM).  The report was also 
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supported by the Structural Reform TA task (which financed workshops on fiscal sustainability 
and transfer of the fiscal sustainability toolkit to the government), and the Programmatic Public 
Expenditure Review task, which supported the dialogue on public management and the MTEF in 
2006-2008 and the 2008 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment (co-
funded with SECO), and the 2008 Country Procurement Assessment Review.  Significant work 
on the private sector in 2008 had been undertaken by the IFC and had been incorporated herein.  
The 2008 Poverty Assessment was undertaken largely in parallel with the CEM, so those results 
could not be included here. Finally, the High Level Forum was held on October 21, 2009, to 
discuss the thrust of the policy recommendations with senior policy makers. 
During the CEM preparation, several economic missions took place in Azerbaijan.  The missions 
held a series of workshops on managing resource-rich economies and on fiscal sustainability 
(largely for government and academic audiences). The missions also held extensive discussions 
and workshops with government officials on the findings of the CEM’s specialist teams, as the 
various components of the report were being developed. The approach served two purposes: (i) 
to inform counterparts of the findings; and (ii) to obtain feedback from the counterparts on the 
CEM assessment and the potential recommendations.  Prior to the issuance of the report, several 
meetings were held with senior government officials.  After the publication of the report, an 
extensive outreach effort to all levels of government, the private sector, the academic 
community, and civil society is envisioned. 
Finally, this report has been prepared by the World Bank with a view to stimulating discussion 
on Azerbaijan’s development.  The report would not have been possible without the 
wholehearted collaboration of government authorities, who wrestle and seek to overcome the 
country’s development challenges on a daily basis.  The Bank’s value added is to integrate and 
deepen analysis on the one hand, and to bring evidence on international experience to bear for 
Azeri authorities on the other, as they contemplate the next development milestones.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. Azerbaijan’s oil and gas boom presents a rare opportunity to accelerate 
improvements in the quality of life of all its citizens. Its per capita income is $5,100 in 2008, 
up nearly 400 percent from 2004 in current USD terms; it could potentially exceed $6,500 by 
2013 and higher beyond that. Consequently, poverty is likely to continue to fall, especially in the 
rural areas, and the entire population of nearly nine million can expect to benefit significantly 
from expanded access to better quality education and health services as well as more targeted 
social assistance. Most of this income growth is expected to come from non-oil output and 
exports, especially agriculture and light manufacturing, though high levels of oil revenues and 
public spending will continue to stimulate significant growth of construction and various services 
sectors. Fiscal revenues from oil and gas are expected to be $198 billion in net present value 
terms through 2024 (based on the oil production profile of June 2008).1 This report outlines 
changes in policies and institutions that would be needed to realize this vision. 
2. The county’s vision is to move toward a diversified, globally integrated market 
economy, based on a sustainable non-oil sector, which includes an expanded role for non-
oil exports.  The vision of a diversified and integrated market economy was first outlined in the 
State Program for Poverty Reduction and Economic Development (SPPRED) 2003-05.2  The 
government plans to develop several oil- and gas-related industries and sees its geographical 
position as ideal to further develop transportation and other transit-related services.  Also the 
population’s history of entrepreneurship and trade is a sound basis for developing a non-oil 
economy. Developing Azerbaijan as an expanded transportation hub, as a center for high value-
added food processing industries and other light manufacturing, and even as a regional tourist 
destination, are all part of this vision. Significantly improved performance of the agricultural 
sector (aided by the country’s famed nine climatic zones) is expected to support the food 
processing sector. The government’s vision thus expects to broaden the country’s export 
markets, now mainly limited to Russia and Turkey, to the rest of Europe and Asia. Azerbaijan 
can benefit from the lessons of successful resource-rich economies, as well as successful small 
economies without natural resources, which have created jobs and additional incomes for their 
populations through diversification and by expanding their non-oil exports.   
3. The global crisis has had important implications for regional growth.   The crisis has 
reduced access to international finance, lowered food and oil prices, affected foreign inflows 
(remittances, FDI and roll-over financing for commercial banks) and reduced demand for exports 
for many countries.  According to the latest Global Development Finance report, (issued in 
September 2009, the Bank expects global GDP growth to slip from 1.9 percent in 2008 to -2.9 
percent in 2009. Developing country growth is expected to decline from 5.9 percent in 2008 to 
1.2 percent in 2009. Growth in high income countries in 2009 will likely be -4.2 percent.  World 
                                                 
1 This report uses four conventions: (a) the terms oil revenues and oil exports connotes revenues from the sale of oil 
and gas where as fiscal revenues from oil denote the government’s revenues from oil, which includes Azerbaijan’s 
share of profit oil; (b) non-oil exports comprise all exports except crude oil and gas in all forms; (c) the oil sector 
connotes the extraction of oil and gas, but excludes transportation of oil and gas, and also construction related to the 
oil and gas extraction sectors; (d) Azerbaijan’s currency is denoted interchangeably as AZN (New Azeri Manat), 
preceding a figure, or “manat”, following a numerical figure. 
2 The SPPRED was Azerbaijan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. 
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trade volume is expected to contract by 12 percent, from 3.7 percent in 2008 to -9.7 percent in 
2009. The global slowdown is expected to have a profound impact on poverty; early estimates by 
the World Bank suggest that a 1 percent decline in developing country growth rates is most 
likely to push an additional 20 million people into poverty. Already, 100 million people had been 
driven into poverty as a result of high food and fuel prices. At the same time, the slowdown in 
global demand and the burst of the speculative bubble for oil, have led the oil price to tumble, 
from a high of $147 per barrel in July 2008, to less than $40 in January 2009, and to neatly $70 
in second part of 2009.  Fortunately, the 2010 forecasts show some encouragement, with global 
growth expected to recover and for Azerbaijan’s neighbors to take advantage of that recovery.  
4. Though Azerbaijan is less affected by the crisis than its neighbors, the external 
environment has become less supportive of diversification.  But, weaker oil prices will 
require medium-term public spending, and stronger private sector growth.  Azerbaijan’s 
development in recent years has been buoyed significantly by rising oil prices through mid-2008 
and by increasing oil production since 2006. The economy has not relied significantly on inflows 
of foreign capital or foreign aid in 2007 and 2008.   Despite the collapse of oil prices in the latter 
half of 2008, Azerbaijan’s oil production is poised to increase in 2009 and 2010. At the same 
time, the financial sector has avoided a major crisis thus far; remittances are expected to hold 
steady in 2009, and non-oil exports alone are too small to precipitate a recession should external 
demand fall. At the time of writing this report, single digit GDP growth (in the order of 3-5 
percent) is expected in 2009 and 2010. While the country’s growth prospects have been dimmed 
by the global crisis, Azerbaijan has fared better than its neighbors. The gloomy external 
environment is likely to have a dampening effect on Azerbaijan’s efforts to attract investors and 
to diversify its production and export base.  At the same time, lower oil prices will likely lower 
pressures for appreciation of the manat, jeopardizing the banking sector’s ability to repay foreign 
loans (as has happened in Kazakhstan in 2007 and 2008) and leaving them exposed to a 
worsening real estate market. Furthermore, while oil prices have recovered somewhat from the 
January 2009 lows, uncertainty still exists about the level at which they will stabilize.  Fiscal 
revenues from oil will drop sharply in 2009, and may not reach the 2008 levels till 2012. As 
such, prolonged low oil prices will require the government to revise its medium-term expenditure 
plans if it wishes to ensure sustainability. 
5. Azerbaijan entered the global crisis much stronger than many other countries. Since 
the transition began, Azerbaijan made commendable progress in stabilizing and reforming the 
economy; that progress, along with sizable oil revenues allowed the country to cope with the 
aftermath of its freedom from Soviet occupation in 1991, the conflict with Armenia, and the 
cumulative impact of economic decline through 1995 (when per capita income after 
independence hit bottom and inflation was high). All this left the country in poverty, with dismal 
infrastructure and few market institutions. The government launched a successful stabilization 
program in 1996-98 through reforms in various sectors to ensure better economic management 
and easier domestic and foreign private investments, especially in the oil and gas sectors. The 
government has been particularly active since 2003 when it embarked on accelerating the 
economic growth in various ways. 
• Social policies.  Since 2003, the government has placed significant emphasis on 
enhancing public sector salaries, increasing pensions, and establishing the country’s 
targeted social assistance scheme.  These efforts, together with the ability of the 
 ix 
 
economy to create jobs and the buoyancy of the region (including remittances from 
Russia), have resulted in significant poverty reduction.  The national poverty rate 
dropped from 68.1 percent in 1995 to 24 percent in 2005; poverty almost halved 
between 2003 and 2005.  While the drop in poverty has been greatest in Baku, it has 
been almost equal in other urban and rural areas.  Since 2006, the surge in 
Azerbaijan’s oil revenues has allowed the government to expand social transfers and 
public sector salaries. Social transfers are empirically found to play a significant role 
in poverty reduction.  The government has also invested extensively in social sectors, 
especially in education (most schools have been refurbished) and in health. The 
investment program, together with the social assistance packages and increases in 
pensions and public sector salaries (albeit from extremely low bases), have amounted 
to significant public expenditures.  
• Infrastructure buildup.  The government has been gradually increasing capital 
investment since 2003, but since 2006, it has tripled the level of public investment 
using the country’s growing oil revenues. Aside from the social sectors, investments 
have been directed at the country’s core infrastructure projects-- power, roads, and 
water (early investments).3  As a result, there has been a significant improvement in 
the quality of electricity supply throughout the country, helping to improve the 
livelihood of households by creating opportunities in food processing, light 
manufacturing and other industries (including modern wine production facilities). 
Investments in roads have sought to reduce the cost of transportation along the 
country’s main corridors (North-South [Russia-Iran, via Baku], and East-West [Baku-
Georgia]). This is likely to facilitate the transport of goods and promote regional 
trade—an important part of Azerbaijan’s diversification strategy.    
• Economic management institutions. While the quality of Azerbaijan’s economic 
management institutions, as measured by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) Transition Index, was much worse than CIS comparators in 
1995, Azerbaijan accelerated reforms after 2001. Since then, the country has made 
good progress on first-generation reforms (more than the CIS average, bringing it on 
par with Kazakhstan and slightly surpassing Russia). On second-generation reforms, 
Azerbaijan has made some progress, but continues to lag behind the CIS average, and 
its Caucasus neighbors-- Kazakhstan, Russia, and the EU accession countries. To 
overcome this, Azerbaijan has placed significant emphasis, much more than the 
average CIS country, on developing institutions to manage the country’s large oil 
inflows. One of the major initiatives in this regard that has received international 
attention is the establishment of  the Oil Fund in 1999 in anticipation of forthcoming 
oil revenues—with assets of $11.2 billion at end 2008. The Oil Fund has been 
spearheading Azerbaijan’s participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), in which the country is an international leader.   Alongside this, 
Azerbaijan has recently made progress in improving some business regulations, 
although they will take some time to pay off. 
                                                 
3 Aside from adjusting the minimum wage from 30 to 75 manats per month since 2004, the government has set up a 
modern targeted social assistance system, which is fully operational and in 2007 covered 20 percent of households. 
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6. The implementation of the government’s vision has generally been proceeding 
according to plan, although there are important economic signals and changes in 
circumstances that suggest adjustment is warranted if diversification and sustainability are 
to be achieved.  The government has been supporting its aforementioned achievements with a 
significant amount of oil revenues, which originated in 2003–06 from escalating oil prices, and 
thereafter from increases in oil production (and oil prices of course).  Between 2004 and 2008, 
government expenditure increased from 37 percent of non-oil GDP to a forecasted 83.8 percent 
(including the 2008 supplemental).4 Azerbaijan’s non-oil deficit is expected to reach 58 percent 
of non-oil GDP in 2008. As a result of previous policies and uncertain global environment,  the 
following challenges have emerged for policymakers: 
• Macroeconomic management has become more difficult. Over 2004–08, 
Azerbaijan’s non-oil GDP grew at an average annual rate of 12.6 percent, buoyed 
largely by the fiscal stimulus.  Its industrial, construction, and service sectors grew in 
double digits, while wages tripled in this period and productivity doubled, albeit from 
a very low level.  The rapid increase in absorption (consumption and investment) 
contributed to an average growth rate of 12.6 percent for non-tradables (here broadly 
defined as services) and 5.9 percent for non-oil tradables (here broadly defined as 
agriculture and industry, less construction and mining) 2004-08. At the same time, the 
economy started to overheat.  Inflation reached 19.7 percent by end-2007, and 
reached 15.8 at end 2008, due to large inflows of U.S. dollars that have supported the 
budget and the policy of managed exchange rate against the dollar; by end of 2008 
inflation had begun to subside as the crisis was intensifying. 
• Diversification is stalling. Azerbaijan’s non-oil exports relative to non-oil GDP 
increased by 5 percentage points of GDP from 2001 to reach about 10 percent in 
2005, but have declined thereafter reaching 8 percent in 2008.  The increase in the 
early part of the decade came primarily from exports of agriculture and food products 
to Russia and Turkey.  Azerbaijan’s REER for non-oil exports increased by 5 percent 
in 2006-07, whereas the REER for all trade increased by 11 percent  during the same 
period; for 2006-2008, the REER for all trade increased by 41 percent, owing in part 
to the devaluation polices of Azerbaijan’s trading partners which took place during 
the crisis. The country’s non-oil private investment and non-oil FDI peaked in 2005 
and reached half their 2005 rates (when compared to GDP) in 2008. These recent 
reversals in trends of important indicators, as well as the increase in the share of non-
tradables in non-oil GDP, suggest that Azerbaijan’s attempts to diversify are stalling.  
• Fiscal sustainability is at risk.  The broad community of economic analysts in 
Azerbaijan (NGOs, government analysts, the Bretton Woods institutions, other 
donors) has recognized that continued large increases in public expenditures (average 
annual increase of 64.6 percent in 2006–08) are neither sustainable nor desirable. 
                                                 
4 The analysis is presented in terms of non-oil GDP because Azerbaijan’s oil revenues are expected to be temporary 
(approximately a 20-year life span). In this scenario, measures of government spending and other relevant flows 
look exceptionally good during the early phase of the boom and deteriorate sharply in the latter half. Relative to 
GDP, Azerbaijan’s expenditures are expected to reach 31% in 2008, while its non-oil deficit is expected to reach 
20%. In 2008, Azerbaijan’s overall fiscal balance is expected to reach 24% of GDP and its external current account 
balance 36% of GDP. 
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Prudence argues that it be reduced. The finite nature of forecasted oil revenues for 
Azerbaijan on the one hand, and examples of entitlement-saddled OECD countries on 
the other argue for long-term government spending to be under 40 percent of GDP, 
akin to what Azerbaijan had before the oil boom.  
• Growth risks are looming, particularly given the global crisis. In the medium 
term, overall GDP growth will slow in 2011 and beyond, as oil production peaks at 
450 million barrels by 2010. Though oil revenue will remain substantial until 2020 
and thus government spending out of that revenue will continue to be a stimulus for 
the economy, especially for its construction and services sectors, much more of 
Azerbaijan’s future prosperity will have to come from growth of non-oil output and 
exports. The potential for such growth is high if appropriate changes in policies and 
institutions are implemented. But Azerbaijan needs to  remain alert to the possibility 
that the trough of the global crisis  could be prolonged (“U”-shaped instead of “V”-
shaped) and that oil prices could stay low or particularly volatile for 2009-10, while 
markets for Azerbaijan’s non-oil exports could stay suppressed.  
7. While the government had been willing to bear a short-term inflationary or 
competitiveness cost for the rapid infrastructure buildup, current outcomes suggest that 
delays in diversification are not simply a matter of time, but require acceleration of specific 
reforms that need to put diversification at center stage.   Azerbaijan’s government seized the 
day, when oil prices were high, to launch an admittedly ambitious program, anticipating that the 
medium-term productivity gains accruing from the public investments would outweigh the short-
term costs to the economy and the impact of real appreciation.  Over the longer term, the 
authorities hope that new relative prices, upgraded infrastructure, and structural reforms will 
generate new areas of economic activity in the traded and non-traded sectors, and will serve to 
diversify the economy and ensure its sustainability. The experience of the last two years has 
shown that, on the contrary, a pattern of public expenditure and economic expectations has been 
set in motion that cannot possibly be sustained and that the pace and focus of institutional 
reforms, especially as they refer to setting conditions for diversification, have been dimmed. 
Today, the government’s broad regulatory reform efforts   appear to be dispersed and open-
ended, therefore reducing their effectiveness. A greater sharpness of regulatory reform on 
diversification is much needed.  
8. Azerbaijan needs to be strategic in navigating a way out of the global crisis.  
Preparing the groundwork for attracting non-oil investment and expanding non-oil exports 
will be critical, particularly given the challenging global environment and the lag time 
needed to implement reforms. In the short term, the government will have to look for 
domestic sources of stimulating demand, both private investment and government 
spending (which should be put on a more sustainable path).  Today, as a result of the crisis, 
capital is less easily attracted by any country (investors the world over are weary and interest 
rates for developing countries have skyrocketed), demand for Azerbaijan’s non-oil exports may 
well be dampened in the short term as the growth prospects for Russia and Turkey –both 
important trading partners-- are significantly reduced from a year ago, and the world price of oil 
may remain low and volatile. During the crisis, Azerbaijan may wish to focus on sustaining 
domestic demand and making prudent plans for public spending based on lower oil prices in the 
medium term. At the same time, the crisis provides Azerbaijan with an opportunity to strengthen 
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the institutional environment pertaining to private sector development, and to diversification. 
When the world exits the economic crisis, the surviving enterprises (in Azerbaijan’s trading 
partner economies) are likely to be stronger and more competitive, both globally and regionally. 
These enterprises will pose fiercer competition to Azerbaijan.  As such, the crisis provides an 
opportunity for Azerbaijan to improve the operating environment for the private sector.   
9. This executive summary presents 16 recommendations aimed to assist the country 
address its diversification challenges.  The recommendations on macroeconomic management 
aim to assist the country toward maintaining macroeconomic stability and minimizing the effect 
of fluctuations in the real exchange rate. This would help create a more stable investment 
environment, while at the same bring the size of public spending down to more sustainable 
levels.  The section on utilities aims to help the government consolidate the gains made in 
current infrastructure projects, and to gradually make way for greater private sector involvement, 
which in turn, would improve efficiency and reduce the risks borne by the government.  The 
section on the business environment aims to help create more opportunities for non-oil 
investment and for diversification by improving the regulatory environment.  The section on the 
financial sector aims to support private sector activities by recommending greater access to credit 
on the basis of improvements in institutions that enhance credit access for micro, small and 
medium enterprises (MSMEs). In addition, it looks at the systemic risk of the financial sector, 
given the lessons of other resource-rich countries. Finally, the section on human capital 
recommends an education system that is more market-friendly, and a modernization of 
Azerbaijan’s public sector employment. 
 
I. Macroeconomic Stability and Governance of Public Finance 
10. Azerbaijan faces three macroeconomic management challenges. First, being a 
resource-rich country, it intends to share its natural resource revenue of nearly $200 billion with 
its future generations.5 Second, it has to manage the macroeconomic volatility created by highly 
unpredictable oil prices and by pro-cyclical government spending (spending more when oil 
prices are high).   During the period of rising oil prices, domestic inflation increased significantly 
(aided by high oil inflows and a stable exchange rate against the U.S. dollar). At the same time, 
the real exchange rate appreciated by more than 19.6 percent between early 2006 and July 2008– 
making it difficult to diversify the economy into agriculture and manufacturing activities, 
something that is critical for the country, given the temporary nature of the oil boom. During the 
global crisis, while the nominal exchange rate has remained approximately stable, the NEER and 
the REER appreciated further through end December 2008 as Azerbaijan’s trading partners were 
devaluing their currencies. Third, the precipitous global economic slowdown and the rapidly 
declining price of oil are likely to reduce foreign investment inflows, lower export demand over 
the next two years, and suppress fiscal revenues from oil for at least the medium term.  Like 
other countries facing the global crisis, Azerbaijan needs to improve access to finance for the 
private sector. While credit is most efficiently provided on market terms, the government works 
to facilitate the availability of some funds through budgetary sources or international borrowing 
                                                 
5 The estimate is in 2007 US$, based on an average nominal (real) oil price of $65 ($52) per barrel, in current 
(constant 2007) US$, for the 2010-30 period, and a nominal discount rate of 8.5 percent; proven oil reserves were 
estimated at 9 billion barrels in July 2008, while the proven reserves of gas are 1.34 trillion cubic meters; these 
figures have been confirmed by the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan. 
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(mostly from development partners). Measures already taken by the National Bank to increase 
liquidity are also useful. 
11. The aforementioned challenges require a sustainable and predictable path to oil 
revenue spending.  In preparation for the oil boom, the government established the Oil 
Fund as a key pillar of its sustainability policy. The government also laid the foundation for 
a modern budgetary framework.  The leaders of Azerbaijan had the foresight to set up an Oil 
Fund to safeguard a part of their oil revenues for future generations, as well as to approve a 
Budget Systems Law (BSL) that lays out the processes by which fiscal revenue from oil and gas 
are channeled to the consolidated budget. However, to be most effective, these instruments 
require that policy decisions on the level of public spending are based on the broad consensus, so 
they withstand the considerable pressures the government faces to spend more.   
12.  In preparation for the oil boom, the government also adopted the principle of 
“constant real spending” out of oil revenues in its Long-term Oil Revenue Management 
Strategy (LTORMS) but this is yet to be operationalized and implemented. This report 
proposes that the above principle be put into practice by using the permanent income (PI) 
approach to estimate the appropriate level of constant real spending. This would involve taking 
the present value of projected fiscal revenues from oil and, effectively, spending annually only 
the real interest earned on it. Based on the production profile as of June 2008, and the 2008 
budget estimates, Azerbaijan can count on an estimated $5.9 billion per year (at 2007 prices) of 
fiscal revenues from oil (including oil companies’ tax payments) in perpetuity; on this basis, the 
Oil Fund would accumulate about $78 billion by 2030. This figure, and the methodology behind 
the PI estimation, is considered quite robust for two reasons. First, it is robust to volatile short-
term oil prices: oil prices are highly unpredictable in the short run, so it is difficult to match 
annual spending plans (be they pro cyclical or counter cyclical) with annual oil price forecasts, 
especially for the next two years. The best policy is to have a long-term perspective that 
smoothes out short-term fluctuations.  Secondly, it smoothens long-term fluctuations in prices or 
supply: should there be changes in oil prices or production in the outer years, they would not 
translate into significantly higher recommended spending levels today. A simulation exercise on 
the permanent income for Azerbaijan demonstrated that for a specific shock to oil prices or 
production, Azerbaijan’s public expenditure does not have to respond by a 100 percent 
adjustment (reduction) in spending in order to maintain fiscal sustainability, but government can 
respond with a smaller adjustment in spending, if that occurs consistently over a given time 
period after the actual shock occurs. That is, the permanent income approach also provides for 
stability in spending in the presence of a crisis. This report recommends that the permanent 
income equivalent be recalculated routinely by government, though medium-term spending plans 
are only adjusted over longer intervals, such as every three years. 
13.  The LTORMS can also be an anchor for gradually reducing Azerbaijan’s total 
public spending to ensure macroeconomic stability and sustainability. In the long term, 
public spending will need to be consistent with the country’s long-term revenues, which will 
increasingly come from the non-oil tax base.  While Azerbaijan’s non-oil tax base can be 
expected to stay at about 32 percent of GDP, the importance of $5.9 billion a year (in 2007 US$) 
from oil revenues will diminish as non-oil GDP grows over time, as shown in Figure 1 (Oil 
Revenue: Recommended Expenditure Rate and Financing Sources). This scenario is largely 
consistent with a real freeze in spending through 2017, and with moderate increases in real 
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spending thereafter.6  It results in a gradual reduction of government spending to about 37 
percent of non-oil GDP in 2024.  If the country tries to spend significantly more than shown in 
Figure 1 (e.g., keep its public spending growth in line with nominal non-oil GDP), the report’s 
projections suggest that it will use up its Oil Fund assets in the next 15 years and will not be able 
to accumulate the desired savings for future generations.7 
14. Implementation of a stable path for 
public spending would meet several of the 
government’s objectives. First, there will be 
savings out of current and future oil revenues 
for future generations as the LTORMS 
envisages. Second, it will help open up space 
for private economic activity (by reducing 
pressure on the economy’s absorptive capacity). 
Third, it would reduce inflationary pressures, 
especially under the de facto fixed exchange 
rate regime which the government seems to be 
following. Fourth, it would not only make 
public spending more predictable but also limit 
expectations about future public spending 
increases, making it more necessary for agencies to pursue efficiency gains.  
15. The LTORMS allows for a gradual reduction in the tax burden of the non-oil sector.  
The report estimates that a PI of about $5.9 billion in 2007 prices on an annual basis allows 
government spending to gradually drop to about 37 percent by 2024, while also allowing for a 4 
percent reduction in the non-oil revenue base.  As such, Azerbaijan has an excellent opportunity 
to reduce statutory tax rates on the non-oil economy. Such a reduction could contribute to 
encouraging private entrepreneurs to move into more formal operation of their businesses, and 
thereby minimize the role of informality and corruption in the economy.  (Later discussion in 
section 3 argues that this opportunity should fully be taken advantage of.) 
16. The LTORMS lays the basis for a more stable macroeconomic policy and reduces 
the pressure on the exchange rate to appreciate, thus reducing one of the major roadblocks 
to the diversification of the economy.  The real currency appreciation has been significant since 
2004—42 percent up to 2008—and has resulted from the tremendous pressure aggregate demand  
put on the domestic supply and the policy of the government to peg the manat to the dollar. The 
LTORMS would reduce that demand pressure and facilitate the transition from a monetary 
policy focused on exchange rate stabilization to one focused on inflation control. In addition, 
lowering the pressure on the exchange rate significantly improves the opportunities to compete 
abroad and makes it easier for the economy to diversify.  
17. Public spending will need to be embedded in a comprehensive MTEF, which pools 
all oil revenues and recognizes all fiscal risks.  The permanent income approach to spending is 
                                                 
6 The scenario shown is consistent with, in real terms, a freeze in recurrent spending and a moderate reduction in 
capital spending through 2017. 
7 While efforts are being made by the government to increase non-oil revenues to enhance the sustainability of the 
budget, this report is arguing that the bulk of the adjustment should come from expenditure reduction. 
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sensible only if all oil-related revenues are incorporated into the net present value estimation and 
if all likely expenditures are included in the expenditure envelope.  For instance, on the revenue 
side, Oil Fund revenues and taxes on AIOC and SOCAR should be included in the NPV 
calculation as those revenues are cyclical to the oil boom (to production levels and to price 
fluctuations) and need to be smoothed out.  Similarly, on the expenditure side, the PI approach to 
spending makes little sense if looming pension liabilities or unfunded liabilities of state-owned 
enterprises are excluded from expenditure forecasts. As the government contemplates its 
response to the impact of the global crisis,  any explicit or implicit commitments on Oil Fund 
assets need to be taken into account (and deducted from the NPV calculation) before the 
permanent income is estimated. 
18. In view of the above, the report recommends: 
Recommendation 1: Translate the government’s LTORMS principle of 
“constant real spending” into an actionable decree and then implement it; 
present estimates of the “constant real spending” level to the Parliament as part 
of the presentation of the budget and discuss how the amount of oil revenues 
used in the proposed budget conforms to or diverges from that estimate. 
19. Creation of an Economic Council to the President to strengthen implementation of 
the above principle would formalize the current processes for high-level coordination of 
policies and strategies. The government can draw on the members of the existing economic 
team from the Cabinet of Ministers—including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of Economic Development, the Chairman of the National Bank of Azerbaijan, the 
Executive Director of the Oil Fund, as well as the Economic Adviser to the President—to ensure 
that the Council can operate at both the Presidential and Cabinet levels. The Council would 
advise the President on strategic, budgetary, and implementation issues, including 
implementation of the LTORMS, and also track the results of the government’s development 
strategy. While high-level consultations already exist among policy makers, the benefit of 
formalizing the current process of high-level coordination into the proposed Council is that it 
would have specific terms of reference, which could help it ensure greater consistency: (i) 
between the government’s budget and the LTORMS principle; (ii) between policy priorities and 
budgetary priorities; (iii) between budgetary priorities and institutional reforms; and (iv) in the 
monitoring of development outcomes. The Council, as part of the terms of reference, could meet 
on a regular basis during the year, with some of its sessions devoted exclusively to giving 
strategic guidance to the implementation of the budget.   
20. A critical function of the proposed Council would be to ensure the buy-in of the 
macroeconomic framework and the expenditure priorities by all stakeholders, especially 
the line ministers early in the budget cycle. In doing so, it could also monitor the 
developmental impact of public spending. While Azerbaijan has set up an expenditure 
management framework according to international standards (with an MTEF effectively 
embedded in the Budget Systems Law, maintains three inter-ministerial Commissions, on 
Macroeconomic Policy, one on Revenues, and one on Expenditures), the President’s role as a 
consensus builder in the early phase of the budget process can be strengthened; the budget is the 
country’s foremost policy instrument. In the past few years, final decisions on the consolidated 
budget envelope (the level of spending) have come late in the budget cycle (after September) and 
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through very significant mid-year revisions. Public expenditure management would be 
strengthened if strategic priorities that are given early in the budget cycle by the senior political 
leadership (a) formed part of a short strategic document that included a medium term budgetary 
framework, and (b) were reflected in spending ceilings for budgetary priorities. Such an 
approach would make the work of prioritizing and of reviewing projects and analyzing the 
impact of decisions more meaningful if the budget ceiling was not subject to re-negotiation. As 
such, greater participation of the Presidency, beyond the medium-term strategic role, is required 
early in the budget cycle to: (a) endorse the medium-term macro framework; (b) set annual 
developmental priorities as part of the medium-term budget framework; and (c) monitor the 
impact of spending. 
21. Apart from shouldering responsibility on budget preparation, the proposed Council 
could also play an advisory role to the Presidency on high-level strategic and coordination 
issues; its work would be aided by a five-year or ten-year strategic document. The Council 
can play a leading role in ensuring that strategic objectives are prioritized, coordination 
bottlenecks are resolved, and institutional reform priorities are set. This applies to several 
settings.  First, on the macro policy level, as indicated, the benefits of an accelerated pace of 
public sector infrastructure improvements need to be juxtaposed with the costs of a contracting 
non-oil private sector (when non-oil investment, or non-oil exports or non-oil FDI decline, 
relative to non-oil GDP). The government needs to decide when public spending is crowding out 
too much of the private sector.  Second, regarding infrastructure investments, studies have 
documented that investments, especially in roads, require institutional reforms to pay off.  The 
studies suggest that border crossings (and customs clearances) need to be made more efficient 
and that cargo needs to be treated equitably and with low transactions costs (few delays, no 
extra-legal payments) if exports are to grow. Third, on the agricultural front, while the 
government recognizes that the sector can be a significant source of employment and exports, the 
recently formulated sector strategy proposes significant incentives for Azeri self-sufficiency in 
several crops; the dual objectives of self-sufficiency and export-oriented agricultural production 
need to be reconciled, especially as incentives for self-sufficiency can lead to displacing 
exportable crops. Fourth, on the fiscal front, high-level leadership is needed to strengthen public 
sector efficiency, both on the recurrent side (hiring policies of the public sector) and on the 
capital side (procurement, modern appraisal standards), in a way that contributes to the 
diversification of the economy (creating private sector jobs and opportunities for private 
investment).  Strengthened coordination would be especially valuable during the time of the 
global crisis, should prioritization of expenditures be required. The aforementioned examples 
suggest that high-level coordination is needed to resolve institutional bottlenecks that prevent the 
desired development outcomes from materializing, despite the already significant government 
efforts. Many European, Asian and Latin America countries have found it useful to a single issue 
strategic framework document that sets the medium term priorities and key polices (and 
sometimes financing) for the entire government.  Within such a framework document, sector 
strategic plans (or State Programs) are developed and prioritized.    
22. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 2: Formalize and strengthen current high-level policy and 
expenditure coordination by creating an advisory body under the President 
 xvii 
 
(e.g., Economic Council). Make decisions based on a post crisis strategic 
framework document (five-year or ten-year) and the MTEF. 
23. After important efforts in 2002-03, expenditure management reforms to increase the 
efficiency of spending have made limited progress. While Azerbaijan has increased its public 
spending by four and a half times between 2005 and 2008, important components of an efficient 
expenditure management system have not been established. The importance of such systems will 
be much higher as rapid increases in total public spending levels become less feasible. 
Azerbaijan’s Treasury Information Management System (TIMS) is in its sixth year of 
preparation, while its investment appraisal system is still under design.  The 2008 PEFA rated 
Azerbaijan’s system quite high in the implementation of budgetary expenditures, but found it 
wanting in the practices surrounding prioritization and medium-term investment budgeting.  The 
2008 CPAR found the public procurement system leaving too much room for discretion 
regarding the use of restrictive procurement practices, limitation of bidders, and inefficient 
centralized decision-making.   
24. There is an increasing urgency to expedite the implementation of reforms of its 
expenditure management systems, including TIMS, project appraisal, budgeting, and 
internal and external control. In addition to completing the TIMS and the investment project 
appraisal system, Azerbaijan would also benefit from accelerated reforms to improve the 
budgetary planning process with a budgeting framework that sets the medium-term resources 
envelopes (ceilings) at the sectoral and agency levels (as documented in the 2008 PEFA 
exercise). Azerbaijan already has an advantage over some countries as it maintains functional, 
organizational, and economic classifications of the budget. Internal financial control and audit 
systems throughout the government will need to be developed to give greater assurance of 
efficiency and legality. There will need to be greater transparency of the Parliament’s role in the 
budgetary process and the work of the Chamber of Accounts. An integral part of efficient public 
spending is adherence to modern, fair, and transparent procurement regulations, starting from the 
regulatory framework to implementation.   
25. Azerbaijan needs to devote special attention to strengthening procurement.  The 
2008 Country Procurement Appraisal Report (CPAR) pointed  out several areas in procurement 
that need to be strengthened;  most important are the overhaul of the legal framework for public 
procurement, including regulations, to eliminate gaps in coverage and implementation; introduce 
safeguards to limit administrative discretion, and to develop standard documents.  Azerbaijan can 
also improve the institutional management and capacity of its legal entities, including clarifying 
the role of the State Procurement Agency (SPA) and, at a minimum, by making it consistent with 
the existing legislation, building capacity, and integrating public procurement into the country’s 
public sector governance system. The CPAR also recommended significant improvements in 
market practices and oversight. 
26.  To further strengthen governance, there is a need for more information about the 
economy to be made available to policymakers and the general public. The country provides 
a lot of information to the public at large about the course of the economy and the 
implementation of fiscal expenditures. Nonetheless, more needs to be done. For instance, the 
government’s information strategy could be further strengthened by ensuring that certain 
important information is made available on a timely basis to policymakers, external analysts, and 
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the general public. This information should comprise detailed data on the consolidated budget 
(quarterly, in GFS format, and under organizational and functional breakdowns), real wages 
(monthly, at the sectoral level), real imports and exports (disaggregated, monthly), and non-oil 
private investment (disaggregated, quarterly). Making available detailed high frequency data 
would further strengthen the government’s and the private sector’s ability to monitor the 
economy. 
27. In order to strengthen implementation of the government’s investment projects, it 
can issue an “Annual Report Card” on the quality of the country’s infrastructure.  The 
government is investing substantially to improve the country’s infrastructure.  While the ongoing 
projects are a response to tangible investment needs, the government can capitalize on the 
improvements in the country’s infrastructure by effectively advertising its completed projects.  
The government can issue an annual “report card” on the quality of its infrastructure. The report 
card can take into consideration not only outputs of investments (such as miles of highway 
repaved) but concrete outcomes (such as average transit times from the Iranian to the Georgian 
or the Russian border).  The report card can track improvements in infrastructure, and progress 
can be highlighted to attract foreign investment. 
28. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 3: Establish/strengthen critical expenditure management 
institutions (treasury management, budgeting, investment appraisal, 
procurement, and internal and external control) and make them functional; 
issue an Annual Report Card on to advertise the improved infrastructure.   
II. Public Infrastructure and Network Utilities 
29. Azerbaijan’s poor quality of public infrastructure has been one of the factors 
impeding development since the mid-1990s, and is behind the government’s push to 
prioritize these investments as its oil boom materialized.  The country’s infrastructure 
capacities have been exploited beyond their useful life of 25-30 years due to a lack of financial 
viability (Azerbaijan’s new oil resources only came on line in late 2006), and obsolete 
management practices. About 56 percent of the main roads remain in poor condition, and 30 
percent need to be repaired immediately. Life of up to 45 percent of regional and local roads has 
expired, which hamper all-year links between territorial units in a number of regions. Similar 
problems plague the rail sector. Due to   deteriorating infrastructure, Azerbaijan Railway (an 
important export route for oil) is unable to operate at full capacity.  The reliability of public 
water supply, al- though has improved in recent years, especially in the capital area, remains low 
at 13 hours per day on average. In many parts of the country outside Baku, people receive as 
little as three hours of water supply. 
30. The government has taken a “short but sure” route to improving network utilities: 
public funding and public management. To expedite improvements in network utilities 
(power, gas, water, fixed-line telecoms), Azerbaijan has  sought to fund critical investments from 
the consolidated budget while simultaneously pursuing financial viability—through significant 
increases in tariffs (through the Tariff Council), and the introduction of metering and billing 
systems. At the same time, the government is pursuing structural reforms in all utilities—
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although this report takes issue with some of the reform priorities, as discussed below. The 
government also is gradually moving, in some cases, to corporatization.  Azerbaijan has a 
medium-term tariff policy, which seeks to attain financial viability of utilities by 2010; through 
2008 it has been largely on track to doing so.8  
31. The most visible improvements thus far have occurred in electricity supply and 
highways—both are strategic sectors.  Electricity supply has improved along the entire grid, 
supporting economic activity in the process. This is especially important for Azerbaijan’s 
burgeoning agro-processing industry, which has significant export potential. Another strategic 
area with visible improvements is in some of the highway portions on the North-South and East-
Northwest corridor.  Both corridors are important for importing products from Iran and Georgia, 
and exporting non-oil products, primarily to Russia and Georgia (as a transit and final 
destination). To continue improving and meeting the growing demand for services, the country 
needs to face up to several challenges. 
32. The first challenge is to strengthen the financial viability of utilities by adopting a 
clear pricing policy that capitalizes on the 2007 tariff adjustments. In preceding years, 
utilities were subject to significant indirect subsidies. During 2006 and 2007, the implicit 
subsidies on utilities were estimated at 4.7 percent and 3 percent of non-oil GDP respectively. In 
principle, these subsidies were eliminated in 2007 with the very significant adjustment in tariffs.   
On the other hand, as growth statistics confirm, Azerbaijan’s petrochemical sector could not 
manage the January 2007 tariff adjustment and had to shut down for a short while.  Going 
forward, the Tariff Council needs to render future tariffs in a more predictable way by specifying 
a tariff policy that domestic and foreign investors can assess in advance. Similarly, the State 
Committee for the Management of State Property (SCMSP) needs to strengthen its management 
capacity. The SCMSP, the MOF, and the TC need to work together to ensure that the progress 
made in financial viability in 2007 will remain. At present, the price-setting process is 
unpredictable to investors, and encourages utilities to stay in the public sector. . 
33. While pricing should reflect financial viability, it should include reasonable 
operating costs and part of the investment (as appropriate in each sector). Lack of sound 
information about the cost structure of service delivery can make it difficult to set a credible path 
for tariff adjustments. Recent reforms have allowed the MOF to usually access key SOE 
information as part of the budget process on a timely basis. Strengthening that initiative, together 
with the application of International Financing Reporting Standards (IFRS) to the country’s large 
SOEs (the cutoff date was January 1, 2008, but has been postponed), should help improve the 
evolving understanding of the cost structures of SOEs, which are the basis of credible planning, 
                                                 
8 The amount of public resources devoted to public investment in recent years has been substantial. Capital 
expenditures have increased by more than 14 times in nominal terms since 2004, reaching 25.7 percent of non-oil 
GDP in 2007. They are estimated to have reached 37.2 percent of non-oil GDP in 2008. Over 2005–07, the 
government has invested significantly in administration, social services, energy, transport, and communication. As 
part of these investments, the government has invested AZN 420 million in Azerenerji (the electricity utility), AZN 
64 million in Azeriqaz (the gas utility), AZN 125 million in Azersu (the water utility), AZN 117 billion in the State 
Agency for Irrigation, AZN 82 million in the Baku Metro, AZN 63 million in AZAL (the Azeri airline), and AZN 
419 million in road construction through the Ministry of Transport (MoT). Spending on network utilities comprised 
approximately 50 percent of total capital expenditures for 2004–07. 
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including investment and tariff determination. In addition, the capacity of medium-term 
maintenance planning and budgeting of utilities needs strengthening, primarily in the road sector.  
34. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 4: Complete pricing policies and complete institutional 
strengthening related to financial management and to improving maintenance; 
this will secure viability of investments and financial viability of state owned 
enterprises. 
35.  The second challenge is to improve the efficiency of the utilities and make sure that 
the “short but sure” route will not become financially burdensome for the state in the 
medium term.  An increase in SOE efficiency is needed not only to provide affordable services, 
but also to reduce the financing needs for new investments and the pressure on the budget. The 
urgency perceived by the government to address large-scale investment needs may have left little 
time to focus on creating incentives for improving efficiency. Nevertheless, progress has been 
made toward the corporatization of enterprises, in improving the billing and collections capacity 
of the gas and electricity utilities, in significantly adjusting tariffs in 2007, and in strengthening 
the exchange of information between the MOF and the utilities. In the future, tariff paths can be 
selected to create incentives to improve efficiency, as has been shown to be good practice in 
other countries. Further progress can be made by involving the private sector both in investment 
and management, as other countries have done with success. A first step could be selling 
Aztelecomm (fixed-line operator) to a reputable international investor when the global crisis 
dissipates, advancing the introduction of IPPs to Azerbaijan. Likewise, management contracts for 
water should be considered. However, a more forceful engagement requires introducing greater 
precision in the institutional arrangements and structural incentives in each sector. 
36. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 5: Consider using the medium-term tariff policy to increase 
SOE efficiency during the global crisis, and as the crisis eases,  pursue greater 
private sector participation to improve efficiency, lessen operational risks and 
create fiscal space (in particular, privatize Aztelecomm, proceed with one IPP, 
and consider private sector maintenance for roads).  
37. The third challenge is to create the conditions for assuring financial sustainability, 
efficiency, and private sector participation through the buildup of appropriate institutions.   
To begin with, the Tariff Council needs to be fully independent.  However, a proper regulatory 
agency requires the government to have taken decisions regarding market structure and the role 
of the private sector.  A good example of the link between market structure and regulation is 
provided by various strategic options facing Azerbaijan’s power sector. First, it could seek to 
develop into a company that services the domestic economy, and, in this case, choose from a 
menu of sector ownership and management models, which would spell out the role of Azerenerji, 
and the potential role of independent power producers (IPPs), as well as the ownership and 
management of the distribution network.  The regulator would then need to be organized around 
that model.  Alternatively, the country could take advantage of the regional opportunities 
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available in the power sector. But this would imply that Azerenerji would become more of a 
purchasing company, and it would be more efficient if it could give up managing a distribution 
network.  In each case, the exact role of the government is different, as are the roles of the 
private sector and of the regulator. But without a concrete decision on the structure of the market, 
the government is keeping investors at bay and delaying the development of the regulatory 
authority.  While Azerbaijan’s other utilities sectors (i.e. telecommunications, gas, and to some 
degree water and irrigation) appear to be more straightforward, decisions on strategic direction 
and market structure are likewise wanting. On the railways, the government is intending to 
continue further restructuring and to turn it into a commercial entity and plans to create 
subsidiary entities under separate lines of business (infrastructure, freight, passenger, and non-
core activities). 
38. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 6: Complete strategic decisions on market structure of 
utilities sectors (particularly regarding the power and water), to begin fine-
tuning regulatory arrangements and invite private sector involvement.  
 
III.  Private Sector Environment 
39. Private investment depends not only on infrastructure services and inter-temporally 
consistent macroeconomic policies but also on a climate for private sector that is very open 
and competitive. Azerbaijan has been quite successful in attracting large investments into oil- 
and gas-related sectors, but much less so in other areas. Total private investment has averaged 
more than 50 percent of GDP in recent years, although private investment in the non-oil sector 
remains very low (it has rarely exceeded 10 percent of non-oil GDP and 5 percent of total GDP). 
This low share suggests that there is considerable potential for the private sector to grow and 
contribute to diversification.  
39. Transition countries have used competition created by new investment (including 
from SMEs) to improve productivity across all their enterprises, including the productivity 
of SOEs. Successful economies have demonstrated the benefits of opening up, and establishing 
internationally competitive industries, whose exports are the cornerstone of external 
sustainability. Recent research by the World Bank on growth and productivity in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia showed that productivity growth has been an important determinant of growth 
and that such increases in productivity have been possible in countries that have stepped up both 
domestic and external competition. Some resource-rich countries (i.e. Nigeria, Venezuela) have 
been less successful in increasing their productivity because they have not opened up trade and 
private investment in the non-oil sector sufficiently to allow such competition.  
40. The government recently stepped up its efforts to improve the regulatory 
environment for business. Recent steps to relax the rules for starting small and medium 
businesses, including the creation of a “one-stop window” for registrations, have contributed to 
further “leveling of the playing field” for all sizes of businesses, including SOEs. As a result, 
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Azerbaijan’s ranking improved from 97th to 33rd among 158 countries, between the Doing 
Business 2009 and Doing Business 2008 surveys.9   
41. Azerbaijan, however, has delayed accession to the WTO.  Accession could help the 
government to resist protectionist pressures, including pressures for sector-specific supports and 
tax exemptions; accelerating accession would also convey a positive signal to both domestic and 
external investors, as well as lock-in a stable, transparent and simplified tariff structure, 
modernize the legal/institutional framework for standards, and introduce important sectoral 
reforms in key services sectors. Azerbaijan needs to juggle the terms of accession to WTO in 
order to signal its desire to broaden and deepen its trade in non-oil goods and services.  At the 
same time, this will create a conducive environment for building competitive and sustainable 
non-oil sectors that can spur growth and employment in the medium and long term. 
42. In addition, Azerbaijan’s progress in three areas—approval of licenses, trading 
across borders and, to a lesser degree, payment of taxes—lags other countries. This finding 
of the Doing Business 2009 report confirms the complaints from firms about high transaction  
costs resulting from informal barriers to business operations in respect of licenses, customs 
clearances and tax inspections. The high transaction costs can serve to limit the entry of new 
firms and can thus limit competition from both domestic and external sources; this can result in 
higher market concentration in various sub-sectors of the economy.  There is evidence to show 
that price transmission processes are weak in the agricultural sector, in part due to market 
concentration, and that the number of small and medium enterprises per capita is significantly 
lower than in comparable countries. Limited competition keeps production costs higher and 
productivity, making the country less competitive. 
43. The regulatory system has been biased against entry and expansion: while business 
registration will likely improve due to recent reforms, the lagging licensing and permit 
issuance regime continues burden private sector operators and impede new investment. In 
the last two years, Azerbaijan brought down the number of days it takes to register a company 
from 115 to 16; early results from 2008 are promising and show that these reforms are having an 
impact, although going forward careful monitoring is advisable. On the other hand, Azerbaijan’s 
licensing and permit regulations remain roughly unchanged. There is neither a clear definition of 
what constitutes a license, a permit, an authorization, or a certification, nor a review mechanism 
to assess the legal basis, regulatory purpose or potential impact and effectiveness of these 
numerous requirements. There is a need to draw on international experience to examine what 
may be the most effective way to regulate vulnerable sub-sectors and to move to a less 
interventionist approach with regard to issuance of licenses and permits. A major examination of 
what sectors and sub-sectors of the economy needs to be regulated  should be undertaken, 
including what would be the goal of such regulation and how it  can be done quickly and 
efficiently.  The government indicated to will seek to streamline the construction permit 
requirements as its next priority;   the present system is needlessly time-consuming, and lends 
itself easily to corruption in a sub-sector where efficient operation is key to keeping construction 
costs down. 
                                                 
9 In the Doing Business 2010 (which ranks countries’ business environments for 2009 and re-ranks the 2008 results) 
Azerbaijan ranks 38th globally for 2009 and 2008. 
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44. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 7: Reduce coverage of licenses and permits, and rationalize 
the process and speed of issuing licenses and permits.  
45. If Azerbaijan is to be a transit hub, its trade and custom facilitation processes have 
to be competitive with the best. Currently, it ranks 174th in trading across borders in the Doing 
Business 2009 report. The weaknesses are many. There is differential treatment of enterprises in 
customs processing of imports and exports in terms of speed in clearance as well as in formal 
and informal charges. The scope for collusion between importers and customs officials is 
considerable. This is evident from the fact that similar import consignments obtain different duty 
rates and different regulatory treatment, which distort competition in domestic markets for the 
same imports. Also, the processes for clearing consignments are out-dated. There is also very 
little mechanization or computerization of the customs system, and, partially as a consequence, 
no use of more modern risk-based inspections, where only a share of consignments would be 
inspected depending upon their risk profile; currently all imports are inspected.   
46. In October 2008, the government adopted a State Program for Reform of the 
Customs that addresses three important issues. The program has already established an 
integrated set-up at the border crossings under the overall control of the Customs Agency, in 
contrast to the current situation where crossings are staffed with representatives of various 
agencies (like highway safety, phyto-sanitary control, customs, etc.). However, customs 
clearance itself remains a distinct activity, which occurs in government-run warehouses in four 
locations inside the country. The number of trained customs brokers and specialists is very 
limited. Under the program, Azerbaijan plans to introduce a modern, harmonized system of 
tariffs. It also expects to move to risk-based inspections.  Finally, Azerbaijan seeks to develop 
outcome indicators to monitor progress and the impact of changes being undertaken. There is 
likely to be a need for support and technical assistance to the government’s ongoing reforms.  
47. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 8: Expedite ongoing reform process in customs and trade 
facilitation in both land-border and sea ports crossings, and move to more open, 
modern, computerized and risk-based, clearing processes, which lead to lower 
inspections. 
48. The government should use the fiscal space foreseen by the oil fiscal framework 
(LTORMS) to undertake a gradual but credible and systemic reduction in tax rates as part 
of a package to support private investment and government savings. Azerbaijan has 
developed a reasonable tax system since independence, and its performance has improved 
considerably in recent years. The buoyancy of the economy and reforms in tax and customs 
administration have contributed to a major increase in tax revenues  from the non-oil sector—the 
ratio of non-oil tax revenues to non-oil GDP has  risen from 19.7 percent of non-oil GDP in 2003 
to about 32 percent in both 2007 and 2008.  Tax rates in Azerbaijan remain relatively high vis a 
vis comparators. With higher oil revenues, the government has the possibility to reduce its tax 
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rates; collectively, the tax rates (especially Personal Income Tax and Social Security 
Contributions) tend to penalize formality and discourage new private investment. 10  
49. The current tax system (both statutory rates and administration), encourages firms 
to remain very small and to keep a significant part of their activities outside the formal 
economy. In addition to high tax rates, tax administration practices (filing requirements, auditing 
practices, inspections, etc.) are too cumbersome for enterprises, which compels them either not 
to register, to remain within the Simplified Tax Regime, or to under-report their earnings.11,12 
The consequence is that the firms lose access to finance and technical services, and they are not 
encouraged either to adopt modern management and accounting practices. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that Azerbaijan has one of the lowest numbers of formal MSMEs per capita in the 
region.13   
50. The government has made progress on lowering tax rates and on improving 
administration.  Since 2003, the most important changes have been the reduction of the 
corporate tax rate in 2005 (from 24 percent to 22 percent) and in 2009 (from 22 to 20 percent), 
and the reduction of the social security contribution (from 28 to 25 percent) in 2004, reduction in 
the VAT (from 20 percent to 18 percent in 2005), and regular increases in excise taxes. In terms 
of tax administration, in the last two years, several improvements appreciably reduced the 
compliance burden as well as the taxpayer-tax official contact. Most notably, Azerbaijan has: (i) 
introduced electronic filing  (96 percent of VAT payers and 35 percent of all taxpaying 
businesses took advantage of it in 2007); (ii) established nationwide call centers;  (iii) enabled 
taxpayer account information on the Internet; (iv) reduced the number of forms approximately 
from 90 to 15, over the last several years, improving efficiency and reducing the close contact 
between taxpayers and tax officials; and (v) linked the tax database to those  of other agencies, 
namely, Treasury, Customs, commercial banks, and the Ministry of Interior. Consequently, most 
tax functions, including desk audits, have been automated.   Any mismatches in tax returns are 
generated without human intervention and sent to taxpayers within five days. Although initially 
controversial, the special deposit account for VAT seems to have been well received by the large 
taxpayers that form the backbone of the tax system. 
51. Nevertheless tax rates remain high and the administration burdensome; critical 
reforms are needed with a view to getting incentives right for enterprises to operate 
formally and to keep all their activities formal. Specifically, it is important to ensure that the 
                                                 
10 On May 2009 the Government decreased the maximum tax rate for corporations to 20 percent (from 22 percent) 
and for individuals to 30 percent (from 35 percent), making progress towards the recommendations made in this 
report. 
11 Currently, Azerbaijan maintains a Simplified Tax Regime (STR) of 4 percent for enterprises with turnover below 
either AZN 22,500 per quarter (98 percent of these enterprises are in Baku), or AZN 90,000 per year; participating 
enterprises pay no property tax, no VAT (18 percent), make no social security contributions (23 percent), and 
individuals engaged in entrepreneurial activities pay no income tax. 
12 The simplified tax regime (STR) was created to support micro and small enterprises throughout Azerbaijan; this 
report argues that while the enterprises do enter the simplified regime, the incentives for exiting that regime (on the 
side of tax rates and administration need to be strengthened substantially.  
13 It is important to note that while a number of factors, such as culture, size of markets, absence of financing or 
unethical behavior, may affect an entrepreneurs decision to operate informally, this report asserts that the high 
transactions costs imposed by the tax system (as laid out in this document) are very significant contributors to that 
decision. 
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“flow-through” of enterprises from informal entrepreneurial activity to the STR, and graduation 
out of the STR into the regular tax regime, is managed by the right incentives.  It is also 
important that the burden of tax administration on enterprises be reduced. While lower tax rates 
serve to reduce incentives to stay within the STR, and to conceal earnings, improvements in tax 
and customs administrations also provide strong incentives for entrepreneurs to operate formally.  
On the tax administration side, Azerbaijan should strengthen its current efforts to minimize 
contact between tax agents and entrepreneurs.  
52. The government should not keep high tax rates with the purpose of extracting 
resources from the SOEs, but instead collect dividends on equity of SOEs and interest on 
loans extended to them. Reportedly, the government is reluctant to lower tax rates across the 
board out of fear of losing significant revenues it receives from SOEs. The consequence has been 
to maintain high rates for private firms and agents in the non-oil economy, thus castigating entry. 
This report recommends that when reducing the tax rates, the government maintain the same tax 
burden on SOEs, but extract those revenues through regulation, or through dividends.  
53. The government could use the opportunity of the global crisis to adjust spending to 
a more sustainable level –but still capitalize on the relative high importance of oil revenues 
early in the oil boom to lower the tax burden on the private sector. Figure 1 depicts oil 
revenues, relative to non-oil GDP under the current oil price scenario. A more conservative price 
scenario would mean a lower permanent income from oil, which necessitates a faster adjustment 
to the proposed government spending level of under 40 percent of non-oil GDP.  Thus, oil 
revenues could also be used to provide a break to the private sector early in the oil boom, even 
under a low oil price scenario. 
54. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 9: Reduce the tax rates, especially in direct taxation and in 
social contributions (once timely actuarial and strategic analysis of all pensions 
is completed and competitive and sustainable pension packages for contributors 
and non-contributors are determined), which burden the private sector and 
often lead to shadow employment, and continue making improvements in tax 
administration (particularly minimizing the contact between inspectors and 
enterprises). 
55. The large size of Azerbaijan’s government creates multiple additional opportunities 
for state actions to impinge on the private economic activity. The government needs to 
reverse that role and to become a problem solver for the private sector and for non-oil 
export development. As noted in 2008, public spending is expected to rise to 83 percent of non-
oil GDP and the government will manage around 80 percent of overall investment. The poor 
ratings in international surveys on corruption and transparency-- confirmed by the scores on 
EBRD transition indicators for second-generation reforms (intended to make markets work more 
efficiently)-- are reasons for serious concern when the government is so large. They call for 
greater transparency in public actions (awarding of licenses and permits, procurement, etc.) and 
an open dialogue with the private sector to better respond to the constraints that limit economic 
activity. Recent reforms throughout the world (e.g., Ireland, Malaysia) have shown that results-
oriented partnerships with the private sector (for domestic investment, FDI, and export 
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development) have enabled the government to respond in a more focused manner to the needs of 
the private sector. While the exchanges could take place on either a regional or sectoral basis, 
and could include labor unions and NGOs, it is important for the government to establish its own 
functioning feedback loop with SMEs and large entrepreneurs. 
56. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 10:  Create the conditions for a transparent dialogue with the 
private sector, focusing on industries with non-oil export potential and on FDI 
attraction; use government facilitation to investigate actively and resolve 
financing, quality, standardization with government facilitation, and remove 
domestic market imperfections that hinder competition at the sub-sector or 
product category level.   
 
IV.  Financial Sector  
57. Azerbaijan’s financial sector has grown in size in recent years. In 2008, gross 
domestic savings were 65 percent of GDP, one of the highest levels, regionally and 
internationally. The real quantity of money (including real quantity of banks’ deposits) also grew 
considerably. Credit expanded rapidly from 2005 due to a combination of monetary and 
exchange rate policies (see chapter 1 and below). Nevertheless, in mid 2008, the ratio of total 
lending to GDP was approximately 17 percent, compared to 50 percent of GDP for EU-accession 
countries, suggesting financial depth remains relatively low. This is especially low, given that 
banks are essentially the only financial intermediaries currently existent in Azerbaijan.  
58. At the same time, the regulation of the financial sector has improved.  Azerbaijan’s 
financial sector was the first to adopt International Financial Reporting Standards.  It has also 
been the first to strengthen the corporate governance of its banking sector, based on extensive 
collaboration with IFC, EBRD, and other development partners.  The National Bank of 
Azerbaijan has developed key legislation to improve the legal and regulatory framework in the 
sector and to bring it closer to international standards and strengthen its capacity as a regulator.  
59. Yet, Azerbaijan’s financial sector has been playing a limited role in intermediating 
resources and pooling risk.  It has been of generally limited consequence in diversifying the 
economy. The country’s nascent financial sector consists mostly of banking, with 46 banks, of 
which the largest bank controls 44 percent of the sector’s assets; the top two control more than 
50 percent of assets. At the same time, the contribution of the organized capital market to growth 
has been very limited. Approximately 90 percent of securities transactions take place over the 
counter (OTC), and are not disseminated as market information. The results are poor price 
discovery and little market transparency. In 2007, annual equity turnover on the organized 
exchange was about 1 percent of GDP, and in 2008 that ratio dropped to about half.  
Approximately 90 percent of the primary and secondary turnover on the organized exchange is in 
short-term debt instruments, that is, T-bills and National Bank of Azerbaijan (NBA) notes. 
Corporate bond issuance has increased rapidly over the last two years, but bond duration does 
not exceed 15 months. 
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60. In recent years, Azerbaijan has experienced extremely rapid credit expansion, 
which, while welcome, calls for vigilance by the supervision authorities particularly if the 
global crisis begins to adversely affect Azerbaijan’s economy.  From 2002 to 2008, credit 
from the banking sector grew more than thirteen-fold, albeit starting from a very small base. The 
number of non-bank credit providers also increased—from 47 to 94 over this period. This 
increase in credit is the other side of the coin of Azerbaijan’s quest for maintaining a controlled 
appreciation of the manat in light of the high volumes of U.S. dollar financing of the fiscal 
deficit, high revenues of SOCAR, and foreign borrowing from local banks. Azerbaijan, 
especially since 2007, also has been the recipient of foreign lending to Azeri banks, which has 
further boosted pressure for local currency appreciation and simultaneously pose refinancing 
risks to the banking system amid tight global credit conditions.  In neighboring Kazakhstan, 
foreign borrowing of this kind led to a financial crisis.  At the same time, the quality of the loan 
portfolio has been improving: in 2007, the banking sector’s non-performing loan to total loans 
was 2.9 percent, and only five banks had a ratio exceeding 5 percent; by mid 2008 it was 2.2 
percent (down from 29 percent in 2001)–but caution is warranted as during a crisis economic 
conditions tend to deteriorate, and the is relatively a recent one. In 2008, the National Bank of 
Azerbaijan increased the vigilance of its supervision. 
61. In the future, the authorities need to be ever more vigilant. As long as the economy 
maintains a high growth rate, most credit granted will likely continue to perform. However, the 
rate of growth has already slowed. It is quite possible that banks may not have exercised 
adequate due diligence about the creditworthiness of their borrowers in an environment of both 
staggering credit growth but limited human resources and weaknesses in corporate governance.  
Weak risk management and limited control over borrowers’ background could imply that the 
rapid monetization of the economy has been accompanied by the rapid growth of doubtful 
quality loans. Given the global crisis, we would expect that some banks may find themselves in a 
difficult position.  Furthermore, the dominance of the state-owned bank has the potential to de-
stabilize the banking system and the economy in the event of serious credit and liquidity 
concerns. Should such situations materialize, it would be important to ensure that the authorities 
adopt pro–active measures to help mitigate those risks.  
62. Azerbaijan’s monetary authorities have played a proactive role in the exuberant—
and highly risky—period before the global crisis.  In 2005–08, the stock of domestic credit in 
Azerbaijan increased, on average, by 64.4 percent per annum, as part of the government’s fiscal 
policy and its desire to maintain a de facto pegged exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar.  The 
resulting appreciation of the exchange rate may have led to excessive foreign borrowing. This is 
a lesson that Kazakhstan learned the hard way. The Azeri banking authorities have learned from 
this experience and have remained extremely vigilant to avoid overexposure to currency risk. As 
a result of this vigilance, by the end of 2008 the commercial banks held about $2.6 billion in 
foreign debt. Unfortunately, due to the global crisis this debt is not being rolled over. Although 
the amount should be manageable and allow banks to keep current on their obligations, it 
represents a challenge to the banking system’s ability to extend new loans. At the end of 2008, 
Azerbaijan had $18 billion in the Oil Fund and in National Bank of Azerbaijan reserves, 
providing ample coverage of short-term debt obligations.  
63. The global crisis has required the authorities to reverse their pre-October 2008 
actions, and encourage credit expansion. In order to support economic activity during the 
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global crisis, the monetary authorities have taken a proactive stance, withdrawing the imposition 
of the 5 percent reserve requirement on foreign loans by commercial banks.  They have also 
made available low interest loans to commercial banks.  However, further discussions regarding 
the use of Oil Fund assets to lend to-- or invest in-- commercial banks need to be viewed with 
caution and with careful balancing of the potential costs and benefits (with due attention to what 
specific problem the action is aiming to solve), respect for the regulations of the Oil Fund, and as 
part of the activities of the consolidated budget. 
64. The government needs to strengthen key aspects of financial infrastructure in order 
to expand the market for credit: the information available to creditors and the accessibility 
of collateral are both critical. To ensure the availability of information to creditors, Azerbaijan 
may wish to: (i) extend the coverage of the public registry; and (ii) broaden the registry’s scope 
to distribute credit information from retailers, trade creditors, and utility companies as well as 
from financial institutions. To strengthen the accessibility of collateral, Azerbaijan may wish to: 
(i) amend legislation to allow all legal residents of the country to be party to collateral 
agreements; (ii) create a unified registry for all security rights in movable and immovable 
properties; (iii) amend legislation to allow parties to have recourse to out-of-court enforcement 
without restrictions; and (iv) reduce the cost of enforcing financial contracts, including 
permitting the seizure of collateral. The country may also wish to further the development of the 
leasing industry and introduce legislation on warrants.  Both instruments “transform” illiquid 
collateral into a liquid financial instrument, readily recoverable upon borrower default.  
65. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 11: Maintain and strengthen proactive banking supervision 
and regulation by monetary authorities. 
66. A strong and dynamic MSME sector requires financing; as such, the multiple 
efforts to extend credit to MSMEs need to be expanded and should be anchored on market 
principles.  Azerbaijan maintains multiple credit programs for MSMEs, but they need to be 
expanded, broadened and anchored in market principles.   The country has seen significant 
growth in micro-credit through a new institution and in small enterprises via the National 
Entrepreneurship Fund.  Azerbaijan needs to expand these efforts, and, more particularly, expand 
access to the agricultural sector. Among several countries that have succeeded in this area, the 
Netherlands and France provide good examples in developing commercial lending for 
agriculture.   
67. Furthermore, the large share of banking system lending to state enterprises is 
crowding out the more efficient allocation of financial resources to private sector projects. 
With a large public sector, 13.7 percent of all loans are to state enterprises at end 2008, more 
than two-thirds of which is concentrated in the portfolio of the state-owned bank. The lack of 
transparency in the allocation of credit to state enterprises distorts competition and may result in 
higher funding costs for the real sector.  
68. Azeri policy makers should prepare to attract foreign banks when the global crisis 
ends. While Azerbaijan has a few foreign banks, it is important for the country to attract some 
big-name financial institutions when the crisis subsides and a clearer picture emerges regarding 
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the health of surviving international banks.  While such banks would benefit the country by 
strengthening competition (despite the progress already made in Azerbaijan in reducing the 
market share of local banks), foreign banks can add substantial value to the banking sector, 
particularly given their experience in lending to the agricultural sector on commercial terms. 
69. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 12: Improve access to credit for MSMEs and for larger 
corporations by improving the institutional environment (i.e., creditor 
information) and by attracting large foreign banks after the global crisis (i.e., 
those specialized in agriculture). 
70. While Azerbaijan’s efforts to improve access to credit should continue, they need to 
be based on both institution-building and fair competition. Azerbaijan’s three special 
funds—the National Entrepreneurship Fund, the Mortgage Fund, and the Azerbaijan Investment 
Company—are designed to play the role of market developer and to also expand access to credit. 
While international experience does exist regarding the governance of sovereign funds 
(referenced IMF guidelines, IFC work), it suggests that the management of these funds will have 
difficulty resisting political pressures.  If, however, Azeri policymakers feel the need to maintain 
these three funds, they should: (i) develop the governance of the funds as the first priority; and 
(ii) consider subsidizing capital, instead of interest rates. 
71. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 13: Any use of public funds in expanding access to credit 
should be on the basis of seed capital or subsidies to borrower’s capital, rather 
than on the basis of subsidies on interest rates. 
 
V.  Ensuring a Qualified Labor Force and Better Use of Human Capital 
72. Azerbaijan has fallen behind in terms of the quality and efficient use of its human 
capital, due primarily to the inadequacy of its education system and to labor market 
policies. Azerbaijan inherited a relatively good education system from the Soviet period. 
However, in the transition years, the quality of education deteriorated; consequently, the supply 
of qualified labor has also significantly decreased. The Azeri education system suffers from 
corruption (which decreases the value of its diplomas), under-investment (public spending on 
education decreased from 3.9 percent to 2.7 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2006, well below 
the average of 5.2 percent of GDP for the OECD countries), and a serious mismatch between the 
training of graduates and the skills demanded by the economy. As a result, Azerbaijan lags 
behind its comparators in the quality and quantity of human capital. Even though in 2007 
Azerbaijan had the fourth highest GDP per capita in the CIS, it ranked 23rd in Europe and Central 
Asia (ECA) in the Knowledge Economy Index of the World Bank Institute (2008), ahead of only 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
73. Investments in education are particularly important given that the country is going 
through a major demographic transition.  Due to the relatively high fertility rates of the past 
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and a favorable population age structure, Azerbaijan’s working age population (15–64) continues 
to grow rapidly;  it has climbed from just under 5.0 million in 1999 to 5.77 million in 2006 (a 16 
percent increase). During the next decade, the number of able-bodied individuals aged 15–64 
will further increase to 6.55 million in 2015 (according to the  UN population forecast14).   On 
one hand, this will stimulate competition for jobs. On the other,  as the cohort born in the 
1990s—when birthrates were low—enter the labor force, the population aged 15–24 will shrink 
from 1.74 million in 2006 to 1.54 million in 2015, and further drop to 1.19 million by 2020. This 
progressive decline will lead to the ageing of the labor force. Azerbaijan, at that point, will have 
to be ready to meet the development challenge with a highly educated and skilled population.  
74. There is a significant mismatch between the specialization of graduates and the 
demands of the economy. In professional and higher education institutions, there is an 
overproduction of specialists in areas such as education, health, and manufacturing, which have 
relatively limited job opportunities; whereas very few graduates have been trained in agriculture 
and services, from where much of the new demand for employment is currently coming. This 
mismatch is recognized by employers. For instance, while MSMEs find it very easy to find 
unqualified laborers (who constitute the bulk of recruited employees), they have difficulty 
finding qualified crafts and related trade personnel, technicians, and managers.15  In fact, in 
recent years, job fairs in Baku have had very low levels of job placement: approximately 70 
percent of the jobs on offer were not filled, despite acceptable wages.  The General Employment 
Department, under the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population (MLSPP), has 
determined that the reason for this failure is that many of the available jobs had high competency 
requirements, including computer skills and English. 
75. The government needs to invest more in education, particularly at the tertiary level. 
It is essential that the government revise current public spending decisions to make education a 
top priority.  This budget reorientation should aim to enhance quality and increase enrollment 
rates in higher education.  Moreover, an important effort to raise teacher salaries is also essential. 
Salary increases might be financed through raising the existing very low student-teacher ratio in 
secondary education (9.4 compared to the OECD average of 14). This effort should be linked to 
measures that reduce corruption in the education system.  In this way, Azeri diplomas will regain 
their value. On the other hand, public spending on higher education should gradually increase to 
1.1 percent of non-oil GDP, allowing for the creation of new universities (especially outside of 
Baku) and higher enrollment in tertiary education institutions. Furthermore, Azerbaijan could 
explore the possibility of attracting foreign universities or private training companies, as has 
been done quite successfully in Japan, China, Korea and India. 
76. Education and training must be linked to labor market needs. Increasing employment 
opportunities means intervening to end the mismatch between the specialization of graduates and 
the structure of the economy.  Intervention should entail better cooperation between the labor 
and education ministries, with a view to offering useful information to students on recruiting 
sectors and wages through career counseling.  This should include revising the curricula of 
public universities and professional schools, based on the government’s interaction with the 
                                                 
14 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, “World 
Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision”. 
15 See the results of the survey concerning the business environment for SMEs in Azerbaijan, conducted by the 
International Finance Corporation in December 2007, and Kuddo and others 2005. 
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private sector. In addition, there should be a comprehensive study of current and future labor 
market needs.  Concurrently, there is also a need to develop a modern system of vocational 
education and training (VET), as well as adult training (lifelong learning), which will equip 
workers with skills currently required by the employers. To this end, the existing network of 
regional training centers and VET schools should be restructured and modernized.   At the same 
time, a Common Quality Assurance Framework as well as a standardized, competence-based 
qualification system should be created. In the process, Azerbaijan can benefit from the recent 
experience of some OECD countries, such as Hungary.  
77. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 14: Focus reforms on tertiary education and ensure the 
system responds to market needs. 
78. The Azeri government (MoLSPP) could develop active labor market policies. 
Strategies to “activate” the unemployed with the help of high-quality employment services can 
help ensure that benefit recipients and other job seekers have a better chance to find employment. 
In Azerbaijan, activating labor policies require improving job search and matching services, 
initial career and job counseling, job and vacancy fairs, training programs, and public works 
projects through better assessment of previous programs and better tailoring to the needs and 
characteristics of the beneficiaries and the labor market. It also entails networking with social 
and health services, housing sector, and communities. 
79. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 15: Undertake active labor market practices to help match 
employment with job seekers. 
80. Azerbaijan’s public sector needs to adjust its approach to employment and 
compensation.  In light of the need to increase public sector efficiency (Chapter 3) and the need 
to ensure that it  delivers higher quality services to the population (Chapters 4 and 5), the 
government cannot continue to be an employer of last resort. It must attract qualified and 
experienced people, and must retain the highly qualified individuals that it already employs. To 
do so, it must increase their salaries and must link pay to performance. However, linking pay to 
performance requires an indirect approach, as recent experience has shown.  Several OECD 
countries have tried to improve the performance of their public services by linking the pay of 
their public sector employees to the performance of their organizational units. This experience 
has proven to be arduous because measuring performance (in terms of activities, outputs, or 
outcomes) has been challenging and has required a considerable gestation. Moreover, the recent 
empirical literature on the results of performance-based pay reforms is discouraging.  An 
alternative for the Azeri government may be to initiate pay reform around the establishment of a 
competitive remuneration structure that links salary improvements primarily to promotions, 
rather than to annual performance-related pay bonuses or salary adjustments. 
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81. In view of the above, this report recommends: 
Recommendation 16: Improve the efficiency of the public sector by raising pay 
to retain and attract qualified people, and linking it to promotions- refrain from 
using the government as an employer of last resort.  
 
VI.  In conclusion 
 
82. This report recognizes that diversification is key to the sustainability of development 
outcomes in Azerbaijan, and presents medium-term recommendations for achieving 
diversification. The strategy is a response to the temporary nature of Azerbaijan’s oil boom and 
the country’s need to generate sustainable growth and employment in the medium term.  The 
urgency stems from: (i) the unsustainable level of public spending; and (ii) the recent collapse of 
oil prices.  The stalling of diversification efforts in recent years is also an important contributing 
factor to consider. The proposed set of policies would have been necessary even if oil prices had 
stayed high, although the government would have had more time to adjust.  The diversification 
strategy rests on three principal recommendations: 
• Stabilization of the level of oil revenue spending and enhancement of efficiency. 
If Azerbaijan were to stabilize its level of oil spending (through more stringent 
implementation of the LTROMS), it would be able to reduce pressures for 
appreciation of the currency and create the fiscal space necessary so as to reduce the 
tax burden on the private sector.   By curtailing spending, the government would also 
be reducing the exposure of the banking sector to appreciation pressures, as more 
stable foreign exchange inflows would make for a more stable macroeconomic 
environment.  To reap the benefits of fiscal expenditure rule, the government would 
need to formalize its high-level coordination mechanisms; the proposed Economic 
Council could play a leading role in this context. Adoption of a fiscal expenditure 
rule, within the context of a medium-term expenditure framework, would exert 
pressure for more public sector efficiency in the implementation of the recurrent 
budget and the preparation and implementation of capital expenditures. 
• Focusing deregulation on diversification. The government’s ultimate goal of 
sustainable private sector growth could be achieved more efficiently if its efforts to 
deregulate the economy were prioritized according to the greatest potential benefit to 
diversification. On the business regulations, reforms of border crossings and 
clearance procedures, reduction in tax rates, and improvements in tax administration 
would be important. In the broader operational environment, institutions to attract 
foreign investors would have to be strengthened. On the utilities front, 
communication and power should figure as priorities, with the intention of developing 
world-class support to the private sector, which would attract foreign investors.  The 
power sector has added regional potential as well. Finally, access to credit in the 
financial sector also rests on institutional improvements in accessing information on 
loan applicants, and on the banking sector acquiring expertise on particular sectors 
and customer types (i.e., all categories of MSMEs). To bring these elements together, 
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and to ensure they all work to increase Azerbaijan’s non-oil exports, significantly 
more high-level coordination is needed.  
• Enhancement of human capital.  Azerbaijan’s labor force needs to become the basis 
of the country’s competitiveness, and both private and public sectors must play a role 
in providing employment.   Today, secondary education, vocational education and 
training, and tertiary level programs need to be more closely aligned to market needs. 
Again, diversification can act as a focal point, and must do so, particularly since 
Azerbaijan is going through a demographic transition and can expect a boom in its 
labor force.  The currently outdated training institutions are largely unable to prepare 
job seekers to engage in globally competitive activities, while the public sector cannot 
be an employer of last resort.  Focusing training around activities that will likely 
sustain Azerbaijan’s growth will ensure a better match between supply and demand 
for labor. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s public sector needs to become more 
competitive; higher skills and commensurate pay are necessary. 
83. The global crisis argues for very specific short-term prioritization of Azerbaijan’s 
reform efforts to achieve diversification.  The aforementioned medium-term priorities could 
have been implemented with some leisure under a pre-global crisis scenario, with oil prices at 
high levels and demand from Azerbaijan’s export markets (oil and non-oil) on the rise.  But the 
reversal of oil prices, their volatility, and the slowdown in global markets all suggest that within 
the aforementioned framework, the following priorities should be set:  
• Ensuring fiscal sustainability and efficiency of public spending. Uncertainty 
regarding the level of fiscal revenues from oil in 2009-10, suggests that the 
government needs to: (i) uphold the guidance provided by the permanent income 
approach to spending; (ii) maximize the impact of its investment program (by 
focusing on bottlenecks to diversification); and (iii) given the concerns about the 
efficiency of public investment and the negative impact of the crisis on the real sector 
and employment, shift some of the investment budget to poverty alleviation under the 
targeted social assistance scheme.  Additionally, it must move with greater 
commitment on budgeting reforms and strengthen, as planned, internal and external 
audits, and public procurement.  
• Ensure stability of the financial sector and access to finance for MSMEs.  
Azerbaijan’s monetary authorities should do their due diligence to assess the stability 
of the financial sector. Any support to the banking sector should be done 
transparently on an individual bank basis, with participation of shareholders, and with 
a clear exit strategy in mind.  In parallel, the government can seek to expand access to 
finance for MSMEs. Any financial support from the government to MSMEs is better 
allocated on a market basis (using market rates).  
• Reduce the cost of production for domestic enterprises. The global crisis is 
constraining trade and growth opportunities.  While Azerbaijan needs to temporarily 
rely more on domestic demand to support growth than in previous years, it needs to 
focus on reducing the direct and indirect costs to production (lower burden of tax and 
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customs administration, lower burden of licensing agencies, help from government to 
resolve sector-specific challenges in production, financing, or export development).  
• Lastly, but most importantly, economic policy coordination needs to be 
strengthened. The significant tradeoffs that Azerbaijan needs to make in light of the 
global crisis suggest that the country’s leadership will have to underwrite all short-
term decisions, should the country seek to position itself as a more attractive location 
for FDI at the end of the global crisis.  While this report clearly documents that large 
spending increases are no longer affordable, and strongly advocates a permanent 
income approach to help guide long-run spending decisions, the economic leadership 
team needs the active participation of the Presidency to ensure judiciousness in 
bringing current spending down to sustainable levels. While too slow an adjustment 
could risk robbing future generations of a sizeable Oil Fund, too fast an adjustment of 
public spending, without substantial efforts to reduce the over-regulation of the 
private sector could push the economy into a tailspin.  In addition, Azerbaijan’s 
macroeconomic team needs to routinely assess the course of the global economy (on 
a high frequency basis), as current indications suggest that duration of the crisis, and 
of low oil price, may be protracted. Finally, the global crisis presents an opportunity 
for Azerbaijan to improve the environment for the private sector and to stimulate 
domestic demand.  The reforms in licensing, modernization of border crossings and 
improvements in trade facilitation, further improvements in tax administration, and 
reduction of tax rates are important and require high level coordination. 
Roadmap to this Report 
 
84. This report puts current development polices into longer-term perspective and 
argues that Azerbaijan remains in an excellent position to achieve its medium-term 
diversification objectives, provided it: (i) disciplines spending as part of a long-term fiscal 
strategy; and (ii) rallies regulatory reforms around the expansion of non-oil exports.  
Chapter 1 presents an overview of macroeconomic developments since the mid-1990s, and the 
challenges Azerbaijan faces in its development today. Chapter 2 illustrates, particularly for the 
reader less familiar with the Azeri economy, the prospects for Azerbaijan’s non-oil sectors and 
the institutional bottlenecks sectors face, especially regarding the functioning of markets.  
Chapter 3 covers fiscal sustainability and the governance of public finances (covers 
recommendations 1-3). Chapter 4 addresses the challenges in the utilities sector (covers 
recommendations 4-6). Chapter 5 addresses the challenges in the business environment (covers 
recommendations 7-10). Chapter 6 addresses the challenges in the financial sector (covers 
recommendations 11-13). Finally, Chapter 7 addresses the challenges in human capital (covers 
recommendations 14-16). 
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CHAPTER 1.  
INTRODUCTION 
Azerbaijan successfully stabilized its economy in the decade after independence (1991) and laid the 
foundations for managing its oil wealth.  While preparatory investments were ongoing in the oil sector, 
1995-2005 saw double-digit non-oil growth, albeit partially due to the prospect of the forthcoming oil 
boom in the country.  During that time, agriculture, non-extractive industry and services grew 
significantly, as did non-oil exports.  Poverty reduction, which was most dramatic in 2002-2005, has 
been felt throughout the country. However, the austerity measures that contributed to successful 
stabilization left the country with significant shortfalls in investment relative to comparators, which 
partly explains the country’s lower productivity.  While market reforms have been undertaken, the 
quality of market institutions lags comparators.   
 
Azerbaijan seeks to develop a sustainable, market-based economy, capable of providing growth and 
employment in the medium term and in the post-oil period.   The country has seized the opportunity of 
its 20-year oil boom, which started in 2006, to launch a sizable public sector investment program and to 
increase wages and transfers to the population. Azerbaijan is also implementing institutional reforms 
aimed at modernizing the economy and strengthening the functioning of markets.  
 
Amid Azerbaijan’s ambitious development plans, the global economy experienced a crisis in the latter 
part of 2008, caused primarily by a year of   sluggish growth in the US.  Its fallout has been felt all across. 
GDP growth in 2009 is expected to fall in many countries, especially the high-income ones, but also in 
developing countries, especially in ECA and LAC.   Furthermore, the crisis led to a significant drop in oil 
price, to which Azerbaijan needs to adjust.  The crisis has also weakened global exports and is expected 
to reduce the volume of total international trade for 2009, while at the same time creating a dearth of 
private capital and raising financing needs the world over.  The crisis will make the global environment 
less welcoming to Azerbaijan’s diversification efforts, which need to be strengthened under all 
circumstances. 
 
Leading up to the global crisis, the Azeri economy exhibited strong performance (including double digit 
GDP growth rates), although by 2007 the overly ambitious pursuit of the government’s development 
plans had led to undesirable developments.  The economy experienced high inflation and lower non-oil 
private investment, lower non-oil FDI and lower non-oil exports relative to non-oil GDP.  The finite 
nature of Azerbaijan’s oil boom (the oil sector will contract after 2017), the global crisis, and the already 
high level of public spending in 2008, all argue for a relatively smaller fiscal stimulus to the economy in 
the medium and long term.  Azerbaijan lags comparators in first and second generation reforms in the 
transition to a market economy.  These developments are starting to separate Azerbaijan from the 
diversification course taken by other successful resource-rich countries and by some small economies.  
This chapter reviews development trends, sets out macroeconomic and institutional challenges, 
compares economic performance with comparators and advocates that expansion of non-oil exports 
receives top priority as a means to ensure sustainability of the economy.  While the global crisis is likely 
to delay Azerbaijan’s ability to make significant gains in non-oil diversification in 2009, it provides an 
opportunity to advance improvements in the business environment that will enhance Azerbaijan’s 
competitiveness after the global crisis. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Azerbaijan had a broad economic base before gaining independence in 1991.  Yet, 
most of its economic life since the mid-1990s has evolved around the anticipation of oil and 
gas revenues. In one way or another, that has energized all sectors of the economy and 
supported high growth rates for the non-oil sector.16   During the Soviet-era, Azerbaijan had 
burgeoning industrial as well as dynamic agricultural and service sectors.  Like all the CIS 
economies, it was integrated economically and socially into the Soviet Union.  After 
independence, and following the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan’s 
economy collapsed much more than the average CIS economy.  Fortunately, in the mid-1990s, 
foundations were laid for the extraction of new oil and gas resources from the Caspian Sea. This 
endeavor required enormous economic resources but, once secured, brought with it foreign 
investment (albeit predominantly in the oil sector) and confidence in the entire economy. 
Confidence was further buoyed by the rising oil prices, which made Azerbaijan’s “old” oil all the 
more profitable.  By 2005, the bulk of Soviet-era industries and exports had declined, and new 
ones were taking their place. In that year, more than one-third of employment in Azerbaijan was 
in agriculture and food processing (both of which were linked to economies in the region), and a 
growing share of GDP was coming from services. Between 2001 and 2005, total GDP growth 
averaged 13 percent, while non-oil growth averaged 11 percent. In 2005, Azerbaijan’s per capita 
income was $1,260 (Atlas method) and $4,010 (in purchasing power parity) terms. 
 
1.2. Azerbaijan’s “new” oil and gas era began in late 2006 as the first “new oil” was 
produced; it is expected to last 20-25 years.  Proven reserves are approximately 9 billion 
barrels of oil17 (mainly in the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli field) and 1.34 trillion cubic meters of 
                                                 
16 Given the short-term nature of Azerbaijan’s oil boom, the report analyzes developments with reference to the non-
oil economy. In fact, the term consists of total GDP less the extraction of oil and gas. It includes transportation of oil 
and gas products, and construction of oil and gas installations, including pipelines.  A narrower definition of the 
non-oil economy is not readily available from national statistical sources.  
17 New discoveries announced in June 2008 raised the level of oil reserves from 7 billion to 9 billion barrels. 
Figure 1.1: Oil and Gas-Proven Reserves Per Capita, 
International Comparison 
Figure 1.2: Indicative Oil Production Profile for 
Azerbaijan, World Bank Projections (2005-2024) 
Based on Production Profile of June 2008 
Source: Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 104.47 Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank Staff estimates
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natural gas (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). Overall, fiscal revenues from existing oil and gas reserves, and 
based on the June 2008 profile, are estimated at $198 billion (net present value), or 
approximately $1,000 per capita per year through 2024.18 At the level of production in the profile 
used, oil reserves are likely to be exhausted in 20-25 years.  However, from approximately 2011, 
oil sector’s growth rate is expected to be about nil, and to turn negative from about 2021.   
1.3. The country sees the new fiscal revenues from oil as an opportunity to lay the 
foundation for a sustainable, market-based economy, capable of generating growth and 
employment. The sources of growth for this development model are discussed in this report but 
require further definition by the authorities. Undoubtedly, diversification away from oil and gas 
production as well as greater regional and global integration form parts of these plans. During 
2006–08, Azerbaijan initiated a very significant increase of its public spending to address the 
first-order, critical infrastructure problems, which deterred broad-based development. They 
ranged from electricity shortages to the absence of water and sanitation facilities. Azerbaijan also 
significantly increased its social spending to alleviate the sufferings of nearly one-fourth of its 
8.6 million people, who lived in “relative” poverty prior to the boom. 
1.4. However, the world is in the midst of an economic crisis and, as a result, Azerbaijan 
will have to rely much less, than previously envisioned, on the outside world to achieve its 
diversification objectives in the short term. The latter half of 2008 saw the world economy 
descend into a global crisis, which (optimistically) is expected to take two years to subside.  
Most recently (according to Global Development Finance report, issued in September 2009), the 
Bank expects global GDP growth to slip from 1.9 percent in 2008 to -2.9 percent in 2009;  
developing country growth is expected to decline from 5.9 percent in 2008 to 1.2 percent in 
2009;  growth in high income countries in 2009 will likely be -4.2 percent.  World trade volume 
is expected to contract by 12 percent, from 3.7 percent in 2008 to -9.7 percent in 2009. In the 
Europe and Central Asia region, prospects for 2009 and 2010 growth are also dim: growth has 
been expected to be -4.7 and 1.6 percent respectively for 2009 and 2010, down from the 2006-7 
average of 7.3 percent. The GDP growth prospects for Russia and Turkey, two important trading 
partners for Azerbaijan, are -7.5 and -5.5 percent respectively for 2009.  The financial meltdown, 
which precipitated the global crisis, and the anticipated poor performance of rich countries as 
well as of Azerbaijan’s regional trading partners, are expected to reduce the availability of short-
term financing of FDI and the potential for non-oil export growth for Azerbaijan.  At the same 
time, it could see a significant contraction in non-oil exports, although that itself is not expected 
to have a very significant impact on aggregate demand. The crisis has also created uncertainty 
around the short-term price of oil, and Azerbaijan’s fiscal revenues.  
B. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
1.5. Following independence in 1991, Azerbaijan experienced massive terms of trade 
shocks, a disintegration of its marketing and trading systems, and an end to Soviet-era 
fiscal transfers and subsidies. The economy was riddled with distorted relative prices, multiple 
exchange rates and black markets for foreign exchange, as well as widespread supply shortages. 
                                                 
18 This estimate is based on an average price of oil of $66 per barrel in current U.S. dollars or US$52 per barrel in 
2007 prices for 2010-2030, taking into account an 8 percent discount rate, and a 3 percent rate of return on Oil Fund 
assets. The 30-year historical average for 1978-2007was $33 per barrel in 2007 prices.  
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The armed conflict with Armenia and the associated influx of approximately 1 million Azeri 
refugees further aggravated the economic problems. As a result, Azerbaijan suffered an output 
collapse and entered the post-independence transition period considerably poorer than many 
other former Soviet republics. Azerbaijan’s real GDP dropped by 63 percent between 1989 and 
1995, compared with an average of 42 percent in the CIS over the same period (Figure 1.3). 19   
Growth came from both the oil sector and the non-oil sector (Figure 1.4), although it will be 
argued later that the latter depends on the former significantly. 
Box 1.1: GDP vs. Non-oil GDP; What Metric to Measure Economic Performance in Azerbaijan? 
Azerbaijan’s hump-shaped oil revenue profile is expected to span about 20 years, ending in 2024.  Gross 
Domestic Product is the sum of all final goods and services produced in an economy in a given year.  
Near peak production, around 2011, the oil extraction sector may produce about two thirds of the 
country’s GDP which will then drop to about 10 percent by 2024.  During the entire 20-year production 
cycle, the oil sector is not expected to employ more than 1 percent of the country’s labor force. Planned 
oil extraction during the production cycle does not require large amounts of new investment—in a purely 
illustrative sense, the oil sector is on “autopilot” running mainly on investment made before production 
began. 
Diversification of the economy, away from oil extraction, is meaningful to the degree it creates 
sustainable jobs.  Investment-- domestic and foreign-- in sectors other than oil extraction is critical to that 
diversification; therefore, it is more relevant to look at those variables relative to non-oil GDP, than to 
GDP, as the former will be less skewed by the temporary budge in oil production than total GDP.  For a 
“small” economy that needs to capture export markets in order to expand its output, non-extractive 
exports are crucial.    
What is the link to GDP? While for most economies GDP is an adequate metric to assess the importance 
of economy-wide flows (i.e., by comparing exports or investment to GDP), in the case of Azerbaijan, 
given the relatively short period of the oil production cycle (20-25 years), oil distorts the GDP (by first 
expanding it during the expansion of oil production, and then shrinking it during the period of oil 
contraction). Hence, when looking to assess the adequacy of some flows (such as fiscal flows, non-oil 
exports, and non-oil investment) that pertain to the long-term sustainability of the economy, the metric or 
denominator needs to be less sensitive to the oil production cycle. In that case, non-oil GDP is a more 
appropriate metric (denominator) –despite the fact that it too suffers from some distortion from the oil 
sector. 
In looking at the value of the economy’s production in Azerbaijan, for the boom years, it is also useful to 
look at GNP and GNP per capita, in order to take into account the large amounts of capital repatriation 
that took place by the oil consortium in the early parts of the production boom. 
  
                                                 
19 For Figure 1.3, CEEC Countries calculated from Size weighted $PPP GDP, includes countries from IMF definition of CEEC 
Countries except Turkey. Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the CIS, are included in CIS for reasons of 
geography and similarities in economic structure. 
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Figure 1.3: Index of Real GDP (1989=100) Figure 1.4: Real GDP Growth 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2000 and 2001; authors’ 
calculations.  
Notes: CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States;  
CEEC = Central and Eastern European Countries. 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff 
estimates 
 
1.6. Azerbaijan started its transition to a market economy in early 1992. At that time, 
most prices were liberalized; a new currency (the manat) was introduced; a foreign direct 
investment (FDI) law was adopted; and a central bank law was enacted. These steps insulated the 
economy from FSU-wide economic instability and made it easier to leave the ruble zone and 
introduce an exchange rate policy that would ease the adjustment of domestic prices to world 
levels. After price liberalization in January 1992, inflation soared to triple digits, but was 
managed efficiently thereafter. Similarly, massive exchange rate depreciation was required to 
eliminate the black market for foreign currency and multiple exchange rates (Figure 1.5).  
1.7.  Azerbaijan was running large fiscal deficits right after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. Following the elimination of fiscal transfers from Russia after independence, large 
revenue shortfalls could not be compensated overnight and required massive expenditure cuts. 
Coupled with less than efficient budgetary and quasi-fiscal expenditure allocations, as well as a 
major need to strengthen management and implementation capacity, the cuts led to both 
declining social outcomes and public services.  
Figure 1.5: Inflation and Nominal Ex. Rates Figure 1.6: Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff 
estimates 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff 
estimates.
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1.8. In 1995, the government embarked on a comprehensive stabilization and structural 
reform program.  The program was supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the International Development Association 
(IDA). Its key component was stringent fiscal 
control (Figures 1.6 and 1.7), supported by 
restrictive monetary policies. These efforts were 
complemented by a wide array of structural 
reforms to accelerate the transition to a market 
economy and to improve the environment for 
both foreign and domestic investment. 
1.9. This reform program was remarkably 
successful. Macroeconomic and financial 
stability was restored and maintained 
throughout severe external shocks, such as the 
Russian financial crisis in 1998 and the large 
drops in oil prices in 1998 and 1999. Growth 
recovered to more than 11 percent per year over 1996–06. This growth was aided by rapid oil 
and gas exploration: on average, the sector grew at 22 percent per year.  The non-oil sector also 
grew––at more than 7 percent annually over the same period. The success in reducing inflation 
was also impressive. The inflation rate was reduced from triple digits in the early 1990s to 
single-digit level by the late 1990s. The overall fiscal deficit was greatly reduced—from 12 
percent to less than 2 percent of non-oil GDP during 1994–97. The budget even registered a 
small surplus for the first time in 2000, due largely to high oil prices.  
Managing the Oil Boom 
1.10. Prospects for growth improved significantly with the beginning of the “new” oil 
boom. Indeed, oil and gas both have a long history in Azerbaijan, dating back to the end of the 
19th century. However, the “new” oil boom started in the mid-1990s with the signing of a 
number of Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) between the State Oil Company of 
Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and foreign oil companies that regulated both exploration and production.  
1.11. During 1996–06, the Azeri economy grew by an average rate of 11 percent per year. 
This growth was largely driven by the rapid development of the oil and gas sector. After the 
PSAs were signed, Azerbaijan experienced massive foreign investments in several mega-
projects.  As a result, the oil and gas sector registered extraordinary growth rates, which peaked 
at 47 percent in 1999. 
1.12. In 2005 and 2006, GDP growth continued at very high rates (26 percent and 35 
percent respectively, Figure 1.4). However, these rates were driven primarily by new oil 
production coming on stream, and the much higher export volumes that was made possible by 
increased production.  Oil GDP, which includes oil and gas extraction and oil processing (but 
excludes oil and gas transportation, such as pipelines, and oil- and gas-related construction) grew 
by 67 percent and 69 percent respectively in 2005 and 2006 (Figure 1.4). As a result, the share of 
oil and gas sector in the economy grew from only about 10 percent of GDP in 1995 to 
approximately 60 percent in 2007 (Figure 1.11).  Oil has also naturally driven the current 
Figure 1.7: Government Revenue and Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff 
estimates. 
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account. Large deteriorations in the current account in the late 1990s and mid-2000s (Figure 1.8) 
reflected large oil sector imports funded by FDI (Figure 1.9).  Significant amounts of negative 
flows reflect capital repatriation  
from oil companies, given high profits due to 
high oil prices (Figure 1.9). Improvement in oil 
inflows mostly reflects increases in 
international prices, as Azeri production picked 
up noticeably in 2007 (Figure 1.12). Rising oil 
prices (Figure 1.11), oil sector FDI and oil 
sector imports have been the major drivers of 
Azerbaijan’s external account and of the 
country’s savings and investment balances 
(Figure 1.10). While non-oil investment 
increased in 2003-05, it has begun to drop 
thereafter (Figure 1.16). 
1.13. While Azerbaijan’s engagement with 
the world has been growing on the back of 
oil exports, some indicators of openness for 
2008 raise concerns. Non-oil imports have 
stayed under 35 percent of non-oil GDP, 
increasing slightly in 2006 (Figure 1.13). Non-
oil exports experienced a surge in 2004 and 
2005, but subsided thereafter. Since 2005, the 
non-oil trade balance has deteriorated (Figure 
1.14), and since 2006, non-oil trade (exports 
plus imports) relative to non-oil GDP has 
deteriorated (Figure 1.15). Once Azerbaijan’s 
structural infrastructure improvements and 
structural reforms are completed, its non-oil 
trade balance should be expected to close. 
(Chapter 2 discusses developments in non-oil 
trade and Chapter 5 the quality of trade 
statistics.)   At the same time, non-oil FDI 
relative to non-oil GDP has been declining 
since 2006.  A look at the sectoral breakdown 
of foreign investment suggests that declines 
have been registered in agriculture, 
manufacturing and construction; these declines 
have been compensated by large and growing 
inflows in the production and distribution of 
electricity and gas, as well as water. In other 
words, FDI in manufacturing, assembly and 
services is extremely weak and most FDI is 
going to infrastructures (supported by public spending) and extractive industries. Azerbaijan’s 
largest non-oil foreign investor is Turkey, followed by USA and UK. Together, these three 
accounted for more than half of FDI in 2001-08. 
Figure 1.8: Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff 
estimates. 
Figure 1.9: Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP) 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff 
estimates.
Figure 1.10: Savings and Investment (% of GDP) 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff 
estimates. 
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Figure 1.11: Oil Share of GDP Figure 1.12: Oil Dependence 
Source:  Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff 
estimates. 
Note: FDI is presented net of capital repatriation. 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff estimates
Figure 1.13: Revenue, Expenditure and Non-Oil 
Deficit (% of non-oil GDP) Figure 1.14: Current Account and Trade Balances (in percent) 
 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff estimates. Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff estimates. 
Note: N-O: Non-Oil 
Figure 1.15: Non-Oil Trade (% of Non-Oil GDP) Figure 1.16: Investment (% of Non-Oil GDP) 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff estimates. Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff estimates. 
Note: (*) Government-owned sectors are predominantly utilities 
and petrochemicals. 
 
1.14. Azeri economic dependence on oil increased gradually but consistently as 
commodities prices increased since the mid-1990s and as oil production came online. By 
1999, Azerbaijan’s oil exports had topped 80 percent of total exports (Figure 1.12). Since 2006, 
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fiscal revenues from oil and gas have topped 50 
percent, having increased from 8 percent of total 
revenues in 1998 (also Figure 1.12). The non-oil 
part of Azerbaijan’s external account deteriorated 
through 2000, as global demand for its  (pre-
transition) exports plummeted,  but again 
improved through 2006, as new exports and new 
partners emerged (Figure 1.15 in this chapter, 
and Chapter 2). Azerbaijan’s overall real 
effective exchange rate appreciated by 42 percent 
in 2004-08 in part as a result of the increasing 
non-oil fiscal deficit (which was funded by US 
dollar inflows into the treasury.  The real 
effective exchange rate for non-oil exports 
appreciated by only 11 percent in the same period, given the inflation trends by Azerbaijan’s 
non-oil export partners (Figure 1.17).  
  
Figure 1.17:  Nominal and Real Effective 
Exchange Rates  
Source: National Bank of Azerbaijan 
Table 1.1: Azeri Economy After Independence, 1992-2008 
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1.15. Table 1.1 summarizes the economic developments since independence that have been 
sketched above. Developments in the real sector and in poverty reduction are discussed below. 
C. EMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
1.16. The prospects of new oil and Azerbaijan’s successful macroeconomic policies have 
supported the broad-based development of the economy since 2000. From the mid-1990s 
onward, the Azeri economy managed to move 
away from the industrial base inherited from the 
Soviet Union toward aluminum ore, crude oil, and 
a number of processed foods and high-value 
agricultural products. Azerbaijan’s agricultural 
growth has averaged more than 5 percent per year. 
The industrial sector (including oil) has been 
subject to many fluctuations, but still managed to 
grow on average of over 10 percent annually for 
most of the review period. During the same 
period, the services sector has shown steady 
growth as well (as happened in many transition 
economies) of approximately 10 percent per 
annum and has continued to expand. 
1.17. Growth brought with it increases in 
employment, and a small adjustment in the 
labor force. Azerbaijan’s formal employment increased approximately 13 percent in 1995–2008, 
and about 80 percent of the increase occurred since 2000. Employment stood at about 4.1 million 
at end-2008. Azerbaijan also hosted about 15,000 immigrants employed primarily in 
construction (before the crisis).  The years 2000–08 saw a small restructuring of the labor force.  
New opportunities in construction (initially in the oil sector, but also in real estate and later in the 
public sector) contributed to reducing the share of employment in the primary sectors 
(agriculture and fishing) by approximately 2.5 percentage points.  During the same period, the 
share of employment in the industrial sector (especially construction) increased by about 1.5 
percentage points. Figure 1.18 illustrates the composition of employment in 2008 (outside ring, 
percent shares) and compares it with 2000 (inside ring). The employment share in the service 
sectors increased by about 1 percentage points between 2000 and 2008; services sector 
accounted for approximately 49 percent of the total employment in 2008. Overall, at about 38 
percent, agriculture has remained the most important employer. 
1.18. Azerbaijan’s growth brought with it tremendous gains in poverty reduction.  The 
number of people living below the national poverty line dropped from 68.1 percent in 1995 to 24 
percent in 2005 (Table 1.2).20  The government further estimates that poverty fell to 19.6 percent 
in 2006. The drop in poverty is remarkable.  In 2002–05, years for which the Bank has 
undertaken significant analysis, poverty almost halved.  While the drop in poverty has been 
                                                 
20 This report does not cover more recent analysis on poverty as a separate report on poverty is under preparation. 
Figure 1.18: Employment Shares (%), 
 2000 (Inner ring) and 2008 (Outer ring) 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff 
estimates.
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greatest in Baku, poverty fell almost equally between the other two strata, “other urban” and 
rural areas.  
1.19. While most improvements in welfare have been concentrated in Baku, growth was 
pro-poor in 2002–05 (as shown by the growth-incidence curve in Figure 1.19). Consumption 
growth for the poorer deciles was higher than for the richer deciles. Per capita consumption 
growth was positive for all percentiles of the Azeri population, with an average of 7–8 percent, 
while the poorest decile enjoyed an annual consumption growth of approximately 15 percent. 
However, poverty remains almost twice as high in rural areas as in Baku. Lack of employment, 
assets, and commercial opportunities, as well as weaker access to basic infrastructure, health, and 
education services have been major factors keeping poverty relatively high in provincial towns 
and rural areas. Refugees and internally displaced people (IDP) are particularly vulnerable 
because they not only lack assets and employment opportunities but also are heavily dependent 
on state transfers.21 
Table 1.2: Poverty 2002-2005 
 Total Baku Non-Baku Urban Rural 
 Population  
Poor
Very 
poor
 
Poor
Very 
poor
 
Poor 
Very 
poor
2002 44.6 41.6 25.6 48.7 31.5 43.7 24.7 
2003 39.7 34.8 19.3 46.0 27.9 38.4 20.0 
2004 28.5 18.6 8.0 35.4 19.0 29.6 13.0 
2005 24.0 14.7 6.6 27.2 11.9 26.9 8.9 
Source: Azerbaijan 2002–06 HBS data. 
 
1.20. Poverty has fallen due to several factors.  From the analysis of poverty in 2002–05, it 
emerges that several factors contributed to poverty reduction: (1) the higher minimum wage, (2) 
higher average wages in the economy, (3) 
significant transfers to households based 
on the government’s social programs, and 
(4) remittances from abroad, especially 
from Azeris living in Russia.  For the 
purpose of this report, it is useful to look 
at the broader period under review, 2001–
08.  During that time, the government 
increased the minimum wage more than 
six-fold in real terms (albeit from a very 
low base) in a bid to alleviate poverty.   
The minimum wage is now AZN 75 per 
month—equivalent to 27 percent of the 
average wage.  In addition to the minimum 
wage increase, wages and salaries on 
average tripled in real terms since 2000, 
                                                 
21 While the dynamics and magnitude of poverty reduction are not questionable, two factors may modify these 
results: underreporting of the poorest groups and under-evaluation of the CPI. 
Figure 1.19: Azerbaijan Growth Incidence Curve, 2002–
2005 
Source: Household Budget Survey and staff estimates. 
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reaching AZN 274 per month in 2008.  These increases are attributed partially to the 
government’s expansive fiscal policy after 2005.  From 2002 to 2008, transfers to households 
also increased, more than doubling in real terms. Pensions—the main component of the 
government’s social program—increased in particular: the basic pension, which constitutes about 
three quarters of the average pension, increased from AZN 14 in January 2002 to AZN 75 per 
month in September 2008. At the same time, remittances from a significant number of Azeris 
working abroad increased 10-fold in nominal dollar terms since 2001, reaching approximately 
$1.2 billion in 2008. 
D. MEDIUM-TERM CHALLENGES 
1.21. Azerbaijan’s most immediate medium-term challenge is to reverse the trend of 
greater reliance on oil revenues. As mentioned in the previous section, Azeri economic 
dependence on oil increased substantially as a result of the rapid oil sector development.   This 
applies both to fiscal revenues and the external current account balance.  The non-oil trade gap 
has also been increasing steadily since 2005. While over the short term, the non-oil trade gap will 
continue to be supported by the oil exports, in the medium or longer term (pending on the course 
of oil prices), the non-oil trade balance may create a financing gap, which Azerbaijan will have 
to overcome by either reducing imports, or increasing its non-oil exports and attracting FDI.    
1.22. Azerbaijan also faces an investment 
deficit, which has affected the quality of 
infrastructure. Azerbaijan’s investment has 
been skewed toward the oil sector.  Figure 
1.20 shows total investment relative to total 
GDP for Azerbaijan (dotted line), and 
compares that to non-oil investment (private 
and public) relative to non-oil GDP for 
Azerbaijan (solid line with markers), and the 
median investment rates for CIS and 
transition economies.  The figure shows that 
for the 1995-2002 period, Azerbaijan 
invested about 4 percent of non-oil GDP a 
year less than the average CIS country, and 
about 8 percent of GDP a year less than the 
average transition economy.  It is interesting 
to note that Georgia’s annual investment rate 
for 1996–2004 (prior to the Azeri oil price 
boom) was about 25 percent of GDP, while 
Armenia’s was slightly above 20 percent of GDP.  Azerbaijan’s annual non-oil investment, 
relative to non-oil GDP, averaged 11.7 percent in 1995–2004.  The low investment rates prior to 
the oil boom have naturally had significant implications for the country’s infrastructure. In 
general, the reliability or quality of infrastructure services in Azerbaijan remains poor.  The 
country’s infrastructure capacities have been exploited beyond their useful life of 25–30 years. 
Because of lack of financial viability, most infrastructures deteriorated and the quality of services 
has been suboptimal. About 56 percent of the main roads are in poor condition, and 30 percent 
Figure 1.20: Investment (% of GDP) 
Source: Bank staff calculations based on national statistics. 
Notes: Azerbaijan, CIS, and Transition: Total Investment 
(public and private (including oil), GFCF) as% of GDP. 
Azerbaijan (N-O): Non-oil Investment (public and private, 
GFCF) / Non-Oil GDP; GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation. 
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10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Azerbaijan (N-O)
Azerbaijan
CIS
Transition
 13 
 
need to be repaired immediately. Up to 45 percent of regional and local roads are life-expired, 
which hamper all-year links between territorial units in a number of regions. Due to deteriorating 
rail infrastructure, Azerbaijan Railway is also unable to operate at full capacity. The reliability of 
public water supply, although has improved in recent years, especially in the capital area, 
remains low (13 hours per day on average). In many parts of the country outside Baku, people 
receive as little as three hours of water supply.  
1.23. Azerbaijan remains exposed to the risks associated with weak market institutions. In 
contrast to the encouraging macroeconomic picture discussed above, progress on institutional 
development has been slow. This is a cause for concern because the economic literature has 
persuasively argued that good institutions are critical for sustainable economic growth and 
private sector development.22 At the end of 2008, Azerbaijan ranked in the third quartile of all 
countries on political risk and in the fourth quartile in bureaucratic quality, corruption, and in 
democratic accountability, according to the International Country Risk Guide.23 The EBRD 
Transition Index also shows that Azerbaijan has made less progress than CIS comparators in 
completing second-generation reforms relating to establishing institutional underpinnings for the 
allocation of resources through competition.24 This is especially true compared to neighboring 
countries (Table 1.3). Concurrently, the burden of government regulation and interference 
remains very high for Azeri businesses. While recent studies of the informal sector are not 
available,   one study in 2003 found that a very large share of economic activity took place in the 
shadow economy.25 At the same time, Azerbaijan’s official labor statistics suggest that the 
informal sector employment is very high (more than 65 percent of employees worked without a 
contract in 2008).26 
Table 1.3: EBRD Transition Indicators, 2008 
(Indicators range from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ 
represents the standards of an industrialized market economy) 
 Note: NBFI: Non bank financial institutions. 
 Source: EBRD 
 
1.24. Azerbaijan also needs to contend with a poorly regarded business environment and 
some lagging reforms. In September 2008, Azerbaijan shot up to 33 in the global Doing 
                                                 
22 Acemoglu, and others 2005.  
23 International Country Risk Guide Database, December 2008. 
24 EBRD Transition Index 2007. 
25 According to a 2007 study by Friedrich Schneider, in 2002–03 the shadow economy consistently represented 
61.3% of Azerbaijan’s GDP. 
26 State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan -Labor Statistics 2009. 
CIS
2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008
Large scale privatization 2.0 2.0 3.3 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.0
Banking reform & interest rate liberalisation 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.0 1.7 2.7
Securities markets & NBFI 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.7 2.7 1.8 2.3
Competition Policy 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.2
Enterprise restructuring 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2
Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakhstan
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Business 2009 rankings following several reforms in registration and labor markets.27 These 
reforms are very promising. However, for most of 2005–07, Azerbaijan ranked above 90 
globally, behind the bulk of its regional comparators. Azerbaijan also ranks poorly in the trade 
logistics index,28 and in the Global Competitiveness Report. In addition, in Azerbaijan, analysis 
shows that the costs of corruption are significantly higher than in other countries, amounting to 
6.1 percent of the value of earnings of Azeri firms against, for example, 0.5 percent in Georgia 
and 1.0 percent in Kyrgyzstan.  
1.25. Access to financing is an obstacle that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) face in 
their development (Table 1.4). Credit supply has been increasing rapidly in Azerbaijan but from 
a very low base. Total credit amounted to 11 percent of GDP in 2005, and reached 18.9 percent  
in 2008. The bulk of the increase has gone to households and services, whereas credit in 
agriculture has grown very slowly. The 2008 Business Environment Enterprise Survey (BEEPS) 
found that access to finance was only a problem for 23 percent of firms surveyed.  However,  
2008 IFC survey of SMEs indicated that access to credit was one of the top three constraints to 
developing a business for 54 percent of SMEs (in particular, those operating in agriculture and 
food processing); it also showed that 95.9 percent of firms’ investment funds are still coming 
from retained earnings.29 Recent reforms and the development of financial infrastructure have 
improved access to financial services. Nevertheless, many segments of Azerbaijan’s financial 
sector remain underdeveloped, including insurance, leasing, venture capital, stock exchange, and 
the banking sector.30 
Table 1.4: Main Constraints to Businesses in Azerbaijan and Neighboring Countries,  
2007–08 
Sources:  IFC SME Survey 2008, BEEPS 2005, Doing Business 2008, Trade Logistics 2007, and Global 
Competitiveness Report 2007-2008. 
                                                 
27 Azerbaijan’s Doing Business 2009 ranking was adjusted in the Doing Business 2010 (which ranks countries’ 
business environments for 2009 and re-ranks the 2008 results); Azerbaijan ranks 38th globally for 2009 and 2008. 
28 World Bank’s new Logistics Performance Index (LPI). 
29 IFC 2008. 
30  Banking sector assets came to 27 percent of non-oil GDP in 2008. 
Az e rbaijan Ge orgia Kaz akhstan Kyrgyz  Re p.
Major or Severe  constraint for doing business 2009 
Business Environm ent and Enterprise Perform ance Survey
(% of firm s surveyed)
Access to financing 23 35 31 28
T ax Rates 25 29 46 48
Ranking in the 2009 Doing Business Report (out of 181 countries)
T ax Level and Complexity of the tax system 103 112 61 156
T rading Across Borders (cost , t ime, procedures) 174 85 180 181
Protect ing Investors 19 38 53 11
Global Com petitiveness Report 2008-09 (out of 134 countries)
Higher educat ion and t raining 80 84 59 83
Goods market  efficiency 89 71 80 120
Financial market  sophist icat ion 92 79 97 115
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1.26. Employment is rising, but existing skills might fail to match market needs and thus 
impede productivity growth. In 2006, approximately 64 percent of the working age population 
was employed, and the total unemployment rate stood at 7.1 percent; regional disparities in the 
labor market are significant, and undeclared work has increased. Only 41 percent of the 
employed had a labor contract in 2006 (down from 55 percent in 2003). Moreover, Azerbaijan 
faces the challenge of a mismatch between the qualifications of graduates and workers, and the 
changing structure of the economy. In particular, there is an excess supply of workers with 
general secondary education but no vocational skills.31 On the other hand, graduates from 
vocational education establishment find the acquired skills irrelevant to the labor market 
demand.  A priority is to invest in education and training to meet future labor demand and the 
higher skill needs expected in agriculture, agro-processing, oil production, oil-related industries, 
tourism, communication, and financial services. 
1.27. Azerbaijan’s challenges have together contributed to lower productivity in the non-
oil economy relative to comparators. Azerbaijan’s overall productivity growth has been high in 
recent years—8 percent in 2001–04 and 26 percent in 2005–07. However, most of this 
impressive growth has been in the oil sector.32 Productivity growth has been more reasonable in 
services (4.8 percent on average), but almost zero in agriculture (0.5 percent on average from 
2001–07). As discussed below, agriculture has suffered from low levels of investment, which 
resulted in a decline of capital per worker. In services, productivity growth accelerated in 2006–
07, and it reached 11.3 percent on average. Despite the  growth in services, Azerbaijan’s overall 
productivity level is very low compared to neighboring countries, such as Georgia and 
Kazakhstan, where, in 2005 it was almost 200 and 300 percent higher respectively (Table 1.5). 
Table 1.5: Azerbaijan and Comparators -Productivity Level (2005),  
and Average Annual Growth Rate (1995-2005) 
(Value added per worker in PPP, constant 2000 international  dollars) 
Source: World Bank Staff calculations based on World Development Indicators 
Notes: Kazakhstan PPP figures for 2004; Ukraine average annual growth for 2000-05.
 
  
                                                 
31 To address some of those needs, the government took measures in 2007 and 2008 to increase employment by 
promoting SME growth and by developing infrastructure projects. 
32 See Jamet 2007. 
 2005 1999-2005 average annual growth rate
 Agriculture Industry Services Total Agriculture Industry Services Total
Azerbaijan  2,349 47,451 5,251 9,217 1.3% 17.4% 1.9% 9.8%
Georgia 2,117 19,882 10,743 6,887 -1.8% 11.2% 11.3% 7.3%
Armenia 5,376 34,799 11,099 12,105 4.7% 24.0% 13.1% 13.4%
Kazakhstan 2,995 28,621 14,777 13,239 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ukraine 7,919 19,745 13,871 14,138 3.4% 9.8% 7.0% 7.2%
Turkey 8,972 21,420 31,424 22,329 0.3% 0.7% 0.6% 2.2%
Latvia          9,209 23,500 33,857 28,101 14.2% 3.8% 6.4% 7.1%
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E. AZERBAIJAN’S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND RESPONSE OF THE ECONOMY 
Objectives 
1.28. Azerbaijan’s development objective is to become a sustainable middle-income 
country by the end of the oil boom.  In order for Azerbaijan to attain a per capita income of 
about AZN 5,000 (in 2007 manats) by 2025, its non-oil economy needs to grow at an average 
annual rate of 6.5 percent in 2008–25. Azerbaijan can use its oil resources and the capacities of 
the private sector to develop a diversified and sustainable economy that is globally and 
regionally integrated.   Its agricultural sector can become an exporter of higher value-added food 
items. The country can capitalize on its refining capacity and in petroleum products. It can also 
capitalize on its geographic location to strengthen its position on the Silk Road, not only for oil 
and gas but also for merchandise trade. Finally, Azerbaijan can continue to expect a boost from 
its service sector as the economy develops.   
Strategies and Policies33 
1.29. Azerbaijan’s strategy is to modernize the economy using oil revenues, and to 
complete the transition to a market-based economy.  Azerbaijan expects to develop its 
economy by using a good part of its oil wealth to pay for much-needed infrastructure 
investments and reforms. It expects to frontload its investments in the early years of the oil boom 
to establish the non-oil economy, and to reap the benefits of a larger production base thereafter. 
Azerbaijan’s Long Term Oil Revenue Management Strategy (LTROMS, 2003) speaks of that 
objective.34  The government expects that frontloading investment will have some inflationary 
costs, but feels it is a price worth paying to jump-start the economy. As the country’s 
infrastructure base is established, the government expects the private sector to take a leading role 
in development, and the economy to complete its transition.  Taking a very hands-on approach, 
the government seems keen to manage all the infrastructure improvements, retain ownership of 
assets, and play a significant role in management.  The government has astutely sought to 
improve the incomes of the poor while the revenues from the new oil are coming in and Oil Fund 
assets are being accumulated. To that end, public sector salaries as well as social transfers have 
been increased.35  
1.30. At the sectoral level, network utilities (mostly power and roads) have been given top 
priority in the short term, while agriculture and services are expected to assume more 
importance in the medium term.  Azerbaijan has made the development of its utilities sectors a 
top priority, given their poor performance and the debilitating impact they have on the rest of the 
economy.  However, in the long term, Azerbaijan expects significant growth and employment 
from the agricultural sector and food processing and from services, particularly wholesale and 
                                                 
33 This section and the next one are based on several World Bank and IMF documents: SAC-II ICR, PRSC ICR, and 
two JSANs. 
34 Within the LTORMS is embedded a very important concept, widely discussed in Chapter 3, namely that 
government should plan to spend an approximately constant real level of fiscal revenues from oil, in perpetuity. 
35 The government’s vision has appeared in several places, over time, though it has been documented systematically 
only occasionally, such as the 2003 Presidential Speech, the 2003–05 State Program for Poverty Reduction and 
Economic Development (SPPRED), the State Program for Economic Development of the Regions 2006-08 and, 
most recently, the draft State Program for Poverty Reduction 2008–2012. 
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retail trade and transit services, but also from finance, hospitality services, and social sectors 
(especially education and health). All this calls for large investments at the tertiary levels in both 
sectors (and at the secondary levels too in health).  
Institutional and Policy Reforms 
1.31. A broad policy package. Azerbaijan’s reform package is based on a macroeconomic 
framework that—together with improved public finance policies, regulation, and privatization—
will provide the underpinnings for balanced growth.  Efforts would be made to improve the 
investment climate, access to credit, and the quality of infrastructure. All this will be done to 
enable the development of the agricultural sector as part of a comprehensive rural development 
policy, and the tourist sector. The package anticipates modernization of the budget process 
(including PIP prioritization) to be completed and exchange rate appreciation to be avoided. In 
addition, there will be significant privatization across the economy (including utilities and the 
banking sector); structural reforms in the energy sector (SOCAR restructuring, etc); adoption of 
new curricula for general education and of a basic health care package.   The Bank expects most 
first-generation policy reforms to be completed by 2010. 
1.32. In practice, top priority has been accorded to the social sectors, particularly social 
policy and assistance to the poor.  Azerbaijan established a targeted social assistance scheme 
that had successfully reached 165,000 households by 2008, and whose effectiveness has been 
documented by the 2008 Living Standards measurement Survey.36  At the same time, Azerbaijan 
has raised pensions and the minimum wages of the public sector in a bid to alleviate poverty of 
the lowest income groups.   Reforms are also underway in primary and secondary education 
(curriculum revision, teacher training/workload) and in the health sector (definition of basic 
package of services, health insurance).   Finally, Azerbaijan’s significant investment program 
initiated in 2005 may itself be viewed as a massive employment-generation program. 
1.33. In practice, Azerbaijan has accorded secondary priority to policy and institutional 
macroeconomic management—with the exception of the Oil Fund’s stellar performance.  
Much lesser priority has been given to expenditure management.  Azerbaijan’s 
macroeconomic policies have been largely consistent with macroeconomic stability – public 
spending has been sustainable through 2008 but inflationary pressures could have been mitigated 
with a more flexible exchange rate (discussed in the next section).  Azerbaijan also managed the 
risks of the appreciating currency and the rising credit of the financial sector reasonably well. 
The primary challenge for macroeconomic policies has been the lack or predictability of public 
spending and the absence of a medium-term vision for public spending.   This has led to few, if 
any, limitations on expenditures by budgetary agencies, and as a result, there was no pressure for 
sound medium-term planning and increasing efficiency.  In turn, because of the lack of an 
articulated vision there has been very little pressure for budgetary reforms or improvements in 
the public investment appraisal system. However, in early 2008, a much-needed macroeconomic 
coordination committee was created under the leadership of the Ministry of Economic 
Development.  The exception to Azerbaijan’s modest reforms in macroeconomic management 
and expenditure management has been the creation of the Oil Fund, which has succeeded in 
credibly serving as a stabilization fund and as a fund to preserve revenues for future generations. 
                                                 
36 The Living Standards Measurement Study is a World Bank study based on household surveys. 
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It has also spearheaded the country’s participation in the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) and has been recognized internationally with a UNDP Excellence in Public 
Service Award in 2007 (Box 1.2).  
 
1.34. In practice, policies and institutional reforms in the utilities sector have been slow 
but sensible on the financial management front, although very much government-centered.  
The government has strengthened the quality of service provision to the private sector (and to 
households) by retaining ownership of the country’s utilities (power, gas, fixed-line 
telecommunications, but also road management, and rail). This has been done through heavy 
investment aimed at improving service quality, accelerating introduction of metering, and 
gradually introducing accounting standards for transparent monitoring by the central 
government.  These efforts have produced  good progress in: (i) bringing tariff rates to cost 
recovery levels for most utilities (latest effort in January 2007); (ii) investing in metering for 
power, gas, and water and commensurately  raising the collection rates; and (iii)  investing in 
International Financial Reporting Standards (expected to be operational in 2009-2011, depending 
on the individual state enterprise).  Notwithstanding the above mentioned progress, there has 
been some controversy in the approach, notably the insignificant involvement of the private 
sector in the management of the SOEs, which entail enormous commercial risk.  Challenges 
facing the utility sectors are discussed in Chapter 4. 
1.35. In practice, despite recent progress 
highlighted in Doing Business 2009, Azerbaijan 
has accorded low priority to the improvement of 
the regulatory environment for the private sector. 
Doing Business 2009 notes regulatory improvements 
made in 2007/08 in the business environment, 
particularly in areas related to starting a business 
(Chapter 5).  However, other regulatory reforms, such 
as passage of the Competition Law and the 
Investment Law, as well as modernization of 
licensing and of customs administration, have lagged 
behind.  Azerbaijan ranked 97th in Doing Business 
2008 survey.   
  
Box 1.2: Azerbaijan’s Oil Fund–International Role and Recognition 
Azerbaijan’s Oil Fund (OF) was established by a Presidential Decree on December 29, 1999; statutory regulations 
for the OF were approved by the President on December 29, 2000.  The purpose of the OF is to serve as a 
stabilization fund and to safeguard oil revenues for future generations.  In 2008 the Oil Fund had accumulated 
$11.2 billion in assets. The OF assets are managed according to investment guidelines approved (and amended) in 
2001 and 2005.  The Fund’s revenues comprise the sale of the government’s share of profit from oil and gas 
exploitation, BTC dividends from oil and gas projects, revenues from management of OF assets, and other smaller 
revenues. The Oil Fund also serves as the government’s implementation agency for the EITI. Azerbaijan gained 
wide experience in EITI implementation and is the only country that has already submitted eight EITI reports; 
Azerbaijan obtained EITI Candidate status in September 2007 was the first country to complete Validation (2009). 
Figure 1.21: Recent Expenditures (2003-
2008) 
Sources: IMF and World Bank Staff estimates 
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Public Spending 
1.36.  The development strategy translated into very large fiscal expansion from 2006 
onwards—which came at a macroeconomic cost that was acceptable to the government. 
The central government’s expenditure doubled in real terms in 2004-08, driven by a 72 percent 
increase in current spending and a 226 percent increase in investment spending. As a result, the 
ratio of consolidated government expenditures to non-oil GDP soared from 40.5 percent in 2004 
to a projected 81 percent in 2008 (Figure 1.21). However, while the burst of spending raised the 
non-oil fiscal deficit from 12.6 percent of non-oil GDP in 2005 to 32.1 percent in 2007, the 
overall fiscal balance remained positive. In the government’s view, accelerating public 
expenditure growth for a few years would have a short-term cost of relatively higher inflation 
and/or currency  appreciation, but it would ultimately produce a  positive effect on productivity 
(through  investment in infrastructures and capacity-building), thereby enhancing the long-term 
competitiveness of the non-oil economy. The structure of the budget is presented for year 2007 
in this chapter and is further discussed in Chapter 2. 
1.37.  The Azeri economy responded to the 
fiscal stimulus. It grew extremely fast during 
2005-2008, at 24.2 percent on average. Although 
slower than oil sector growth, non-oil GDP growth 
has averaged 12.1 percent in 2005-08. Services 
were the most dynamic component of the non-oil 
economy in the last four years, whose share 
increased to 55.1 percent of non-oil value added, 
while other sectors’ shares declined: non-oil 
industry now represents 7.4 percent of non-oil GDP, 
construction 21.2 percent, and agriculture 16.3 
percent.37  
1.38. The combination of the large fiscal 
stimulus and a policy of managed float against 
the U.S. dollar, as well as monetary expansion and the credit boom, fueled inflation in 
2006-2008. The annual appreciation of the manat against the U.S. dollar was 6.7 percent for 
2005, 4.9 percent for 2006, 3 percent for 2007, and 4.3 percent for 2008. As a consequence, the 
National Bank followed an expansionary monetary policy to counter the rising need for manats. 
Annual inflation rose from 5.4 percent in December 2006 to 15.3 percent in December 2008 
(Figure 1.22). While the jump in inflation can be explained partly by the administrative price 
adjustment in early 2007 (adjustment of gasoline and utility tariffs as well as regulated prices), 
most of it is due to the monetary expansion—broad money (M2) increased by 622 percent 
between January 2006 and December 2008. In this period, Central Bank’s international reserves 
tripled, as it sought to accommodate the government’s fiscal policy and at the same time 
maintain a nominal appreciation rate of 4-5 percent per year. Concurrently, credit growth, mainly 
directed at households, was as high as 203 percent in 2006-2008, which fueled a real estate 
boom. In the face of inflationary pressures, the National Bank of Azerbaijan (NBA) was 
                                                 
37 In contrast to the changes in the structure of the economy, official statistics report few changes in the structure of 
employment (see figure 1.18).  
Figure 1.22: Non-oil Primary Deficit, Money 
Growth, and Inflation (2003-2008) 
Source: National Bank of Azerbaijan  
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relatively slow to respond, waiting until March 2007 to raise the refinancing rate, which rose 
from 9.5 percent in March 2007 to 15 percent as of July 2008, and down to 8 percent by 
December 2008 (as the crisis picked up, the Central Bank eased its monetary policy).38 
1.39. The fiscal expansion has started crowding out non-oil private investment. While 
public investment and public expenditure are on the rise, non-oil private investment decreased in 
2006–2008 in its share of GDP (Table 1.6). This trend raises concern that the public spending 
boom might have a relatively large crowding-out effect. 
Table 1.6: Estimated Non-oil Private Investment Breakdown, 2003–08 
 
Sources: Statistical Committee and World Bank staff estimates. 
Note: Corresponds to Figure 1.16.
 
1.40. The overall trade surplus and rapid growth, as well as devaluations from trading 
partners as a result of the crisis, has led to appreciation of the REER. The CPI-based non-oil 
REER appreciated in 2005–2008 after depreciating in 2001–2004. The rate was below its 2001 
level through 2007. While the manat appreciated against the U.S. dollar by 2.9 percent in 2007, it 
depreciated against the currencies of its main trading partners (respectively by 7.5, 16.4, 1.4 and 
4.2 percent against the euro, the Turkish lira, the Kazakh tenge and the Russian ruble; however, 
in 2008, many of Azerbaijan’s trading partners devalued their  currencies (See Figure 1.17).  
1.41. The global crisis “put the brakes” on the overheated Azeri economy.  While heading 
into 2008, the Azeri policymakers had to subdue an overheating economy (rising prices, 
appreciating currency and suffering non-oil sector).  In late 2008, oil prices   dropped to less than 
$50 per barrel and international credit to the Azeri economy was drying up.  Azerbaijan runs 
moderate risks of having lower remittances (from Russia) in 2009, and lower than expected oil 
revenues.  The conservative 2009 budget proposes a modest 15 percent nominal increase of the 
consolidated budget (perhaps resulting in a real contraction of the budget).  All together, these 
are reasons for depreciation of the currency that, however, risk provoking a banking crisis.   
  
                                                 
38 In early 2008, the CBA adopted a dual currency basket containing dollars and euros to allow for more exchange 
rate flexibility and reduce imported inflation. The policy was abandoned as the global crisis deepened later in the 
year. 
2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Investments 96.4 81.7 71.4 61.5
  Government Sector 13.3 21.6 34.1 38.5
  Private Sector 83.1 60.2 37.4 23.0
    o/w Oil 60.0 41.3 27.2 13.4
    o/w Non-oil 23.1 18.8 10.2 9.7
       o/w construction .. 5.9 4.2 4.5
       o/w other .. 12.9 6.0 5.1
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1.42. In the post-2008 period, Azerbaijan will have 
to contend with lower fiscal revenues relative to the 
size of the non-oil economy.  Sustainability requires 
Azerbaijan to moderate its fiscal expenditures in the 
short and medium term (Figure 1.23). This moderation 
will minimize the fiscal stimulus to the Azeri economy, 
relative to 2005-2008, necessary if Azerbaijan wishes 
to set aside some oil revenues for the next generation.  
Azerbaijan will have to increasingly rely on the private 
sector and non-oil exports to generate domestic 
demand.  
F. SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT IN RESOURCE-RICH AND SMALL ECONOMIES  
1.43. International evidence suggests that natural resources are neither a curse nor a 
blessing; the ability of the each country’s political system to reach an agreement on the 
creation of sound institutions is behind the natural resource success stories. Figure 1.24 
shows that the number of countries that have resource endowments is almost equal to the number 
of countries with high per capita incomes.  The figure has a notional “V” shape: along the left 
side of the “V” are countries with no natural resource endowments, while on the right side of the 
V are countries with natural resource endowments–there is a large number of countries on the 
right side. Both sides of the V have high- and low-income countries, and confirm that Azerbaijan 
has the ability to choose the group it will belong to in the future.  Box 1.3 highlights the example 
of Malaysia, which has pursued successful social policies and diversified its economy.  
Figure 1.24: Natural Resource Endowments and  
Level of  Development 
Source: Maloney 2007 and Bank estimates using IMF and UN Comtrade data. 
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1.44. Successful development results from better market institutions.  Success comes when 
countries diversify their exports, improve public finance management, and build on the 
accumulation of knowledge and infrastructure. Successful countries that have natural riches––
Botswana, Chile, Norway, Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates––have taken into account the 
importance of institutional capacities in their strategic priority-setting by ensuring that these 
capacities are sufficient before considering using resource revenues to stimulate growth. It is 
important to note that these countries score much better than Azerbaijan on governance 
indicators such as control of corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, political stability, 
regulatory quality, and accountability.39  An objective measure of the broad quality of economic 
institutions, abstract from views of analysts or survey respondents, can be found in the proxy 
Contract-Intensive Money (CIM), which measures the degree to which individuals are willing to 
hold a larger proportion of their financial assets in the form of currency as protection in 
environments where third-party enforcement of contracts is unreliable.40 Figure 1.25 compares 
broad institutional quality for Azerbaijan in the beginning of its oil boom, with that of well 
performing resource-rich and small economies.  The figure shows that 30–40 years ago, most of 
the comparators were little different from where Azerbaijan was in 2008.  In fact, in the 1960s, 
Chile’s per capita income, CIM and non-commodity exports were somewhat comparable to those 
of Azerbaijan today.  However, by 2008, Chile’s non-commodity exports had more than tripled 
(as a share of non-commodity GDP), its CIM was identical to that of Norway and, most 
importantly, its per capita income had also more than tripled.  
Box 1.3: Malaysia’s Successful Diversification 
The example of Malaysia illustrates that the presence of large natural resources is not perforce a curse.  It 
demonstrates that a strong political will and commitment to sound economic policies, sustained over many years, 
can avoid the “resource curse.”   As recently as 1980, 32% of Malaysia’s total exports of goods and services were 
from oil and natural gas.  From 1980-2006, there were wild gyrations in the price of oil.  However, by 2006, oil and 
natural gas comprised only 13% of total exports while Malaysia’s real per capita GDP grew at an average annual 
rate of 3.6% from 1980 to 2006,  reaching over 150% to $12,536 (in current $PPP) in 2006.   
A critical element of success was the high savings rate that made capital available for investment. Households were 
required to contribute to a compulsory savings scheme. Government expenditures favored education, housing, and 
health, and achieved a geographically balanced distribution.  Moreover, good governance enabled Malaysia to 
sustain these high growth rates.   In the 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Malaysia 
ranked 39th, far above Nigeria (159th), which failed to emulate Malaysia’s diversification model.  For example, it 
currently takes only one day to either Stamp the Company Documents or to register with the Income tax Department 
in Malaysia.  Not surprisingly, Malaysia ranked 20th globally in the World Bank 2009 Doing Business Survey.  
(Azerbaijan’s recent graduation to 33rd is encouraging). 
Although Malaysia promoted export-oriented manufacturing from the early 1970s, it also tried, unsuccessfully, in 
the early 1980s, to use its oil income to start heavy and chemical industries in the public sector  with government 
protection.  Moreover, the size of the public sector doubled between 1966 and 1981. This too was abandoned due to 
the recession of the mid-1980’s.  Thereafter, Malaysia pursued economic and export diversification.   
Sensible economic policies were formulated and implemented by professional civil servants, academics, and 
technocrats. At that relatively early stage of economic development, the government focused on labor-intensive 
industrialization utilizing workers from rural areas.  Recognizing that at this time multinational companies (MNCs) 
                                                 
39 See Kaufmann and others 2007. 
40 CIM is measured as (M2-Currency)/M2.  It is based on citizens’ decisions regarding the form in which they 
choose to hold their financial assets and is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size 
of contract-dependent sectors of the economy. Clague, Christopher; Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur 
Olson (1999), “Contract-Intensive Money." Journal of Economic Growth, 4, 185-209.   
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were relocating manufacturing to developing countries to take advantage of lower wages, the government increased 
the supply of skilled workers to the rapidly expanding manufacturing sector by allocating a substantial portion of the 
budget to education. Moreover, even within manufacturing, Malaysia diversified from resource-based to technology-
intensive products.  In particular, since 1987 the electronics industry has been the leading export earner in Malaysia.  
This industry developed  with the  arrival of MNCs in two waves, the first in 1972-75 and the second in 1985-90, 
lured by Malaysia’s educated work-force and business-friendly environment.  Exports of these high value-added 
products have grown rapidly and have provided Malaysia with a cushion against terms of trade shocks and led to the 
aforementioned sustained growth. 
 
1.45. Good market institutions imply a good degree of global integration—this has been a 
lesson for small countries as well, and will be important for post-oil Azerbaijan. Success has 
come to resource-rich countries that diversified their exports and improved public finance 
management.  Successful resource-rich countries––Chile, Malaysia and Indonesia—improved 
their institutional capacities and then used resource revenues to stimulate growth.  Similarly, 
several small economies—the Czech Republic, Ireland, South Korea and Taiwan—rapidly 
became high-income countries by competing in global markets and improving their institutional 
capacities.  While for small economies the need to be open may be obvious (i.e., the need to 
expand markets, and to be competitive), it is important to note that successful resource-rich 
countries diversified their exports by gathering critical inputs through imports and FDI. For 
instance, Chile and Malaysia managed to increase the technological content of resource-based 
clusters and developed new areas of competitive advantage.41 Common features include policies 
to improve business environment and attract FDI (including trade facilitation, competition 
policy, and a qualified labor force), a diversification strategy that built on existing strengths 
(horizontal and vertical diversification through clusters based on natural resources) before 
moving to higher skill-content specializations, and efforts to coordinate public and private actors.  
Figure 1.26 presents the export performance of selected small economies that Azerbaijan is 
urged to emulate, while Figure 1.27 presents non-commodity exports of selected resource-rich 
countries that have successfully diversified.  
Figure 1.25: Long-term Measure of Institutional Quality 
(Contract-Intensive Money[M2-Currency] as Percent of M2) 
Source: Bank staff estimates based on Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson (1999). 
Notes: (a) No data for Ireland and Netherlands after 1998 because they adopted the euro; (b) no data for Azerbaijan and 
Slovak before 1992; (c) data for Georgia, Kazakhstan and Armenia average of 2006-07; and (d) no data for Indonesia 
before 1979. 
                                                 
41 See J-F Jamet, “What can Azerbaijan learn from successful diversification strategies abroad?” CEM Background 
Paper, 2007. 
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1.46. Good market institutions have been complemented by focused public-private 
partnerships aimed at facilitating exports of specific sectors of products with demonstrated 
market opportunities.  Focused partnerships between the public and private sectors have aimed 
to strengthen access to foreign markets, standardize quality, and reduce transportation costs.  Box 
1.4 provides examples from Malaysia and Chile.     
Figure 1.26: Exports of Selected Small Economies (% 
of GDP) 
Figure 1.27: Non-Commodity Exports of Selected 
Natural Resource Economies (% of GDP) 
Source: Comtrade 
Note: (*) Non-oil exports as percent of non-oil GDP. 
Source: Comtrade  
 
1.47. While the government can play a very significant role in diversification, it should 
not compromise competition.  A study of  10 cases of successful diversification in some 
resource-rich and some non-resource-rich countries has revealed a common set of actions that 
governments could take to support the private sector, and create incentives for diversification.42 
The following industries/countries were studied: software in India; electronics in Taiwan and 
Malaysia; palm oil and related products in Malaysia; salmon farming and wine production in 
Chile; grapes and maize in India; fisheries in Uganda; floriculture in Kenya.  The common 
actions of governments in these successful cases of diversification were:  
• Governments set up goals to support non-traditional or nascent industries because 
they were valuable sources of export-led growth, foreign exchange, and/or fulfilled 
employment objectives. 
• Governments did not necessarily pick winners (except for electronics, palm oil, and 
salmon –the cautious development of the salmon industry in Chile is documented in 
this chapter, Box 1.4), but instead supported industries that were growing faster than 
others.  They pursued private sector-driven export-led growth by facilitating the 
private sector’s ability to adapt and master new technologies and sharpen export 
competiveness. 
• The governments rewarded winners and dropped losers by conditioning public 
support on export performance. 
                                                 
42 Chandra, Vandana (ed.) Technology, adaptation, and exports: how some developing countries got it right. World 
Bank 2006. Adapted from Box 1.2, page 40. 
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• Competition between domestic firms, and between domestic and foreign firms, was 
generally unrestricted. 
• Rule of law, including observance of international property rights, applied in all 
cases. 
• Political commitment, sometimes in the form of a national vision, was a significant 
contributor to the success of the industries. 
Box 1.4:  Examples of Diversification in Resource-rich Countries:   
Malaysia and Chile  
The Palm Oil Diversification Program in Malaysia 
After its independence in 1957, the Malaysian economy was dependent on tin and rubber, which accounted for 50% 
of GDP at the time and whose development was supported by the government. However, the advent of synthetic 
rubber led to the fall of rubber prices, which triggered  an economic and social crisis in the 60s. The government was  
forced to recognize the necessity  of expanding the economy’s  narrow base  to generate growth. It adopted a 
diversification strategy based on the development of palm oil exports and on the establishment of industrial estates 
aimed at growing the manufacturing sector. The promotion of the palm oil industry proved to be a success story and 
the emphasis on rural and agricultural development provided employment and income-earning opportunities to the 
rural poor. This came mainly from a policy that allowed for an increase in palm oil production and greater 
sophistication of exports, based on initiatives in penetrating and deepening markets, R&D and a conducive 
regulatory framework: 
-  The Federal Land Development Authority opened new lands for resettlement of the rural landless, seizing the 
opportunity to promote oil palm smallholdings. It also helped to convert large areas of rubber land to palm oil.  
- The Palm Oil Registration and Licensing Authority ensured the orderly development of the palm oil industry  
by issuing license to the businesses involved in production, transportation, storage, exports and sale of palm oil, 
and by controlling quality of the products, and registering trade contracts. 
- The Palm Oil Research Institute of Malaysia was in charge of improving productivity, value added, quality and 
other aspects of the  industry’s performance. In particular, it provided the bulk of R&D about palm oil. 
- The Malaysian Palm Oil Promotion Council was responsible for public relations and market promotion  in 
international markets through trade missions, exhibitions and distribution of information on nutritional aspects 
of palm oil. It made special efforts to increase consumer knowledge on palm oil products and provided technical 
support to develop the utilization of palm oil. 
 
Diversification from Copper in Chile 
Chile offers a good example of how a country can successfully diversify into agricultural products and processed 
food exports by combining horizontal and vertical integration. The world food industry is concentrated and 
internationalized, and “retail distribution has become a key component of the food chain, with monopsony power 
reinforced by buying alliances”.43 In this context, competitiveness of the agro-food sector on world markets is 
particularly dependent on low logistics and transport costs and performance of the whole food chain. It also requires 
increasing productivity by investing in agronomic R&D, permitting technology transfers, training workers, 
upgrading quality standards and facilitating access to credit.  
 
Chile was also particularly successful in differentiating primary agricutural production as well as food products (for 
instance wine, organic cultures, fresh fruits or high quality cereals) and developing the service content of its exports 
(thanks to good logistics and branding). These actions were important on top of the improvement of the economic 
environment the country displayed: stable macroeconomic fundamentals, upgraded infrastructure, integrated 
commercial networks (including small farmers), competition in the non-tradable sector and better access to credit, 
education and R&D. Finally, FDI played an important role as it facilitated participation in international production 
and distribution networks. 
 
The development of the salmon industry is in particular very instructive of how the government and the private 
                                                 
43 OECD, Trade and Competitiveness in Argentina, Brazil and Chile: not as easy as A-B-C, 2004 
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sector can cooperate to achieve international success. Early on, the government created opportunities for fish 
farming in the country (by seeking assistance from donors and co-funding), and funded agencies that gradually 
worked to develop the sector. The Chilean government first looked into salmon and trout farming in the 1960s, 
developing the Institute for Fishery Development (IFOP) and the Agricultural and Live Stock Service (SAG) to 
explore the feasibility for fish farming and to identify locations and to work with donors (Japanese International 
Agency for Cooperation) to establish some local expertise.  A Japanese firm was the first to invest in Chile’s salmon 
sector.  The Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO) made its first loan for trout farming in 1974. As 
demand for trout and salmon increased, not only did production increase, but enterprises became self-sufficient in 
producing most inputs needed for fish farming (netting, pens, etc.), except eggs.  Eventually in the 1980s, as the 
industry grew, the government structure evolved, separating the strategy and policy from the implementation and 
enforcement tasks. 
 
Over the years, the government developed numerous agencies, and enabled the engagement of donors in  various 
stages of development of the industry: CORFO for lending, Canadian International Development Agency funded a 
project to co-manage local firms, local partnerships emerged with Norwegian and Japanese firms; Fundacion Chile 
(private non-profit) did a lot of experimentation, and disseminated knowledge. In the 1980s, as a critical mass of 
producers was formed, an association was established for: (a) marketing research; and (b) establishment of standards 
(INTESAL -Institute for Salmon and Trout).  The government focused on rationalizing regulation (across 
jurisdictions).  In the 1990s, Salmocorp, a joint venture, was created to look for new markets. 
 
1.48. Non–reformers pay a price. On the other hand, it is widely known that resource-rich 
countries can be underachievers in development. Failures are found when incentives for rent-
seeking and corruption are unmitigated, and when there is a lack of spillover from the resource 
sector to the rest of the economy, low value-added of exports, and low efficiency of public 
spending.44 Such incentives generally proliferate in an environment of weak institutions45 and 
poor public finance governance.46  Figure 1.25 showed a generic measure of institutional 
strength in Azerbaijan, relative to other resource-rich countries at the time when they 
experienced resource booms and relative to small open economies.  While it suggests that—as 
can be seen from other countries—the institutions that support exchanges (and in fact the 
functioning of markets) are weak in Azerbaijan,  it also shows that progress for Azerbaijan is 
within reach, and that it  can work to close the gap. 
1.49. These resource-rich countries attained higher incomes by adopting deficit/debt rules 
aimed at stabilizing spending, promoting public spending transparency and anticorruption 
initiatives as well as the removal of trade barriers, streamlining business regulations, and 
developing public-private partnerships. It is also recognized that resource-rich countries are often 
unable to sustain high economic growth due to their inherent incentives for rent-seeking and 
corruption.  Furthermore, because of the lack of spillover from the resource sector to the rest of 
the economy, there is low value-added to exports and little employment.  All of these problems 
are exacerbated by weak institutions and poor public finance governance. 
1.50. The examples of successfully diversified resource-rich countries suggest that the best 
employment of oil resources by the government is one that leads to reduced costs for the 
private sector.  This applies to the deployment of macroeconomic policies that reduce volatility 
in the economy (such as the course of the exchange rate or inflation). It also applies to reducing 
                                                 
44 See Sachs and Warner 2001.  
45 See Lane and Tornell 1995. 
46 See Manzano and Rigobom 2007. 
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transport and operating costs, whether they originate from economic, institutional, or 
administrative barriers.  
G. OVERCOMING THE HURDLES CAUSED BY THE GLOBAL CRISIS  
1.51. Amidst Azerbaijan’s ambitious development plans, the global economy descended 
into a crisis. While ECA is hard hit by the crisis, Azerbaijan, to date, seems to have escaped 
relatively unscathed but still has suffered some minor shocks.   The ECA and LAC regions 
seem to be the second hardest hit by the crisis after the high-income countries –they are the only 
regions whose 2009 GDP growth is expected to be less than half the 2006-2007 average.  The 
ECA region seems to have had little direct exposure to the U.S. financial crisis, but was hit by 
indirect spillovers.  Slow demand in the Euro zone has dampened the export performance of 
ECA countries. Already, the performance of the Baltic countries has stalled; the CIS countries 
are also experiencing a decline because of the drop in oil revenues, and as a consequence of the 
impact of the banking crisis on the Russian economy.  For 2009, the Azeri economy is  expected 
to hold up better than the average country in ECA because: (a) the country was less integrated 
regionally and previous years’ performance relied significantly on oil revenues (see earlier 
discussion), the reliance of the banking sector on foreign credit had  been relatively small and 
external borrowings  could be covered by national reserves, the reliance of aggregate demand on 
non-oil exports  was low; and (b) oil production is currently expected to increase further in 2009-
2010 before gradually tapering off. With anticipated higher oil production, a significant 
financing source for the economy is currently expected to remain intact, even if oil prices remain 
suppressed. Nevertheless, amid the global crisis, vigilant monitoring of global developments, oil 
production plans, non-oil sector performance, and prices, is required. 
1.52. During the crisis Azerbaijan should ensure that domestic demand is sustained.  In 
the absence of the crisis, Azerbaijan might have continued to rely on the public sector to expand 
aggregate demand, simultaneously pursuing the development of non-oil exports.  As a result of 
the crisis, however, Azerbaijan needs to rethink its growth strategy. One approach is to use 
public spending to support aggregate demand, as before.  However, Azerbaijan’s public spending 
is already quite high, as this chapter and Chapter 3 suggest. Under current circumstances, the 
downward trend in public spending (relative to non-oil GDP) should be sustained, although there 
is leeway regarding the pace of the decline.  Should the domestic economy weaken as a result of 
the crisis, the pace of adjustment could be slower in the short term.  Another approach is to 
accelerate reforms that encourage non-oil private investment. In Azerbaijan, the private sector 
operates with significant administrative hurdles (Chapter 5 discusses licensing, tax and customs 
administrations placing significant costs on the economy). During 2009, Azerbaijan should focus 
on reducing those hurdles following the recommendations in Chapter 5. 
1.53. To support domestic demand, and to ensure financial stability, Azerbaijan can 
strengthen its vigilant supervision of the financial sector, and ensure that access to credit 
for the private sector does not decline significantly as a result of the crisis. The inadequacy 
of financing created by the global crisis will likely have an impact on Azerbaijan.  The direct 
impact relates to short-term foreign debt that is not rolled over and the financing shortages that 
would be created for some commercial banks, which will affect the private sector. These short-
term obligations are anticipated to be in the order of $1-2 billion in 2009, significantly smaller 
than the Oil Fund assets and the country’s foreign currency reserves at end-2008 (about $15 
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billion).  The indirect impact of the global crisis on the financial sector (and more broadly in 
financing of domestic investment) will be from the lower availability of private foreign 
financing, either in the form of foreign lending to Azeri banks, or FDI, especially to the non-oil 
sector.47 To mitigate the risk of adverse developments in the banking sector, Azerbaijan’s 
monetary authorities should enhance the supervision of the financial sector.   If government 
support of the financial sector is required, such support should be channeled through the 
consolidated budget. In order to enhance the ability of the financial sector to support investment, 
especially in 2009, Azerbaijan may wish to accelerate reforms in formalizing the operations of 
the private sector (discussed in Chapter 5) and ensure hassle-free access to credit (Chapter 6).  
1.54. While in the absence of the crisis Azerbaijan could have acted early (in 2009) and 
aggressively to expand export markets (as has been done in earlier decades by Asian 
countries), the crisis forces policy makers to look to 2010 or 2011 for gains in non-oil 
exports.  The relatively poor prospects for Azerbaijan’s trading partners as a result of the crisis 
suggests that gains in diversification, and especially in expanding non-oil exports, may take a 
little longer to achieve.  Azerbaijan can use the ‘down time’ in the global economy to: (a) 
strengthen the efficacy of its public sector interventions; and (b) reduce operating costs for it 
private sector. 
1.55. Azerbaijan must exercise exceptional caution as the depth and the duration of the 
global crisis are yet to be determined, as is the trough and duration of low oil prices.  This 
section demonstrates the high degree of oil dependence of Azerbaijan’s economy, and the need 
to reduce public spending (relative to non-oil GDP) in the presence of high oil prices (in a pre-
crisis scenario).  As a result of the global crisis, however, Azerbaijan faces significantly more 
pressure to reduce public spending.  The country may find it beneficial to adopt a long-term 
approach to estimating fiscal revenues from oil (as proposed in Chapter 3), and to base short-
term expenditure plans on permanent income estimates.  At the same time, it is very important 
that accurate forecasts of oil production for the short term are used, incorporating margins for 
error in oil and gas extraction and transportation, and also, for lowering the pace of production, 
should that be necessary for the short term. Separately, Azerbaijan’s foreign currency reserves 
(at the National Bank and the Oil Fund), and its untapped oil reserves  give it ample room to 
gradually adjust its public spending (i.e., soft landing) to a new expenditure level based on lower 
oil prices than expected in 2008.   
H. CONCLUSION  
1.56.  Oil undoubtedly buoyed the Azeri economy for the whole of 1994–2005. Today, 
Azerbaijan’s strategies and policies are pointing in the right direction-- toward greater regional 
and global integration. The importance given to infrastructure and institutional reform aimed at 
improving the business climate for the private sector, and social policies to help the needy are 
also appropriate. Both private sector growth and social policies target poverty reduction in the 
long and short run. Early in the oil boom, the government needs to take concentrated action to 
reverse the unfavorable trends in non-oil private investment, non-oil exports, and non-oil FDI.  
                                                 
47 In order to strengthen the management of state guaranteed debt, in 2008 the government created the Security Fund 
for Debt Under State Guarantee, and included provisions for it under the budget.  The main purpose of the fund is 
the timely repayment of state guaranteed debt.  
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The action is even more urgent given the global financial crisis and the need to reduce public 
spending in order to ensure sustainability and leave some oil revenues for future generations.  
The lessons from resource-rich and small economies show that a strategic focus on global 
integration needs to be maintained and strengthened, even during the global turmoil that the 
world is currently facing.  This report is about strengthening fiscal policies and economic 
management institutions that can help Azerbaijan meet its medium- and long-term development 
objectives. Prior to embarking on that task, the next chapter looks more closely at sectoral 
developments of the Azeri economy. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
THE ECONOMY AND ITS PROSPECTS 
 
Azerbaijan’s current output structure provides significant opportunities for the private sector to grow in 
the medium term.   The country can capitalize on existing activities in agriculture, agri-business and the 
service sectors.  Its economy often operates below its production frontier, sometimes for lack of inputs 
(scarce or poor-quality inputs, high cost of imports or lack of know-how) and sometimes because of 
institutional shortcomings (poorly functioning markets).  These constraints have neither prevented 
Azerbaijan from attaining double-digit growth in recent years, nor from gradually expanding its non-oil 
exports. But, since they do add to the cost of production, they may have hindered non-oil private 
investment and FDI.  Identifying and addressing the challenges will allow Azerbaijan to be more 
competitive when the buoyancy of high oil spending subsides, or if the country faces unforeseen 
challenges in the global downturn.  
 Removing the constraints that hinder the operation of markets would allow Azerbaijan to make 
progress across its entire economy. First, agriculture could move into higher value-added products and 
greater commercialization, and it could prepare agro-products for the more lucrative, but demanding, 
upper middle-income markets; second, investment in commercially viable downstream oil and gas 
activities could be stimulated; third, the cost of construction for all types of investments could be 
reduced; and fourth, it could improve the quality and scope of the service sectors, possibly transforming 
Azerbaijan from a transit route into a location for processing and value added. All of these activities 
would generate employment, which must be a high priority for Azerbaijan.   
This chapter provides the reader who is less familiar with Azerbaijan with a micro context for the macro 
level development dialogue that follows in other chapters of the report, and a basis for assessing the 
economy’s prospects. 
A. AZERBAIJAN’S FUTURE: BROAD STROKES FOR THE MEDIUM TERM 
2.1. In the medium term, Azerbaijan’s sustainability and growth as a small economy 
(given its size and market power) depend on its ability to integrate itself into the regional 
and global economies.  For integration to be sustainable, it must be based on efficient 
participation in global markets in the non-extraction industries; being regionally and globally 
competitive in non-extraction industries will secure jobs.  To that end, building infrastructure and 
undertaking a broad reform program to improve productivity and competitiveness, is 
strategically sensible.  This parallel initiative will serve Azerbaijan well in the future.   
2.2. Azerbaijan’s agricultural and agri-business sectors hold significant potential. Most 
immediately, given its existing knowledge and export base, and its climatic and geographic 
advantages (spring in Azerbaijan arrives one month before Russia’s, providing opportunities for 
exports) the agricultural and agri-business sectors have significant scope for growth This is 
especially true in the south and east of the country, since Azerbaijan already has an important 
presence in Russia’s food  market.  It exports a range of unprocessed products to Russia (fruits, 
vegetables, nuts, edible oils and fats, cotton, tea, and sugar). There is an opportunity to move up 
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the value chain on these products by producing canned goods and processed nuts.  Azerbaijan 
also exports sugar, animal feed, and wheat flour to Georgia. Improvements in the country’s 
electricity and transport sectors will help in this respect.  
2.3. There is also no reason why Azerbaijan’s engagement in natural resources should be 
limited to upstream activities only. Given the country’s improving knowledge base, Azerbaijan 
should reevaluate the potential of these sectors, both commercially and competitively.  First, it 
has been shown that resource-rich countries that managed to diversify, also managed to broaden 
their activities in resource-rich sectors (such as Norway in paper products).48 Second, regarding 
the chemical and agri-business sectors, research suggests that one approach to diversification is 
to capitalize on existing exporting industries and move up the value chain.49 Azerbaijan should 
also not neglect the regional opportunities in power and gas.  There is potential for a regional 
power market covering the South Caucasus, Russia, Iran, and Turkey, where Azerbaijan can 
have an important position. .   
2.4. Azerbaijan’s trade and transport sectors also offer many opportunities. Azerbaijan 
already is a regional trade center. It imports products from China (light manufacturing), Iran 
(carpets, fruits, vegetables, food stuffs), and Turkey (carpets, clothing), and exports to Georgia 
and Russia.  Improved road infrastructure will reduce transportation costs. However, studies on 
other continents suggest that institutional barriers, particularly costs related to border crossings 
and road transport (i.e., cost of security, police protection, etc.) can be higher than costs 
stemming from poor infrastructure. Preliminary evidence emerging from the Central Asia 
Regional Economic Cooperation Forum (CAREC) countries supports this conclusion.  
2.5. Azerbaijan’s other service sectors also hold strong potential, particularly banking. While 
credit has rapidly risen in recent years, it has been directed primarily to households. As the 
number of formal SMEs grows, thanks to recent improvements in business registration, but 
hopefully also thanks to lower tax rates (as proposed in Chapter 5), the banking sector should be 
able to respond to the growing demand for credit. Also promising is tourism, which showed 
progress in 2007 and 2008. Due to the country’s natural beauty, especially in the west and north, 
Azerbaijan has local and regional potential in tourism and hospitality services. However, it 
would have to offer better quality services in order to turn tourism into a major source for 
employment.   
2.6. Increasing competitiveness will be critical to Azerbaijan’s future.  Looking forward, 
the key challenge for Azerbaijan comes not from a lack of non-oil economic activities, but from 
the need to ensure the competitiveness of the non-oil economy, as that is the key to employment 
generation in the future. Today, Azerbaijan’s wages for the non-oil sector have been outpacing 
productivity. The REER for non-oil exports and imports has been appreciating modestly during 
the oil boom, due primarily to the inflation experienced by its trading partners (Iran, Russia). The 
rising gap between real wages and output per worker suggests that, for the non-oil economy, the 
exchange rate may be under-valued. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show largely similar increases in the gap 
between real wages and labor productivity pointing to the need for Azerbaijan to better 
coordinate its public expenditure policy with its macroeconomic policy. The shortages of inputs 
                                                 
48 Lederman and Maloney 2007. 
49 Ibid. 
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created by the build-up of public investment affected competitiveness in 2005-07 (discussed in 
Chapter. 5). In turn, public investments and institutional reforms will have to contribute to 
increasing productivity in 2008 and beyond, so that the gap between productivity and real wage 
increases begins to contract. 
Figure 2.1: Real Wages, Output per Worker, NEER, 
and REER: Total GDP 
Figure 2.2: Real Wages, Output per Worker, 
NEER, and REER: Non-Oil Economy 
Source: Statistical Commission, National Bank of Azerbaijan 
and Bank staff estimates. 
Notes: REER T: Real effective exchange rate for the whole 
economy; NEER T: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate for the 
whole economy; W-Q/L: Difference between real wage and 
output per worker. 
Source: Statistical Commission, National Bank of Azerbaijan 
and Bank staff estimates. 
Notes: REER N-O: Real effective exchange rate for the non-
oil economy; NEER N-O: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 
for the non-oil economy; W-Q/L: Difference between real 
wage and output per worker. 
 
2.7. Azerbaijan should be wary of the Dutch Disease, which could affect its economy in 
the medium term. Many resource-rich countries suffer from an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate stemming from sudden influx of foreign currencies and rising domestic prices for 
the non-traded sectors.  In turn, this has detrimental effects on a country’s non-commodity 
exports.  The negative aspect of Dutch Disease that threatens policymakers is the temporary 
nature of real exchange rate appreciation.  By the end of a resource boom, the real exchange rate 
reverts (depreciates) to the pre-boom level. But then the real danger is that the country would be 
left with no natural resources and an economy that had lost skills and competitiveness in the non-
commodity sector.  This is especially true of Azerbaijan, where oil production will end in 20 
years.  The only sure way for a country to “beat” Dutch Disease is to: (a) keep all foreign 
currency revenues outside the country; or (b) bring them into the country at a predetermined and 
sustainable rate.  While Azerbaijan’s domestic prices increased in 2005-08, two factors argue 
against declaration of a Dutch Disease calamity. First, Azerbaijan’s non-oil trading partners also 
suffered from currency appreciation; Figure 1.17 shows that the REER for non-oil exports 
appreciated modestly in 2006-07, and is at the 2002 level.  Second, the rate at which Azerbaijan 
has been “importing” its foreign currency has generally been considered sustainable in that it is 
roughly on par with the permanent income equivalent discussed in Chapter 3.  Should oil prices 
stay low, Azerbaijan will have to adjust downwards the level of its oil spending permanently, 
then a case might be made for Dutch disease should the economy not adjust. Chapter 1 discussed 
the trends in the REER of Azerbaijan; Chapter 4 discusses policies that will contribute to 
Azerbaijan smoothening its REER appreciation (which also depends on its trading partners). 
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B. SECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPEDIMENTS 
2.8. This section looks at recent developments and challenges to Azerbaijan’s economic 
sectors. Although an image of segmented sectors and markets emerges from this section,  it also 
suggests that the recommendations made to improve the business environment (Chapter 5) may 
be necessary but not sufficient to ensure that Azerbaijan’s non-oil economic base obtains a 
sustainable footing; the government will also need to look at independent reforms in these 
sectors.  
Agriculture: Potential yet to be tapped 
2.9. Azerbaijan’s agricultural sector has 
been growing at reasonable rates in recent 
years.  Since the trough of transition, around 
1995,  its agricultural sector has been growing at 
an average annual rate of more than 5 percent, 
which means production will have doubled from 
this trough by 2009 (Table 2.1).  Today, a 
dynamic rural commercialization process is 
beginning to accelerate in many parts of the 
country. In primary production, a progressive 
commercialization of farming has stimulated 
some land consolidation under lease-holding and 
purchase. This is required to achieve larger-sized 
holdings, which are better able to support 
specialization and investment in structures and 
machinery. In the agri-food industries and inputs 
distribution enterprises, investment and 
modernization are being encouraged. It is being 
done by expanded rural lending facilities from 
commercial banks and by the initial capitalization 
of enterprise development funds being 
administered by commercial banks from budgetary sources.  In terms of products, although 
production of some crops has slowed (tea leaves, tobacco, sunflowers, cotton), production of 
most others has increased manifold: cereals have doubled production since 1995, potato 
production increased more than five-fold, vegetable production by almost two-fold, and 
production of fruits and berries almost doubled.  At the same time, Azerbaijan’s livestock sector 
has been doing very well; the various livestock products grew at an average annual rate of 4 
percent to 6 percent in 1996–2007. 
2.10. Surprisingly, the agricultural growth has come despite very low investment rates in 
2001–07 and labor-shifting from agriculture to higher-paying construction jobs. From 2001 
to 2007, labor moved away from agriculture to the thriving construction sectors, initially to 
pipelines, and subsequently to residential construction and public infrastructure build-up. While 
the number of people employed in agriculture increased by 5 percent in 2001-2007, the share of 
total employment in agriculture fell from 41 percent in 2001 to 38.8 percent in 2007 (Chapter 1). 
Given the sector’s declining share of employment and low investment, its entire growth from 
Table 2.1: Agriculture: Recent Developments 
 2005 2006 2007 
Production growth rates by sector 
Agriculture 7.5 0.9 4.0 
Cereals -1.5 -2.2 -3.6 
Cotton 44.9 -33.8 -23.1 
Fruits (incl. grapes) 47.1 7.2 3.2 
Vegetables 4.7 5.2 3.4 
Meat 3.3 4.1 7.5 
Milk 3.1 3.8 3.2 
Eggs 5.4 -13.0 14.5 
 
Profitability for farmers (production cost less 
farm gate price; AZN per 100 Kg.) 
Cereals 4.1 3.2 5.5 
Fruits and berries 16.4 11.7 16.2 
Grapes 23.7 16.9 16.2 
Vegetables 1.0 5.4 9.8 
Potatoes 0.5 16.0 22.3 
Source: Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan.  
Note: Production costs include labor, fertilizers, energy, 
and other inputs.  
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2001 to 2007 can be attributed largely to improvements in total factor productivity (Chapter 1). 
With Azerbaijan’s REER appreciating only moderately, and institutional reforms in the business 
environment and the agricultural sector falling behind (discussed below), the sector has been 
operating significantly below its potential.50  
2.11. Institutional challenges and poor policy choices hinder agriculture’s performance. 
Azerbaijan’s agriculture faces several obstacles: (i) weaknesses in the legal and regulatory 
system (quality standards, resolution of contractual disputes, monopolistic practices); (ii) 
pervasive administrative barriers to investment (primarily from high tax rates and monopolistic 
practices); (iii) weaknesses in infrastructure provision (irrigation, availability of secondary 
roads); and (iv) low availability of credit.  At the same time, policymaking has sometimes been 
counter-productive (regulations biased against the use of new seeds). For instance, it has tried to 
make up for shortcomings by promoting inefficiencies (wheat subsidies, special tax regime with 
no profits or value-added taxes on agricultural production, to name just a few), or has not been 
proactive enough—Azerbaijan has sub-standard cultivars, and herds with low genetic potential.  
In addition, land reform has not come full circle yet.   Plot sizes remain very small after a 
remarkably equitable privatization program (which ended in 2000), but the consolidation that has 
taken place in other ECA countries and brought with it scale economies has yet to occur.  
Finally, corruption has also played an important role in preventing entry of investors directly, or 
in contributing to limiting options in the supply chain (imports, wholesale markets, etc.).51  
2.12. The challenges affect the sector’s products differently. The aforementioned problems 
affect different products differently. For example, pomegranate juice definitely has export 
potential but requires modern presses, filtration equipment, acceptable preservatives and/or 
investments in transport, and strict food safety and quality standards. However, existing 
production facilities are concentrated in the hands of a few (five major producers), and existing 
producers reportedly discourage new entrants from entering the market.  Cucumbers have weak 
to moderate price-transmission mechanisms between farmer and market, but the product’s 
perishable nature makes rent-seeking at the border crossing common. While potatoes have a 
robust price-transmission mechanism, they have poor transit facilities, and on-farm storage 
creates on-farm spoilage. Moreover, communities in Azerbaijan have failed to organize in order 
to benefit from collective investments in machinery or storage, as have communities in other CIS 
countries.  
2.13. Agriculture’s sector-specific challenges, together with the broader ones of the 
business environment, lead to the reported concentration of purchasers and suppress offers 
made to farmers. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show a large discrepancy between farm gate and retail 
prices through 2006 (latest available data) for agricultural products. Since 2000, the increases in 
farm gate retail prices have almost doubled.  In Azerbaijan, the discrepancy is often attributed to 
the small number of wholesalers in regional markets and to local “monopolists.”  It is reported 
that farm gate prices barely cover the cost of harvesting and do not cover the cost of farm and 
                                                 
50 Sub-sectors with export potential are pomegranate, potatoes, tomatoes, early vegetables, early fruits, greenhouse 
vegetables and fruits, and hazelnuts. Sub-sectors with import-substitution potential are wheat, apples, potatoes, 
juices and concentrates, and greenhouse tomatoes.   
51 Background paper on Primary Agriculture and the Agro-food Industries (2008); Azerbaijan Agricultural 
Marketing Study (World Bank 2005). 
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equipment maintenance or new investment.52  For most agro-food items, the transmission of both 
domestic and border prices has not been very fluid. 
2.14. Perceptions of “monopolization” or oligopolistic behavior can be attributed to 
corruption or to low market power of farmers.  The ready response obtained in Azerbaijan is 
that wholesalers with political connections at the rayon level dominate markets, and that farmers 
often are forced to sell their products to a single buyer.   In Azerbaijan, the lack of community 
organization of farmers (either to market their products or to co-finance machinery or equipment 
such as refrigeration) remains a puzzle. As such, the lack of organization on the part of the 
farmers makes them weaker against the wholesalers, be they politically connected or not. Lack of 
marketing institutions, technical capacities, and financial services comprise the “missing middle” 
in the agro-food value chain.   
Figure 2.3: Farm Gate Prices of Agricultural 
Products 
Figure 2.4: Retail Prices of Agricultural Products 
Source: StatCom and Bank staff estimates. Source: StatCom and Bank staff estimates. 
 
2.15. Azerbaijan’s recently launched State Program for Agriculture seeks to address all 
the aforementioned challenges but success will depend on what government chooses as a 
priority.53  The program maintains or deepens a host of relatively recent  government actions, 
namely increased official subsidies to the agricultural sector (defraying up to 50 percent of the 
costs of fertilizer and fuels, and modest per-hectare payments authorized to stimulate wheat 
plantings), state loans to agriculture-- capitalized by budgetary transfers to participating 
commercial lenders-- a tax-free environment for agriculture (no profits tax and no VAT on 
inputs) and, of course, the establishment of Aqrolizing in 2004 to encourage the purchase of new 
agricultural machinery. It also introduces the restoration of intra-farming irrigation networks; 
seeks to expand enterprises for food processing and storage; seeks to improve the strain of cattle 
through imports; supports private sector activity in meat and milk processing; seeks expansion of 
lending resources, including Aqrolizing branches, resources through the NEF, and the 
establishment of a universal agrarian bank; creation of a research center for agriculture; and 
creation and management of a State Grain Fund. In trying to ensure that agriculture is endowed 
with the aforementioned services, Azerbaijan needs to ensure that excessive state management of 
                                                 
52 World Bank (2006a; Swinnen, Johan, Liesbet Vranken and Victoria Stanley, “Emerging Challenges of Land 
Rental Markets—A Review of Available Evidence for the Europe and Central Asia Region”,  ECA Chief 
Economist’s Regional Working Paper Series, Volume 1, No.4 (Washington – March 2006) 
53 State Program on the Reliable Provision of People in the Republic of Azerbaijan with Food Products from 2008–
2015. 
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the sector is avoided and that it develops in a sustainable fashion.54 This particularly pertains to 
food security, as the program seeks to significantly reduce import dependence on potatoes, 
vegetables, sugar beet and other products (including wheat), reversing market trends in wheat 
and sugar beet in recent years. Going forward, Azerbaijan should first prioritize the development 
of larger farming entities (through leasing of land, creation of associations, enabling the sale of 
land, etc.) as a means to balancing the market power of wholesalers.  Improvements in licensing, 
business registration, and property rights should continue, with specific review of regulatory 
issues of specific product or geographic areas. First, the government should monitor the 
competitive nature of farm sales across the county and should oversee the development of the 
“missing middle” (of service providers for marketing, storage, technical assistance, etc,)—when 
that develops, farm gate prices should begin to rise. Second, related to the proposal to recreate a 
universal agrarian bank for action in 2009–10, Azerbaijan should review the experience of the 
Netherlands, where the agricultural bank is operating on commercial grounds.55 Non-commercial 
approaches to operating an agricultural bank risk reversing the good progress that Azerbaijan has 
made with financial sector reform and saddling the government with a large contingent of 
liabilities, which will lay indirect claims on the Oil Fund.  
Industrial Output: Robust Growth of Food Processing and Transport Equipment 
2.16. Azerbaijan’s industrial output is dominated by the oil sector. As noted above, oil 
extraction accounted for 95 percent of industrial activity in 2007, up from 76 percent in 2004, 
before oil prices and production increased.56 However, the oil sector accounts for only 1 percent 
of total employment.57 Outside oil extraction, about 86 percent of the industrial sector’s value 
added in 2007 came from manufacturing (still oil-related), especially refining, food processing, 
and machinery and transport equipment) and about 14 percent came from utilities. Employment 
in the non-oil extractive industries was about 6 percent of total employment in 2007, largely 
unchanged from the employment share in 2001. Manufacturing is not only important for its role 
in generating employment, but also for its role in trade: plastics and chemicals are important 
export items to Turkey and Russia, which are Azerbaijan’s most important trading partners.  
2.17. Upstream oil is largely privately managed and regulated by PSAs.  Oil production in 
Azerbaijan increased dramatically with the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline in 2006—from approximately 15 million tons a year from 2001–05, to 46 million tons in 
2007. Production and transport of the new oil and gas is managed by the Azerbaijan International 
Oil Consortium. The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) is the de facto “competent 
authority” dealing with the upstream oil sector on behalf of the government vis-à-vis the AIOC. 
SOCAR is also a holding company that manages Azerbaijan’s other upstream oil and gas 
                                                 
54 Cf. the Action Plan set forth in Section V of the Program.   
55 It is worth noting that the formation of the Netherlands’ Rabobank and France’s Crédit Agricole was grounded in 
long experience with cooperative credit organizations and societies.  Thus, a local framework and clientele––
spontaneously created––upon which a national structure could be erected, already existed in rural areas; such is not 
yet the case in Azerbaijan.  
56 In Azerbaijan’s national accounts, industry comprises mining (including the extraction of oil and gas), 
manufacturing (including the manufacturing of oil products and chemicals), and utilities (power, gas, water), but 
excludes construction.  The same breakdown is maintained in this report.   
57 This includes the extraction of oil and gas only. 
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activities.58 These include oil and gas extraction, preparation and maintenance of wells, and a 
deep-water platforms plant. 
2.18. Azerbaijan’s downstream activities 
are managed by state-owned-enterprises. 
Azerbaijan maintains a full range of 
downstream activities, ranging from oil 
refining to the manufacture of plastics on the 
one hand, and gas storage and distribution on 
the other. The sector grew at about 6 percent 
a year since 2003, and has made up almost 
half of the non-oil extraction industries since 
2006. In 2007, it accounted for almost 3 
percent of GDP.59 SOCAR manages the 
country’s refining capacity and—benefiting 
from the recent surge in oil prices—has been expanding through investments in the region (joint-
venture refineries and petrochemical facilities). It is also the wholesale supplier of oil products to 
the domestic market, based on its own production and on imports. The petrochemical sector is 
managed by Azerchemyia SOE, with about 6,600 employees and seven subsidiaries—the plant 
closed production in the first quarter of 2007, when its input prices were temporarily adjusted by 
the government.  On the gas side, SOCAR is the single buyer of natural gas for domestic 
distribution, adding to its own production of gas from ACG, from Shah Denis, and previously 
imported Russian gas; it has also been investing in gas storage. Azeriqaz is the distribution 
company and the operator of the transmission network.  Buoyed by soaring revenues in recent 
years, SOCAR has been modernizing by unloading non-core activities (especially social 
infrastructure), restructuring, and upgrading its financial reporting to IFRS.  While Azeriqaz’s 
distribution network of gas lines is being upgraded with government support, Azerchemyia is in 
a weak financial position and lower on the government’s priority list.  Both companies are facing 
delays in implementing IFRS and, as such, their financial positions lack transparency.  
“Regulation” of the large, downstream industries has largely focused on: (i) obtaining budget 
implementation and investment plans at the time of budget preparation (successfully since 2006); 
and (ii) increasing the prices of inputs to Azeriqaz and Azerchemyia (sold by SOCAR), which 
till 2007 was largely subsidized with offsets on SOCAR’s tax obligations.  The regulatory 
environment is managed by the Ministry of Energy and Industry on the one hand, and the Tariff 
Council on the other. In short, looking to Azerbaijan’s future, while local and regional demand 
for downstream activities exists, efficiency improvements through better enterprise management 
and new investments are needed. 
2.19. Other manufacturing and utilities sectors have also shown buoyancy. The next 
largest sectors—after the manufacture of coke and refined oil products—are the manufacture of 
food products and metallurgy, jointly accounting for 2.6 percent of industrial output in 2006. The 
most dynamic sub-sectors from 2001 to 2007 were the smaller ones––metallurgy, machinery,   
                                                 
58 The policy discussion regarding Azerbaijan’s oil and gas sector rests on “Azerbaijan: Issues and Options 
Associated with Energy Sector Reform”, World Bank 2005. While important changes took place in the sector in 
2005, the institutional issues raised here have not been addressed. 
59 This capacity helped Azerbaijan “export” its oil to the south, as it exchanged refined fuel with Iran in 2008, in 
exchange for Iranian crude delivered to Azerbaijan in the Gulf. 
Table 2.2: Non-Oil Extractive Industries, Growth 
Rates 
  2005 2006 2007 
Non-Oil Industries1 14.8 4.1 7.9 
Food processing 4.2 4.0 10.1 
Metallurgy 30.2 9.1 1.7 
Chemical industry 6.2 14.9 -33.6 
Transport veh. & equip. 79.0 -11.1 23.3 
Textiles industry 55.7 -17.1 -21.6 
Production and supply of 
electricity, gas, and water 4.8 8.0 -7.6 
Source: Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan 
Note: One year-on-year change. 
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and electrical and transport equipments––all with average annual growth rates above 20 percent. 
The largest sub-sector in manufacturing-- food products-- grew very slowly from 2001 to 2007. 
Utilities (power, gas, and water) grew at an average annual rate of 8 percent through 2006, and 
contracted by 7 percent in 2007, after the adjustment in the tariffs.60  
2.20. Manufacturing is largely in public hands. Although, in 2006, 72 percent of production 
came from the private sector, this number is deceptive as it includes the oil sector. Excluding the 
oil sector, private sector accounted for only 28 percent of value added, albeit up from a mere 15 
percent in 2000.  As much as 90 percent of Azerbaijan’s refining, chemicals, and utilities 
production is government-owned, as is 60 percent of the metallurgy industry. Together, these 
sub-sectors make up two-thirds of the non-oil extraction industry. 
2.21. The first-level institutional issues in the industrial sector are how to reverse the 
public ownership and management structure in manufacturing… While EBRD indicators 
show that other transition economies have moved to greater private management of their 
economies than Azerbaijan, the issue is not private management or privatization per se.  It is 
rather selecting a governance structure for the management of the private sector that can deliver 
innovative products and generate sustainable employment.   
2.22. …and also in utilities.  In utilities, which are discussed extensively in Chapter 4, the 
government has taken a distinctly public sector-driven approach. While it is not wise to 
generalize for all utilities, the principle of a five-pronged approach has generally been sensible: 
(i) build up the targeted social assistance scheme; (ii) build metering/billing capacity; iii) 
improve service quality; (iv) strengthen internal management (introduce IFRS accounting 
principles and alter governance structures, where possible); and (v) adjust tariffs so that users 
pay more for better service, but the poor are protected through targeted social assistance.  While 
the strategy has been sound, it is time to take the next step, i.e., to establish efficiency enhancing 
governance structure (see next paragraph).  Azerbaijan’s utilities were 99.3 percent publicly 
owned in 2007 (similar to 2000), up from 89.9 percent in 2004.  Attempts at negotiation with 
regional and Asian investors regarding electricity generation have fallen through, though 
Azerbaijan is currently using management contracts for distribution.  The government’s renewed 
efforts at bringing in private sector management are important, as is the ongoing process for the 
selection of strategic investors that respect national priorities.61 
2.23. There are many examples of successful private participation in infrastructure.  
However, should Azerbaijan find it absolutely necessary to retain government ownership, China 
is an interesting example (Box 2.1). Given the myriad transactions between governments and 
private sector the world over, the critical factor is perhaps not the a priori selection of a 
methodology for engagement, but the commitment to principles of transparency, fairness to the 
country and to investors, and to dealing with agencies of international repute. Most important is 
the commitment to seek private participation for the purpose of increasing efficiency.  
 
 
                                                 
60 In January 2007, Azerbaijan adjusted utilities’ rates in all sectors to nearly cost recovery levels (Chapter 4). 
61 See EBRD transition indicators on privatization progress in Chapter 5.  
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2.24. For SOCAR, the challenge is greater specialization in commercial activities and 
elimination of “competent authority” functions. In Azerbaijan, most oil and gas upstream 
activities have been structured under PSAs. However, older oil and gas upstream activities fall 
under the management of SOCAR. At the same time, it is the “competent authority” in the 
government’s relations with the AIOC.62 Given the tremendous scope of commercial activities of 
SOCAR, Azerbaijan’s national interest could be better served by allowing it to focus on its 
commercial role while refraining from regulatory ones. In fact, SOCAR has already begun to 
streamline commercial activities.  It already ended its previous social obligations (transferring 
the management responsibility for some social infrastructure and programs to government 
agencies). This transfer, plus new investment that allows the company to adopt international 
accounting standards and a new management organization, has made SOCAR a more efficient 
                                                 
62 The Azerbaijan International Operating Company is a consortium of currently 10 petroleum companies that have 
signed extraction contracts with Azerbaijan. These companies include: BP (UK), Chevron (USA), Devon Energy 
(USA), StatoilHydro (Norway), Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO; Turkey), Amerada Hess (USA), State 
Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR; Azerbaijan), ExxonMobil (USA), Inpex (Japan), and Itochu (Japan). The 
AIOC has made significant investments, contributing to the construction of the South Caucasus Pipeline and the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, and is currently discussing construction of a Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline between 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Extraction of oil from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli fields and natural gas from Shah 
Deniz has been made possible by FDI in this consortium. 
Box 2.1: Transformation of a Chinese SOE by Private Management 
The recent construction of the Guangzhou Metro Rail project in China offers valuable lessons about the 
successful construction of a transportation infrastructure project wherein the government retained ownership 
of the SOE. This is an SOE that once performed poorly and had a bad reputation. Today, it is considered to 
be one of the best-run mass transit companies in China. The transformation program was put together jointly 
by the Guangzhou Metro Corporation and Booz, Allen, Hamilton (BAH) in 1999, with the Government of 
Guangzhou retaining ownership. By 2003, two of the major rail lines were fully operational, with a total 
length of 37 kilometers and an average daily ridership of 470,000.  Subsequent construction added six more 
lines. 
In 1999, when the metro project first began, it was plagued by fraud scandals. A new management team was 
appointed to transform this project into an effective company. This new team hired BAH, the renowned 
American management consulting firm, to help them achieve their goals. BAH and Guangzhou Metro 
Corporation Management first carried out a complete diagnostic examination of the project, including its 
organizational structure, construction management, operations, governance, human resources, financial 
performance, and affiliated businesses.  
After consolidating all of the findings from the first phase, the strategic development plan for the next five 
years was formulated, and a conceptual framework for the longer term was outlined. First, the company 
streamlined its organizational structure. It then revamped the employee-compensation system by setting up a 
new incentive mechanism that would be more aligned with desired behavior and performance. Guangzhou 
Metro then built its core capabilities and developed a learning culture. In a few short years, as noted above, 
the first two lines of the Guangzhou Metro rail system were operational. 
In addition, BAH also recommended that Guangzhou Metro Corporation and its owner (the Guangzhou 
government) adopt a new relationship, based on a clear contractual arrangement between them and  a new 
governance model, whereby a Board of Directors would be established to protect the interests of the asset 
owner and to provide checks and balances on management. Moreover, the management team would be fully 
empowered to run the company. The Hong Kong Mass Transit Railways Corporation and the Airport 
Authority of Hong Kong are widely recognized success stories of well-run statutory bodies. 
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enterprise, better positioned to focus on its core commercial objectives. However, the next 
critical step needs to be the separation of SOCAR’s regulatory role (as the “competent authority” 
dealing with the upstream oil and gas sector) from its commercial role. In addition, as SOCAR is 
a representative of the State and in good financial health, the government can consider 
transferring the management of the government’s minority share in the PSAs and some joint 
ventures to a separate holding company. 
Construction: Despite Two Booms Market Constraints Prevail 
2.25. In recent years, Azerbaijan’s 
construction sector has seen three surges in 
demand. Azerbaijan’s first construction boom 
took place in 2001–04, and was mainly the 
result of the construction of the BTC pipeline. 
The second boom was due to the rise in 
demand for real estate and  increased 
confidence in the Azeri economy (because of 
the pipeline) and partly to developments in 
Russia. The third boom, especially from 2005 
onwards, was fueled by increases in the 
national budget.  These helped boost the 
incomes of Azeris. The latter factor, coupled 
with the poor quality and low supply of 
housing, a booming capital city, and   a lack of 
capital market opportunities for investors, provided the boost to real estate and triggered the 
construction boom. After oil, construction was the highest growth sector in 2001–05 (Table 1.1). 
2.26. The constraints faced by the construction sector stem from the large role played by 
the state, the huge regulatory burden, and to the absence of competition.  The share of the 
state in Azerbaijan’s construction sector has diminished substantially since 2001.  It came down 
to 25 percent of the total in 2007, compared to 47 percent in 2000; and the number of state-
owned construction companies has diminished by 18 percent since 2001. There are three 
principal barriers hindering development of the construction sector. First, the issuance of 
construction permits is a major impediment to investors (primarily because of the significant 
number of inspections and permits required).  This has been noted in several Doing Business 
surveys, along with the issues of corruption (discussed in Chapter 5). Second is the issue of 
rising cement prices.  Only one cement producer is operating in Azerbaijan today, following the 
departure of a foreign investor. This has likely contributed to cement prices increasing faster in 
Azerbaijan than internationally. Figure 2.5 indicates that the domestic price of cement was closer 
aligned to international prices in 2004–06, but by 2007 was 50 percent higher than imported 
prices. Third, it is reported that there are only a few importers of construction materials and that 
officials at border crossings assist in limiting foreign competition. Taken together, the three 
factors suggest that monopolistic practices are prevalent, and that they translate into very direct 
costs to investors and to the economy.  
  
Figure 2.5: Analysis of Cement Prices (Index 
2004=100) 
Source: Statcom, State Customs Commission, and Bank staff 
estimates.
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Services 
2.27. From 2001 to 2007, Azerbaijan’s service sector was the most dynamic component of 
the non-oil economy. Two factors contribute to the buoyancy of the service sector. The first is 
the often-observed increased importance of services that accompanies development. The second 
is the important role that trade and transport have long played in Azerbaijan, given the country’s 
location on the Silk Road. Of significant interest in this respect (indicative of trade not evident 
from the review of official statistics) is the Baku International Airport Bazaar, with its estimated 
7,000 stalls (shops). It imports from China (electronics, kitchenware, clothing), Iran (carpets, 
textiles), and Turkey (higher-end clothing, textiles), and sells locally as well as to buyers from 
Georgia, Iran, and Russia (Dagestan), who export their purchases back home by air, truck, or bus 
daily.  
2.28. The structure of services sector has undergone significant change in the 2000s.  
Transport and wholesale/retail trade were among the largest service sub-sectors (nearly 10 
percent of non-oil GDP). Hotels, public administration, defense, and financial intermediation 
were among the most dynamic, exhibiting the highest growth. Transport sector statistics include 
the ramping up of the BTC and BTE pipelines, which are not separated by the State Statistical 
Committee for publication purposes. Nevertheless, other transportation services (all the non-oil 
services) remain important, particularly those related to regional and transit trade. 
Telecommunication services boomed in Azerbaijan in 2001–07. Especially in the last two years, 
cell phone companies have begun operations, whereas the fixed-line operator remains in public 
hands. Azerbaijan’s financial sector has also seen tremendous growth, particularly from 2005 to 
2007, as credit expanded due to Azerbaijan’s de facto fixed exchange rate policy through March 
2008. Part of the growth in the banking sector is due to the increase in credit to households, 
which in turn, supported the real estate boom. Social services and public administration have also 
grown, but that was due partly to the hiring policies of the public sector. Azerbaijan’s tourism 
sector has seen resurgence, based mainly on local tourism. The health sector held its share of 
non-oil GDP, while other sectors––real estate, education, and community and personal services–
–seem to have contracted relative to non-oil GDP. 
2.29. The institutional issues facing the service sector are as varied as the sector itself.  On 
wholesale and retail trade, administrative barriers in tax and customs are an important issue.  The 
success of the Airport Bazaar, with its flat rate rental/tax payment and flat rate transport costs 
(inclusive of import/customs duties) points to the challenges other traders face.  In the 
transportation sector, the most important strategic route (the BTC) is managed under a long-term 
contract. The rail sector, another important transport conduit, is publicly run, but contractual 
arrangements are being revised (Chapter 4).  Air and sea transport remains closed to competition. 
On telecommunication, there is significant competition in mobile telephony, particularly with the 
recent addition of a third operator. At the same time, however, the fixed-line operator is publicly 
owned, and presents a very good opportunity for privatization (Chapter 4). Azerbaijan’s banking 
sector has been raising its level of competition, gradually but steadily.  The market share of the 
two largest banks has dropped significantly in recent years.  However, foreign banks have been 
conspicuously absent from Azerbaijan’s burgeoning economy.   
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Summary 
2.30. Azerbaijan’s economy is indeed broad-based but needs to modernize to compete 
regionally. To sustain its non-oil growth rates, Azerbaijan will have to turn more to the outside 
world to cultivate and secure export markets and products. Global markets do not tolerate low 
productivity levels and inefficiencies. Azerbaijan must open up to new investment for two 
distinct reasons: (1) to overcome the existing deficit in productivity prior to the oil boom; and (2) 
to overcome the burden placed by recent real exchange rate appreciation on its competitiveness. 
2.31. The existing structure of Azerbaijan’s non-oil economy is not conducive to attracting 
know-how and new investment because it remains very closed and averse to competition. 
Despite its very significant potential, Azerbaijan’s agricultural sector is not ready to make the 
productivity gains that are within its reach because there are no incentives for consolidation 
(through outright purchases or leases).  The main reason is monopolistic or oligopolistic control 
of wholesale purchases at the regional level. This also has stalled the development of vertically 
integrated enterprises observable in other transition and developing economies, and of low levels 
of community organization.  
2.32. At the same time, the oil and gas sector are not effectively open to new entrants for 
downstream activities because the utilities sectors are not open. While no legal barrier exists to 
entry, the absence of significant competitors in Azerbaijan’s booming economy speaks volumes. 
Other industrial sectors, with stable levels of domestic investment and declining foreign 
investment (relative to GDP) also speak of an unfriendly environment.  This is also true for 
construction. At the same time, the services sector is booming, but its two potential flagship sub-
sectors––banking and fixed-line telephony––lack serious foreign competition.  In addition, the 
domestic environment for operating in the service sector is fraught with regulatory problems. 
Azerbaijan’s export potential is undermined by the low level of non-oil FDI. 
C. REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE 
Recent Developments 
2.33. Azerbaijan’s growing economy has increasingly relied on oil exports.  Its total trade 
increased from 79 percent of GDP in 2001 to 102 percent in 2007.  In 2007, oil accounted for 
over 91 percent of total exports.  Depending on the outlook for oil prices, the share is expected to 
increase through 2010 as production peaks, and to start dropping thereafter as production flattens 
while the non-oil economy, along with non-oil exports, continue to grow.  In 2007, Azerbaijan’s 
total foreign trade balance was $13 billion or 42 percent of GDP, while the non-oil trade balance 
was -$3.8 billion, or -12.3 percent of GDP. The non-oil trade balance stayed approximately 
stable as a share of non-oil GDP, from -29.9 percent in 2001 to -28.9 percent in 2007, although 
as Figure 1.14 indicates, the balance improved through 2005 and then deteriorated till 2007. 
Azerbaijan’s medium-term strategy for diversification needs to begin to close this gap, unless 
enormous amounts of FDI can support the current account.  
2.34. Although Azerbaijan’s non-oil exports are small in comparison to the over $15 
billion of oil exports in 2008, their value more than quadrupled in 2001–07.  The robust 
growth of exports of agro products (Figure 2.7) to $288 million in 2007, up over six-fold from 
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$51 million in 2001, was particularly noteworthy. In fact, agro-exports accounted for nearly 31 
percent of all non-oil exports in 2007.  This is an encouraging sign as 38 percent of the Azeri 
labor force was employed in agriculture in 2008.  Agricultural goods were exported primarily to 
Russia, which included higher value-added processed foods (Figure 2.6).   
 
2.35. Russia and Turkey continued to be the two largest markets for Azeri non-oil exports 
from 2001 to 2007, accounting for more than half of total Azeri non-oil exports (Figure 2.7). 
Although these two countries accounted for half of all non-oil exports in 2001, Azerbaijan’s 
increased dependence on them is more notable, as these non-oil exports more than quadrupled 
between 2001 and 2007, albeit in nominal dollars.63  Azerbaijan is still in the early stages of a 
transition from a system of central planning to a market-based economy and is still finding its 
footing in the world of non-oil trade.  While Azerbaijan exported over $328 million of refined oil 
to Russia in 2007, it was also a market for a broad range of Azeri agricultural products during 
that year, totaling over $228 million (chiefly fruits, vegetables, nuts, edible oils and fats, cotton, 
tea, and sugar).64  Moreover, in that same year, Azerbaijan’s exports to Russia included over 
$105 million of manufactured goods (incl. plastics, chemicals, and textiles) and machinery.65 In 
contrast, the importance of Iran as a destination for Azeri exports diminished rapidly from 2005 
                                                 
63 Preliminary data from 2007 indicate that Turkey and Russia became even larger markets for Azeri goods in 2007, 
collectively accounting for over 80 percent of Azerbaijan’s total Non-Oil Exports.   
64 In figures 2.6-2.9, both exports from and imports to Azerbaijan are calculated from the numbers reported to 
Comtrade by Azerbaijan’s trading partners, as there was little difference between their numbers and the numbers 
reported by Azerbaijan from 2001-05.  However, there was a non-trivial gap between their numbers in 2006, a gap 
that grew even larger in 2007.  The likely reasons for these differences are discussed further in Chapter 5. 
65 The source of the trade data reported in figure 2.7 is Comtrade, which reports data from both the importing 
country and the exporting country. All the data reported in Figure 2.7 is from "mirror trade," or Azeri exports as 
reported by the importing country.   Usually the importing country reports a higher value for imports of a 
particular category than the exporting country reports, primarily due to the inclusion of freight and insurance in 
the imports. But differences can also arise because of accounting error or even mis-reporting by either partner to 
benefit from export incentives, avoid import taxes, or other reasons.  For 2007, the mirror trade differences 
between Russia and Azerbaijan are minor. 
Figure 2.6: Composition of Azeri Non-Oil Exports, 
2001, 2004, and 2007 
Figure 2.7: Destination of Azeri Non-Oil 
Exports, 2001, 2004, and 2007 
 (example: in 2001, Azerbaijan’s non-oil exports came 
to US$222 million, of which about 23% were food and 
other items and 27% were materials and other items)   
 
(example: in 2001, Azerbaijan’s non-oil exports 
came to US$222 million, of which about 34% went 
to Russia and 14% went to Turkey) 
Source: Comtrade 
Note : Iran reports no trade data for 2007 but Azerbaijan 
reported $93 million in non-oil exports to Iran. 
Source: Comtrade 
Note : See discussion in paragraph 2.35. 
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to 2007, although it was a significant export market for Azeri products from 2001 to 2004.   Even 
though Azerbaijan had exported $135 million of a collection of  goods to Iran in 2004, by 2007 
non-oil Azeri exports to Iran had dropped to $93 million (of which $79 million was in 
manufactured goods).66, 67 The same is true for Kazakhstan. Although there is still substantial 
Azeri oil exports as well as re-export of oil sector equipment to Kazakhstan, the export of all 
other goods to Kazakhstan has been minimal. Oil (primarily crude) is overwhelmingly the main 
Azeri export to the EU ($7.1 billion in 2007). Thus far, Azerbaijan has chosen not to penetrate 
the fast-growing markets of Asia. Exports to China have been insignificant until recently, when 
China began importing modest amounts of oil/oil products, and Hong Kong began importing 
aluminum. Azeri exports to India are also modest. They were inconsequential before 2004, when 
they reached $1 million of aluminum, but subsequently fell off. 
 
2.36. Azerbaijan is increasingly importing from industrialized countries as well as 
China…  Finding new sources of imports is not surprising as Azerbaijan opens up to global 
competition; inefficient industries have declined in relative importance and have been replaced 
by industries in which Azerbaijan has a comparative advantage (as evidenced by increasing non-
oil exports in Figure 2.6 and 2.7). In 2001 Iran was the largest exporter to Azerbaijan of a wide 
variety of goods (i.e. $20 million in food products and $20 million in manufactured goods).  
However, between 2001 and 2007 the share of Azeri non-oil imports from Iran declined from 
over 22 percent to barely 1.3 percent (Figure 2.9). Even though Russia’s share in Azeri imports 
                                                 
66 Comtrade data for Azeri trade with Iran for 2007 come from Azeri sources. They also report non-oil exports to 
Iran make up 10 percent of total non-oil exports.  
67 While Figure 2.7 supports analysis based on mirror trade, it also makes an exception by including Azeri reported 
data in Comtrade for Iran in 2006. Azeri non-oil exports to Iran came to $74 million, or about 10 percent of non-
oil exports for 2006. This information is included in Figure 2.7 to enrich the discussion and to demonstrate that 
Azeri exports to Iran are likely to be non-zero (as indicated in the mirror trade), but diminishing in relative 
importance. 
Figure 2.8: Composition of Azeri Non-Oil Imports, 
2001, 2004, and 2007 
 
(example: in 2001, Azerbaijan’s non-oil imports were 
US$1.4 billion, of which about 38%  were manufactured 
goods and 30% were machinery) 
Figure 2.9: Origin of Azeri Non-Oil Imports, 
2001, 2004, and 2007 
 
(example: in 2001, Azerbaijan’s non-oil imports were 
US$1.4 billion, of which about 23%  came from Iran 
and 16% came from Turkey) 
 
 
Source: Comtrade Source: Comtrade 
Note : « B » is Billion. 
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increased, Azerbaijan had additional imports from China, the Euro Zone, and the UK.68  In fact, 
if treated as a single entity, the Euro Zone surpassed Russia as the largest exporter to Azerbaijan 
in 2006, and became the largest source of Azerbaijan’s imports.69  
2.37. … and importing a different set of products than previously. Change in the 
composition of imports from Turkey provides a good illustration of processes that have been 
underway. A decade ago, Azerbaijan imported many of the same food products from Turkey 
(including sugar products and cereals) that it now exports to Russia and Georgia. Furthermore, 
electricity has long been a major import from Turkey (as well as from Iran). Today, major 
imports from Turkey are jewelry, carpets, telecommunication equipments and food-processing 
machinery. In 2001, Turkmenistan was a significant supplier of oil and gas, but little else. 
However, in 2006, oil platforms (which were originally exported to Azerbaijan from 
Turkmenistan) were re-exported to Azerbaijan, causing a one-time jump in Azerbaijan’s imports 
from Turkmenistan. China has also increasingly become a supplier of a wide range of 
electronics, tractors, and garments (over $346 million in 2007). Japan mainly supplies motor 
vehicles, electrical machinery, and materials for the oil sector. The U.S. usually has supplied 
approximately 5 percent of Azerbaijan’s imports, primarily equipment for the oil sector, 
pharmaceuticals, and agricultural products. 
2.38. International trade in services has represented approximately 20 percent of 
Azerbaijan’s GDP for the past decade. Total service exports have grown relatively slowly 
during this period. In contrast, service sector imports have grown rapidly since 2001,   due 
primarily to the construction boom that is both a part of the expansion of the oil sector and a 
consequence of rising incomes from increasing oil revenues.  A residual category of “other 
business services” is not further disaggregated in the available balance of payments statistics. 
The latter category is the second largest imported and exported service.  Azerbaijan’s largest 
service export is transportation, which is also one of its largest service inputs. Total trade in 
transportation services has been growing steadily in value in recent years.   This is attributed to 
the rise in international trade, since moving more goods across borders boosts demand for 
transportation services. Relative to goods trade, Azerbaijan’s international trade in transportation 
services has remained fairly constant since 1999, at 7percent to 9 percent of total merchandise 
imports and exports. In light of the country’s desire to become a regional transportation and 
distribution hub, this statistic is less than encouraging for the future.  
2.39. Azerbaijan’s exports show evidence of transition. After increasing dramatically in 
2001-05, the share of non-oil exports in non-oil GDP has remained constant in recent years—in 
the 8 percent to -9 percent range.  While the share of a number of sectors (textiles, plastics, and 
chemicals) in exports has decreased, others are gaining more weight (Figure 2.7). The growing 
exports of food and beverage, as well as aluminum, are encouraging signs of ongoing 
diversification.  
 
                                                 
68 The Euro Zone comprises all 12 countries that use the Euro as their currency. 
69 Preliminary data from 2007 suggest that Russia and Turkey have retained their positions as the pre-eminent 
sources of Azeri imports, collectively accounting for 40 per cent of Azerbaijan’s non-oil imports.  In fact, these 
data suggest that Russian non-oil exports to Azerbaijan increased more than ten-fold from 2001–07, while Turkish 
non-oil exports nearly quintupled in the same period. 
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Lessons from World Development Report (WDR) 2009 
2.40. The WDR 2009 brings important global experience to Azerbaijan, as it reviews 
successful diversification strategies of countries while considering their geographic location 
relative to potential trading partners.    The Report states that the range of goods in which a 
country can develop a comparative advantage has expanded along with the growth in global 
trade. Intermediate goods and services, more tradable nowadays, provide developing countries 
with a broader range of diversification opportunities than ever before. Higher exports can occur 
when countries cooperate regionally to generate scale economies, favor greater factor mobility, 
and lower transport costs, as well as integrate globally. Regional cooperation means that firms in 
neighboring countries can produce final goods more cheaply by building international supply 
chains than they can by relying on suppliers in one country alone. Global integration provides 
the demand and incentive to develop such efficient regional supply networks. This combination 
of regional and global integration has produced successful developers (like South East Asia, 
Western Europe and Coastal Chin) in today’s rich neighborhoods.70  
2.41. Market-driven vs. institution-driven integration. When integration is market-driven, 
as it was in East Asia, production factors will relocate and promote convergence in neighboring 
countries’ per capita incomes. In contrast, when integration is institution-driven, as in most 
developing neighborhoods today, political economy challenges can become major concerns. This 
is the reason that countries far from world markets––in Central Asia, the Pacific Islands, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa—face the stiffest challenges to economic growth and need a strong 
commitment to cooperative solutions. Regional integration can occur in “natural” neighborhoods 
of these regions with three sets of instruments: 
(i) These regions need close institutional cooperation and comprehensive regional 
infrastructure investments, as is the case of any other region. 
(ii) They also may need cross-country compensation mechanisms to sustain the 
integration effort because deep integration is likely to lead to uneven, short-term 
gains and losses across countries.  
(iii) The international community can support these integration efforts through 
coordinated incentives. 
2.42. Azerbaijan is located in an isolated geographic neighborhood with few large 
markets. It may benefit from creating centers or hubs around its border with Georgia and 
Iran, and also with Kazakhstan. The sub-region itself is on a spoke, linked to European and 
Asian markets. Azerbaijan’s average trade share with its neighbors was 26.7 percent during 
2000–05, compared with 10.4 percent for Armenia and 39.4 percent for Georgia during the same 
period. The country shares two major “twin cities”—with Georgia in its northwestern region 
(Ganja-Rustavi) and with Iran in its Southern region (Lankaran-Astara). In the northwest, Ganja 
is the second largest city of the country (more than 300,000 inhabitants), located 149 km from 
Rustavi in Georgia along the Baku-Tbilisi corridor. In addition to the road and rail connection, 
Ganja has an international airport. In the south, Lankaran has 50,000 inhabitants and is located 
                                                 
70 This approach is in contrast to experiences of some countries, such as Chile, Mauritius, and the well-known East 
Asian tigers, that have integrated globally without much cooperation from their neighbors. They enjoyed significant 
first-mover advantages.  
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36 km from the Iranian border city Astara, which is an important transit point for all kinds of 
goods. This geographical proximity hints that Georgia and Iran are the “natural” neighborhood of 
Azerbaijan, although Kazakhstan, on the other shore of the Caspian Sea, could be another option. 
However, effective economic cooperation will require adequate cross-country infrastructure, 
institutional reforms, and the help of the international community to provide coordinated 
incentives that can sustain this regional cooperation.  
2.43. Azerbaijan could use three types of policy instruments to pursue this regional and global 
integration:  
• Institutional cooperation to address coordination problems within neighborhoods and 
foster greater scale economies. Behind-the-border reforms (such as mutual 
recognition agreements on technical and business procedures, adoption of 
international standards, and macroeconomic convergence frameworks) could 
expand the size of the Azeri market by creating a more attractive business 
environment for domestic and foreign firms. At-the-border policy reforms (such as 
WTO compliance reforms and labor and capital mobility reforms) could facilitate 
the flow of capital, labor, and intermediate inputs as a precondition for cross-border 
production networks. Between-the-border reforms (such as trade and transport 
facilitation initiatives) could reduce transport costs and facilitate the emergence of a 
more reliable distribution system. 
• Regional infrastructure to strategically link the neighborhood to Iran, Russia, and 
Turkey, as well as the EU. Productivity-enhancing regional infrastructure (such as 
power grid and telecommunication backbone infrastructure) could elevate the 
attractiveness of the Azeri market. Mobility-enhancing regional infrastructure, such 
as regional excellence tertiary education centers, could supply Azeri firms with a 
larger pool of skilled workers. Trade-enhancing regional infrastructure, such as 
transport hubs, could support the diversification strategy by enabling more cheap 
intermediate goods to be available on the Azeri market. 
• Coordinated incentives involving all of the neighborhood’s stakeholders and 
donors from the leading world markets will be necessary to compensate potential 
short-term losses to get the long-term efficiency gains from these institutional 
reforms and regional infrastructure. For instance, when a regional public good is 
sensitive to the performance of the weaker members, as in a hub-and-spoke airport 
network, the challenge for the other members is to raise the performance of the 
weaker links to an acceptable standard. This can be done through cross-country 
subsidies or through foreign aid. In a relatively poor neighborhood such as that of 
Azerbaijan and its neighbors, foreign aid may be the only feasible way to ensure the 
provision of such public goods. If the good depends on the best-performing member 
of the neighborhood, such as a regional tertiary education excellence center, the 
weaker members may be asked to contribute to stronger members, or foreign 
assistance can facilitate its provision. Coordinated incentives require trust among 
the neighboring countries. International organizations can help build such trust, as 
in the Aral Sea basin rehabilitation.  
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2.44. Azerbaijan’s development strategy seems to be very much aligned with the WDR 
2009 findings. Azerbaijan is already investing heavily in infrastructure (in highways and rail 
lines) but needs to strengthen its institutional cooperation and its coordination incentives, as is 
suggested above and will be discussed further in the report (see also discussion in Box 1.2). 
D. GOING FORWARD  
2.45. Azerbaijan’s broad economic base augurs well for the country’s future. However, to 
sustain its non-oil growth rates, Azerbaijan will have to turn more to the outside world in the 
medium term. While the global crisis presents a short-term challenge to the implementation of 
that strategy, it also presents an opportunity to undertake the necessary sectoral reforms, and set 
up the market-based export-oriented institutions that will serve Azerbaijan well in the post-crisis 
period.  
2.46. In Azerbaijan’s agricultural sector, primary production can be expected to register 
substantial increases through commercialization. The fading away of small subsistence farms 
operated by geriatric households and poor families will accelerate. Farms will need to further 
consolidate into larger farming units,   using modern equipment and techniques, expanded 
production of tradables and higher value-added crop and animal products, and much more robust 
levels of investment in green houses and mechanization. However, labor shedding by most of the 
recapitalized and commercialized farming operations is inevitable. The commercialization of 
primary production will be supported by an expansion of the private sector in the import and 
supply of modern farm inputs, including seeds, chemicals, genetic materials for herd upgrading, 
animals, feed supplements, veterinary supplies, and machinery and equipment. At the same time, 
the agricultural sector will see the rapid development of the commercial seeds industry and the 
availability of improved cultivars––supported by joint venturing with the major international 
corporations and a considerably more flexible seeds law. The domestic livestock industry will 
feature measurably increased reliance on private animal breeders to import and develop 
improved breeds. 
2.47. Agri-food industries will benefit from facilities’ upgrading, modernization, and a 
more appealing business environment. A host of improvements are needed in agriculture. 
They will be fostered by improvements in the rural business environment and a more effective 
tailoring of business development services to the requirements of “rural” entrepreneurs along 
with a slow but progressive filling-in of the absent intermediates in most agri-food marketing 
chains. On the investment side, there is a need for accelerated investment in modern equipment 
and process controls, training and automated business management systems, bulk transport, 
handling and storages as well as cold chains; improved grading, packaging and SPS certification 
procedures (not necessarily government-managed). On the institutional side, there is a need for 
effective de-monopolization, as Customs reform and the work of the Competition Commission 
could work to influence the rural business environment. This vision also features a resumed 
withdrawal of  government agencies and SOEs from direct management and control of primary 
production and the food industries to a posture of setting standards, regulatory oversight, reacting 
to emergencies and administering (limited) public investment programs through public-private 
partnerships, outsourcing, and contracting––to every extent practicable. These reforms can result 
in higher productivity and increased employment in the sector.  
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2.48. In rural financial markets, businesses and agriculturalists increasingly will benefit 
from the continued development and broadening of financial services and credit lines, 
including savings and––perhaps––index-based insurance products, as well as from specialized 
credit facilities such as warehouse receipts and production advances associated with contract 
farming. They will also benefit from more responsive input financing and equipment 
leasing/purchase facilities for farms, overdraft lines of working capital credits for seasonal agro-
processors and agri-food traders, and short-term trade financing facilities––whether from the 
financial sector or offered by foreign clients and suppliers. 
2.49. The future of Azerbaijan’s industrial sector merits serious consideration. In oil and 
gas, new downstream activity depends largely on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Moreover, 
additional transport activities (of oil or gas from Azerbaijan’s eastern neighbors) depend on 
geopolitical factors. However, downstream activities have potentially a more certain economic 
future. Currently, Azerbaijan’s downstream sectors are growing but are not the most dynamic. 
They lack investment, which may reflect government prioritization, given the enormous demand 
pressure on the economy. However, prudent and sustainable exploitation of downstream 
opportunities would require: (i) elimination of implicit and explicit energy subsidies to the 
sector; (ii) a governance (and management) framework that is largely, if not entirely, in private 
sector; and (iii) a profit-making mandate. Research has shown that successful resource-rich 
countries have developed substantial downstream industries.  
2.50. The future of the construction sector remains bright even as the country’s 
infrastructure and housing quality (even inside Baku) remain generally poor despite significant 
investments.  Construction has played an important role in driving up labor wages and 
intermediate products, such as cement, which are produced under monopolistic conditions. 
Substantial breathing space to the sector and to the economy could be created by allowing more 
competition to domestic producers, either through FDI or imports. 
2.51. Azerbaijan is counting on the potential of its service sector. Its service sector has 
many opportunities to grow in the short to medium term. First, and most important, with ongoing 
improvement in road infrastructure, some of the country’s high transportation costs will drop, 
improving the opportunity to transport produce, and products, from Afghanistan and Iran. 
Second, Azerbaijan’s position as a regional trade center will improve;   its wholesale, retail, and 
tourism sectors will be bolstered by improvements in transportation.  Its banking sector has yet to 
open up significantly to the private sector, so ample opportunities remain.  Similarly, 
telecommunication is still under public management. Opening up to private management should 
help improve service quality and demand. Other utilities (power, water, and gas) have yet to 
complete major investments––or undertake private management practices—that would enable 
them to provide quality services.  
E. CONCLUSION 
2.52. Azerbaijan’s broad economic base and its existing level of regional integration offer 
significant opportunities for sustainable growth. However, existing inefficiencies place 
Azerbaijan behind comparators in terms of productivity. Low productivity and new terms of 
trade resulting from the use of oil revenues create pressure for new investments to keep 
Azerbaijan competitive and its growth sustainable. The government’s public expenditures in 
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infrastructure should contribute significantly to increasing productivity.71 However, private 
investment is still required for Azerbaijan to innovate and develop new products consistent with 
its new terms of trade. Successful resource-rich countries diversified by ensuring that their 
institutional capacities were adequate, before considering the use of resource revenues to 
stimulate growth.  Possible elements of institutional capacity-building are stabilizing spending, 
improving the transparency of public spending, removing trade barriers, streamlining business 
regulations, and creating institutions that facilitate collaboration with the private sector. The 
latter institutions should have the objectives of encouraging technical development, promoting 
exports, coordinating small businesses, and developing public-private partnerships.  
                                                 
71 Using an overlapping generation’s model, Takizawa, Gardner, and Ueda (2007) evaluated the most appropriate 
use of windfall revenues from natural resources to maximize long-run macroeconomic welfare in resource-rich 
countries.  They found that using these revenues to finance government spending on infrastructure could raise 
productivity and private investment.  In particular, they demonstrated that the government could maintain a constant 
level of per capita spending by transforming oil wealth into financial assets.   
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CHAPTER 3.  
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY AND PUBLIC FINANCE GOVERNANCE 
 
In planning for the oil boom, Azerbaijan’s government had the foresight to set up an Oil Fund to serve as a 
stabilization fund and to safeguard oil revenues for future generations. Although Azerbaijan’s forecasted fiscal oil 
revenues are considerable, they are  likely to be exhausted in approximately 20 years, with an estimated net 
present value of $198 billion (in 2007 prices).  However, although oil price forecasts for the next 20 years remain 
above historical averages, they are not good predictors of future prices.  And the government’s large spending 
increases in 2006-2008 have left it at a rate of public spending (82 percent relative to non-oil GDP), which is 
unsustainable. The spending increases have also increased volatility of the real exchange rate to the detriment of 
private investment and diversification. 
 
This chapter develops a methodology for smoothening oil revenue spending with a view to maintaining 
macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability; it is based on 2008 estimates. The chapter develops an 
operational approach to implementing the government’s existing Long Term Oil Revenue Management Strategy.  
The methodology produces an estimate of the ‘permanent income’ or ‘constant real spending’ from government 
oil revenues (in constant US$) that can be used to finance the consolidated budget, effectively, in perpetuity.  The 
estimate is equivalent to a sustainable non-oil deficit. Naturally, this calculation needs to be conducted frequently, 
about every three years.  The chapter’s analysis is based on permanent income estimates under three long-term 
price scenarios that have been selected during the unfolding of the global crisis.  The analysis confirms that the 
level of the 2008 non-oil deficit was unsustainable, and that sustainability requires a much lower non-oil deficit for 
2009 and beyond (in nominal terms and relative to non-oil GDP). 
 
This chapter argues that Azerbaijan would benefit from smoothing its spending out of oil revenues by annually 
spending a constant amount (the permanent income equivalent) based on the LTORMS.  Smoothening oil revenue 
spending under the permanent income approach would gradually bring down the size of public spending to 
sustainable levels.  However, if the government were to spend only a little more than the permanent income 
equivalent out of oil revenues, this would rapidly deteriorate its public finances, and would require harsh fiscal 
adjustments, even in the medium term.   
 
Coordination challenges arising from the adverse developments on diversification, and prospects of a declining 
expenditure envelope (relative to non-oil GDP), and the prospects of low oil prices henceforth, suggest that 
Azerbaijan may wish to formalize its high level policy discussions with a high level advisory body to the President.  
This would ensure that macroeconomic and expenditure policies are consistent with diversification. Azerbaijan 
would also need to strengthen significantly the efficiency of its expenditures by concluding reforms in financial and 
expenditure management.   
A. INTRODUCTION 
3.1. For Azerbaijan, macroeconomic stability and governance are highly interrelated. 
Development experience has demonstrated the formidable governance challenges that resource-
rich countries face, given the pressures to distribute rents to stakeholders. Azerbaijan had the 
foresight to set up an Oil Fund (OF) to safeguard part of its oil revenues for future generations 
and to serve as a stabilization fund. The OF is expected to serve both as a gatekeeper to distribute 
oil rents in the economy and a key contributor to macroeconomic stability. Appropriately, the 
country’s Budget System Law (BSL) stipulates that all oil revenues are to be budgeted as part of 
the consolidated budget. Decisions on the level of fiscal spending from oil revenues dovetail 
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with political decisions on the level and composition of the budget. Despite the robust double-
digit growth of the non-oil economy, stimulated by large increases in government spending 
between 2005 and 2008, recent adverse developments involving inflation, non-oil private 
investment, and the tradable sector have raised questions from international observers about the 
level of governance. This chapter proposes a fiscal rule to stabilize oil spending, presenting the 
implications of this rule for medium-term budgeting, and looks at the necessary institutions to 
support this rule.  
Forecasted Revenues 
3.2. Azerbaijan has sizable oil and gas resources that will earn large fiscal revenues in 
the next 20 years. Oil reserves are estimated 
at 9 billion barrels and gas reserves at 1.36 
TCM.72 Figure 3.1 shows that fiscal revenues 
from oil have been rising since 2005; they are 
expected to peak in 2010–15 and then 
decrease gradually. Future revenues from oil 
production also will depend on new 
discoveries.73 The revenue profile is based on 
projections in Figure 1.2, which has been 
confirmed as a reasonable estimate for 
production for the purpose of this report by the 
government. World Bank price projections 
estimate the net present value of Azerbaijan’s 
oil and gas revenues for 2008–24 to be $198 
billion (in 2007 prices), that is, more than six 
times the 2007 GDP. 74  
Variability and Risk to Revenues 
3.3. Azerbaijan’s actual fiscal revenues from oil might be higher or lower than currently 
expected. Future extraction volumes are relatively well known in the short run, although they 
could change, depending on new discoveries. However, volatility of revenues is probably much 
more influenced by price volatility. Oil prices are largely unpredictable, with major shocks and 
volatility spikes (Figure 3.2). After the oil shocks of 1973–79, prices returned to long-term prices 
close to $20 per barrel. However, beginning in 2002, the international oil price started to rise 
again, and in July 2008, it was near $145 per barrel.  By October 2008, it was $60-70 range per 
barrel.  The volatility of oil prices and the global financial crisis suggest forecasts need to weigh 
                                                 
72 New discoveries were announced in June 2008 that raised oil reserves from 7 billion to 9 billion barrels (bl). The 
inclusion of these discoveries in this study has been confirmed with the Government of Azerbaijan. 
73 Based on discussions with government officials, oil production cannot be reduced in response to low oil prices 
due to technical reasons.  Nevertheless, should the global crisis lead to a reduction in oil or gas production in 2009 
or 2010, the impact on the net present value estimate would be very small.  
74 This estimate is based on an average price of oil of $66 per barrel in current US$ or $52 per barrel in 2007 prices 
for 2010-2030, taking into account an 8 percent discount rate, and a 3 percent return on Oil Fund assets. The 30-year 
historical average for 1978–2007was US$33 per barrel in 2007 prices. 
Figure 3.1: Azerbaijan Fiscal Revenues from Oil 
(AZN Bill): Actual 2005-07; Estimates for 2008, and 
Three Scenarios For 2009-24 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff 
estimates. 
Note: For oil prices see Table 3.1 
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heavily on the side of prudence when trying to identify a medium-term oil price against which to 
budget. 
Macroeconomic Issues and Options in Using Resource Rents 
3.4.  The use of oil money inside the 
resource-rich economy invariably leads to 
real exchange rate appreciation.75,76 
Azerbaijan’s domestic prices are likely to 
outpace the rise in prices of its trading 
partners. It is because Azerbaijan is putting 
relatively more pressure on its domestic 
prices with the use of oil revenues than its 
trading partners are (indeed some of 
Azerbaijan’s trading partners also have 
natural resources). There are two 
theoretically “sure”—but practically 
improbable—ways of avoiding real 
exchange rate appreciation: (i) keep the oil revenues abroad in U.S. dollars; and (ii) use oil 
revenues to only purchase imports. Only these two approaches would eliminate real exchange 
rate appreciation pressures.  In practice, pressure for real exchange rate appreciation in 
Azerbaijan stems from: (a) OF transfers to the state treasury; (b)AIOC taxes on profits paid in 
U.S. dollars; (c) SOCAR foreign currency revenues; (d) foreign borrowings by SOEs under 
explicit or implicit state guarantee; (e) Azeri commercial bank borrowings from foreign 
creditors; and (f) government borrowing from foreign creditors. Azerbaijan’s effective real 
exchange rate for non-oil exports appreciated by 26 percent from January 2005 to April 2008. 
However, in 2007, it depreciated by 1 percent (despite Azerbaijan’s 17 percent inflation) because 
Azerbaijan’s trading partners’ currencies and prices appreciated. 
3.5. Real appreciation materializes in the economy from either nominal appreciation or 
domestic inflation, or a combination of both. Each version has distinct implications for the 
domestic economy. Resource-rich countries may prefer managed or gradual appreciation (as 
opposed to floating their exchange rates) in the hope that the appreciation of the exchange rate 
does not overshoot, which could adversely affect the tradable sector.77 But importers effectively 
look at the real exchange rate of the country from which they consider importing to assess the 
price competitiveness of the country’s goods. However, a managed appreciation policy often 
leads to higher domestic inflation, which is commonly viewed as a regressive tax that impacts 
the poor more than the rich. In Azerbaijan, which has chosen the managed appreciation route, 
inflation hit 19.7 percent at the end of 2007, and reached 15.3 percent in 2008. Besides the risk 
of creating expectations of accelerating and volatile inflation, higher inflation submits the private 
sector (households and entrepreneurs) to unpredictable inflation taxes, and to higher costs (and 
risks) associated with investments. 
                                                 
75 The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of domestic prices to foreign prices, which may be measured in the 
CPI or another price index. 
76 IMF 2004 discussed issues of managing Azerbaijan’s oil wealth. 
77 Another reason for preferring a stable currency may be that a stable nominal exchange rate allows US$ earnings to 
maintain their value in foreign currency. 
Figure 3.2: Annual Average Domestic Crude Oil Prices, 
1946–Jun 2008 
Source: Bank staff estimates. 
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3.6. To maintain competitiveness, real appreciation needs to be accompanied by higher 
productivity, which may be supported by public investment. Public investment is a way to 
boost productivity growth, hence to relieve long-run pressures on the real exchange rate. 
Productive public investment includes improving and maintaining the existing infrastructure in 
the water, transport, telecommunication, and power sectors as well as providing better education 
and social services to build human capital. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, although 
productive public investment fosters productivity growth in the long run, in the short run, it 
accelerates government spending and induces upward pressures on the real exchange rate. To 
moderate the pace of investment, it is critical to take into account the absorptive capacity of the 
economy. Limits to absorptive capacity point to the need for efficient implementation of 
investment decisions, which requires modern and effective vetting and implementation 
institutions. Thus, part of public investment should be directed at the institutional infrastructure 
to improve its capacity aimed at evaluating and monitoring public projects. 
3.7. However, instead of exclusively using oil revenues to finance the increase in public 
spending, some oil money could be used to finance a reduction of the tax burden on the 
non-oil sector, if affordable.  This could be done as follows. First, in a—for Azerbaijan—
hypothetical situation, where oil revenues are very large relative to the size of the future 
economy, as in the Emirates or Saudi Arabia, the tax system could be designed with low non-oil 
revenue objectives.  Second, in the case of Azerbaijan, where a permanent stream of revenue 
income from oil can be estimated, the government could follow a similar but more measured 
approach: lower its non-oil revenues somewhat and, in doing so, could provide some relief to the 
private sector.   
3.8. In practice, for Azerbaijan, there is a caveat.  First, the bulk of the fiscal revenues outside 
the oil and gas profit shares to government are contributed by AIOC, SOCAR, and, to a smaller 
extent, by the SOEs.  In most revenue categories, contributions from other tax payers amount to 
about 20 percent of total contributions (of which half comes from VAT, a quarter from corporate 
profit tax, and a quarter from personal income tax).  So, at first glance, lowering statutory rates 
does not seem to benefit the bulk of the private sector, with the exception of two important 
factors. First, real exchange rate pressures coming from high oil revenue spending have 
negatively affected the competitiveness of non-oil businesses by raising their costs. This burden 
could, however, be offset by reduced tax rates on the private sector.  Second, Azerbaijan’s 
statutory rates are on the high side relative to the region, and they are likely to be significant 
factors pushing entrepreneurs to operate informally.   Both of these factors argue for reducing the 
statutory tax burden on the private sector, although, of course, one would have to recognize that 
taxation of SOEs poses a particular challenge in Azerbaijan, which needs to be addressed head 
on.  At the same time, the AIOC, which is a major tax revenue contributor, is governed by 
separate conventions (the PSAs). 
3.9. The argument for lowering the tax burden on the private sector holds even more 
during the global crisis.  The global crisis has played havoc with short-run oil price projections, 
and has even raised concerns about the short-term financing of public expenditures. However, 
the potential for oil revenues provides a revenue buffer for the country.  It allows the government 
to set as a policy priority the reversal of the negative trends in non-oil private investment (or at 
least their arrest of the downward trends). Failure to do so would prolong the decline in private 
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investment and delay diversification of the economy, which is so essential for mitigating the 
impact of the crisis for Azerbaijan. 
B. SMOOTHING OIL SPENDING: PERMANENT INCOME APPROACH 
3.10. Wise management of the fiscal consequences of oil revenues requires a framework 
to smooth public spending for at least four reasons. First, for intergenerational equity. 
Because Azerbaijan’s oil and gas resources are limited in volume, production will be limited by 
time. Spending too much today would entail spending less tomorrow, to the detriment of future 
generations. The second reason is the need to preserve macroeconomic stability. Oil price 
instability could translate to cyclical and unpredictable public spending that would raise real 
exchange rate and price volatility, creating uncertainty that would behave like a tax on 
investment decisions. Moreover, instability would create upward pressures on the real exchange 
rate that would harm the non-oil tradable sector and increase the risk of Dutch Disease. A third 
reason to smooth public expenditure is the need to maintain spending efficiency. This reason is 
reinforced by a sustainability imperative. Azerbaijan’s resource wealth is the collateral 
supporting its access to capital markets. However, the value of this collateral, and thereby the 
ease of capital market access, will decline precisely when income flows dry up, that is, when oil 
prices are low or oil resources are exhausted. These would be precisely the times that access to 
capital markets would be most needed.  
Table 3.1: Oil Price Scenarios in Current Prices, Permanent Income (PI) Estimates, and Average of 
Real Prices 
 
3.11. These challenges can be overcome by a permanent income (PI) approach to 
spending oil revenues, as envisioned by the Long-Term Oil Revenue Management Strategy 
(LTORMS). In 2004, by Presidential Decree, a LTORMS was approved that called for constant 
real spending fiscal revenues from oil. This is equivalent to a PI approach to spending oil 
revenues, which stipulates that Azerbaijan would annually spend the same real amount of 
expenditures in perpetuity (Box 2.1). This strategy is sustainable: first, because it proposes using 
only the interest portion of the anticipated fiscal revenues from oil; second,   it is a flat stream of 
expenditure in real (foreign currency) terms. Thus, expenditure volatility is greatly reduced 
(although it will not disappear entirely, since PI estimates may have to be revised occasionally); 
Oil Price Scenarios PI in 2007 in 
bill. of US$  
(AZN)  
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2015 
 
2020 
 
2030 
2010-30 
Avg Nom’l 
2010-30 
Avg 
Real* 
I.  Jul 07 forecast  7.7      (6.6) 108.1 105.5 98.5 92.5 75.3 77.1 81.1 80.2 64.5 
II.  Pre-Oct 08 with 
short crisis 7.5      (6.5) 97.5 70.0 81.3 82.1 83.7 85.8 90.2 85.9 68.8 
III. Pre-Oct 08 with 
delay 7.2      (6.1) 95.0 60.0 65.0 70.0 83.7 85.8 90.2 84.2 67.4 
IV.    Med Low 5.9      (5.1) 95.0 60.0 61.3 62.0 63.2 64.8 68.1 64.5 51.9 
 V. 30-yr hist. avg 4.3      (3.4) 4.3 95.0 68.0 39.5 40.0 40.7 41.7 41.7 33.4 
Source: Bank staff estimates 
Notes: (*) Annual average for 2010-2030 in 2007 constant US$. 
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and  third, spreading expenditure over time stretches out the period of real exchange rate 
pressure, thereby obviating Dutch Disease concerns.78  
3.12. An important benefit of the PI approach is that estimates of PI are not subject to 
extreme volatility, even in the face of extreme volatility in oil prices or production. The 
benefits of the PI methodology are illustrated in Table 3.1. The PI quantifies the decision 
maker’s forecasts about the future trend in oil prices, by smoothening the impact of price 
fluctuations in the forecasts.   Table 3.1 suggests that if oil prices were to stay in the vicinity of 
$55-60 per barrel in 2007 prices, Azerbaijan will have about $7.5 billion per annum in 2007 
prices.  Historically, the price of oil in 2007 U.S. dollars was $33 per barrel for the past 30 years 
and $39 per barrel for the past 10 years.  Today’s long-term forecasts are much higher than the 
historical prices.  They may yet change significantly, as the depth of the global crisis and the 
behavior of OPEC evolve.  Should prices drop to about $ 52 per barrel in 2010–30, the PI will be 
$5.9 billion per year (in 2007 prices); should they fall to $33 per barrel in 2010–30, the PI will be 
$4.5 billion per year (in 2007 prices).  Table 3.1 shows the PI equivalent in U.S. dollars and 
AZN (both in 2007 prices), selected years of the oil price forecast in current U.S. dollars, and the 
average oil price of the forecast period in 2007 U.S. dollars. 
3.13. The global crisis poses a challenge for medium-term budgeting. A $5.9 billion PI (in 
2007 U.S. dollars) is recommended at the drafting of this report.  Figure 3.3 shows historical 
oil prices from 1960 and illustrates three post-October 2008 scenarios.  The first assumes the 
same long-term global demand as before the financial crisis from 2010 onwards, but provides for 
a downturn in 2009, as a result of the crisis. This is scenario II in Table 3.1, and is based on Bank 
and U.S. Government’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) projections in December 
2008.  The lowest scenario—scenario V in Table 3.1—is based on the 30-year historical average 
(1978-2007). The mid-case scenario is halfway between this report’s low and high cases, 
scenario IV in Table 3.1.  While it is not the intention of this report to recommend oil price 
forecasts, it needs to grapple with what is a 
reasonable PI on which to base fiscal 
expenditures.  Given the unique uncertainty 
in the global economy at the time of 
preparation of this report, the “Med Low” 
scenario is proposed as an operational 
forecast.  The PI equivalent of that scenario 
is $5.9 billion in 2007 U.S. dollars. Given the 
uncertainty regarding the course of the global 
crisis, and the recovery of oil prices, the 
government should undertake estimates of 
the PI on a routine basis.  
3.14. Should the government choose to 
adopt a PI of $5.9 billion per annum (in 
2007 U.S. Dollars), it may want to try and 
                                                 
78 The 2003 Public Expenditure Review discussed the merits of other approaches to distributing oil revenues. This 
report takes as its starting point the strategy that has already been selected by the government and advises on its 
implementation.  
Figure 3.3: Oil prices 1960-2030–Actual Through 
October 2008 and Forecasts Thereafter (in 2007 US$) 
Source: Bank staff estimates
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publicly communicate this by setting a five-year target stock of assets for the OF of 
approximately AZN 35 billion (at 2007 U.S. Dollars) through 2013, and re-evaluate the PI 
estimate thereafter. If Azerbaijan could draw US$5.9 billion (in constant 2007 US$) annually, 
the OF assets could reach approximately 40 billion manats in 2013 (under conditions described 
in section C below).  Should the OF accumulate more (or fewer) assets than targeted, the PI level 
could be adjusted upward (or downward) on a 3-5 year interval. While government analysts may 
(and should) estimate the PI equivalent frequently, particularly during times of global 
uncertainty, policymakers should refrain from making large, abrupt increases in spending 
envelopes because that would affect macro stability and efficiency. Besides, as has been shown 
previously, the PI estimate is quite “inelastic” in response to future changes in revenues, and is in 
fact more inelastic to changes that happen even further into the future. 
3.15. The LTORMS and PI approach needs to be operationalized. Azerbaijan issued a 
Presidential Decree in December 2004, which sets out the first principle for long-term use of the 
fiscal revenues from oil. It states:   
“When forecasting the amount of long-term expenditures from oil and gas revenues, the 
constant real expenditures principle shall be used as a basis and annual limits shall be set 
for the expenditures to be made within the period covered by the strategy.”  
The strategy also stipulates that the government can spend more than the real expenditure 
equivalent in the early phase of the oil boom, and adjust accordingly in the boom’s later phase.   
The time before the global financial crisis demonstrated the need for a fiscal rule, as pressures 
for higher spending led to some unfortunate macroeconomic outcomes (discussed in Chapter 1), 
despite the double-digit growth rates. In the midst of the global financial crisis, the benefit of the 
fiscal rule would be to ensure against abrupt reductions in public spending, which could give rise 
to inefficiencies in public investment and possibly have negative macroeconomic consequences.  
In both cases, it is important for the government to operationalize the strategy to ensure that 
budgeting decisions are consistent with long-term fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic 
stability.  The PI should be calculated on the basis of all resource inflows that have a cyclical 
Box 3.1: Permanent Income Calculation 
 
The permanent income calculation consists of two steps: first, it computes the discounted value of
projected oil revenues, and second, it calculates which income level would give exactly the same
discounted value while being constant in real terms forever. The value of parameters may be changed
but a good starting point is to take a risk premium equal to 3 percent, rS = 3 percent (equal to the US long
term real interest rate (2 percent) plus a hundred basis points for Azerbaijan country risk ), p)  = 2.5 percent
(equal to the US long-term inflation rate) and thus iR = 8.5 percent. Estimates of the World Bank consistent
with forecasted revenues then shows that the level of permanent income that could be spent annually
amount to 7.7 billion in constant 2007 US dollars, i.e. 31 percent of Azerbaijan’s 2007 GDP or 69 percent
of non-oil GDP. 
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NPVo = net present value from future oil 
revenues, 
Ptoil = price of oil in current dollars per barrel 
Ot = production volume in year t 
iR = discount rate integrating a risk premium 
p) = long term inflation rate 
rS = real interest rate in the absence of 
uncertainty 
T is the year in which oil reserves are 
exhausted. 
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component, including OF and other oil revenues used in the state budget.79  From the operational 
aspect, the estimated PI should be compared to the non-oil deficit of the consolidated budget.  
For the technical readers, Box 3.1 provides an overview of the PI calculation. During the crisis, 
the PI provides good guidance as to the sustainable level of spending.  
C. STRATEGY FOR AZERBAIJAN’S PUBLIC FINANCES 
A Long-term Objective 
3.16. A long-term fiscal strategy can serve the vision of a moderate-sized government and 
mandates a small but consistent adjustment in the consolidated budget. While the 
government of Azerbaijan has indicated on various occasions its desire to develop a sustainable, 
market-based, non-oil economy, no clear guidance has been offered as to the size of government 
it seeks to develop. Azerbaijan has the opportunity to develop a limited government that is still 
capable of delivering defense and other critical services. Unfortunately, European countries with 
large governments are typically shouldering large pension systems, civil services, and public 
service systems that Azerbaijan has largely managed to avoid thus far. This report posits that 
Azerbaijan should develop a medium-sized government—consistent with its wish to develop a 
flexible market-driven economy—of approximately 35 percent of total GDP by 2024, or 37 
percent of non-oil GDP. The starting point would be the pre-oil-boom size of government 
(specifically from 2002–04), in which the consolidated budget was approximately 27 percent of 
GDP (or 40 percent of non-oil GDP) and economic stability was heralded as a critical trait of 
Azerbaijan. The country thus could use the bulk of its fiscal revenues from oil to build a more 
modern and competitive economy, and gradually return to a moderate and manageable 
government by the end of the oil boom. By 2016, Azerbaijan could have a per capita income of 
$5,700 (in 2007 US$, Atlas method), akin to that of Malaysia, Turkey, or South Africa today. 
The government expenditures of these countries are 29 percent, 26 percent, and 27 percent of 
GDP respectively.80 Adopting such a strategy would require Azerbaijan to undertake a small and 
gradual but consistent adjustment in the consolidated budget. In 2008, Azerbaijan’s consolidated 
budget is expected to reach 84 percent of non-oil GDP. The goal of a medium-sized government 
necessitates a definitive change of course from the country’s current expenditure trajectory. 
3.17. Azerbaijan’s 2008 budget estimates place oil revenue spending somewhat above the 
proposed PI of $5.9 billion. Azerbaijan’s non-oil deficit for 2008 is estimated at around AZN 7  
billion in current prices, or about AZN 5.5 billion in 2007 prices, or about AZN 0.5 billion 
mantas in 2007 prices.  This is based on the PI $5.9 billion in 2007 prices, which is equivalent to 
AZN 5.1 billion in 2007 prices. 
3.18. Azerbaijan can use the proposed PI level of $5.9 billion in its drive toward a 
sustainable moderate-sized government. Based on the 2008 budget estimates, is can do so 
by maintaining: (a) recurrent real spending at 2008 estimate levels, and (b) by reducing 
real investment spending to 2007 levels gradually by 2012, with a moderate non-oil tax 
                                                 
79 Cyclicality here refers to all dimensions of volatile revenues, including cyclicality in volumes and in prices. 
80 In the OECD, the top three fiscal revenue earners of 2007are France, Hungary, and Sweden with average revenue 
of 51.6% of GDP. 
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burden and low debt. Azerbaijan could attain a moderate-sized government (37 percent of non-
oil GDP) (Box 3.2) by 2024, if it allowed the totality of wages,  
transfers, subsidies, and goods/services expenditures to remain constant in real terms at 2008 
levels, and returned the investment budget to its 2007 level.81 Maintenance costs and interest 
                                                 
81 In 2007 (constant) manat, investment expenditures amounted to AZN 2.8 bn in 2007 and were expected to reach 
AZN 4.6 bn in 2008. To be consistent with the PI approach, investment expenditures would need to gradually go 
back to AZN 2.8 bn (in 2007 manat) in 2012 (AZN 3.6 bn in 2009,  AZN 3 bn in 2010, AZN 2.9 bn in 2011, and 
AZN 2.8 bn in 2012, at constant 2007 prices).  The proposed trend for investment is consistent with early discussion 
 
Box 3.2: Recommended Spending Scenario, $52 per Barrel in 2007 US$ (2005-30) 
Notes: (1) In  Box 3.2 simulations, permanent income is calculated based on the net present value of oil revenues for 2008 
estimates–2024 and phasing out AIOC from 2025–29.  (2) In the Public Debt figure, the green line represents both the 
“Recommended scenario $59” per barrel, and the “Scenario $33”, while the red line represents the “Very high spending with $59 
per barrel” 
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payments vary according to the stock of public investment and public debt. Taking these actions 
implies that the government needs to engage in significant inter-sectoral allocations and 
efficiency gains. While for some years the adjustment would involve overspending oil revenues 
with respect to the PI of $5.9 billion (in 2007 U.S. Dollars), it would still allow the country to 
accumulate about $100 billion (or AZN 72 billion in 2007 prices) in the Oil Fund by 2030. 
3.19. This scenario assumes that Azerbaijan follows a reasoned approach to accumulating debt, 
so we assume that government debt stays at 2008 levels as a share of non-oil GDP, namely, 20.6 
percent. The scenario also assumes that the tax burden will be alleviated by decreasing non-oil 
revenues—from 34 percent in 2008 to 31.5 percent in 2009, and to 30 percent in 2010. In this 
scenario, Oil Fund assets would amount to AZN 72 billion at 2007 prices in 2024 (Box 3.2), and 
Azerbaijan would still be able to get $5.9 billion (in 2007 U.S. Dollars) of PI from the Oil Fund, 
without decreasing the real value of the Oil Fund assets. 
3.20. Two plausible counterfactuals are presented for illustration. First, oil prices drop 
back to their historical average ($33 per barrel, in 2007 prices) for 2010-2030, but Azerbaijan 
does not adjust expenditures from the aforementioned spending scenario (Annex 1, Scenario of 
$33 per barrel).  The result, all else equal, is that the OF assets would drop from $100 billion in 
2030 under the previous scenario to $40 billion in the current one.  Along the lines of this 
scenario, it is very important for the government to consider whether it would choose a gradual 
adjustment (which was illustrated here purely for the purpose of illustration), or a more rapid 
adjustment, say over a period of 1-2 years, to bring public spending down so that the OF might 
still accumulate more than $40 billion. The rapid adjustment appears to be more costly in the 
short-term, but of lower risk for the medium term, as it helps build up the Oil Fund. 
3.21. A second counterfactual is that Azerbaijan continues to increase spending at about the 
rate of non-oil GDP (Annex 1, Very high spending scenario).  This would yield a larger 
government, which would be unsustainable and inconsistent with a moderate tax burden and low 
debt. This hypothesis under this scenario is plausible, as many countries increase wages, 
transfers, subsidies, and goods/services expenditures at the pace of non-oil GDP growth. In this 
scenario, public investment increases at the pace of non-oil GDP until 2012, and is then kept 
constant in real terms (that is, nominal public investment increases at the pace of inflation). 
Increasing current spending at the pace of non-oil growth appears unsustainable because, by 
2026, the OF would be left with no assets and by 2030 public debt would be as high as 128 
percent of non-oil GDP. In this very high-spending scenario, the size of government would be 67 
percent of non-oil GDP in 2024––an extremely high level by today’s standards––which no 
longer would be sustainable, as Azerbaijan would no longer be a resource-rich country by that 
time. 
3.22. The commitment to reduce public expenditures as a percentage of non-oil GDP 
requires the government to prioritize public spending. In particular, the government must 
resolve some long-term strategic issues, medium-term fiscal management issues, and shorter- 
term macroeconomic issues: 
                                                                                                                                                             
with authorities in 2006, at which point it was recognized that after the expenditure spike needed to implement 
critical investment projects, the level would have to be adjusted downwards.  
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(a) Some long-term strategic issues: Existing implicit claims on government resources 
comprise several large-scale ticket times.  First, large tax expenditures on energy, 
which stem the current from below (world) market prices to domestic producers and 
consumers.  While social considerations are certainly important in setting domestic 
utility rates and gasoline prices, including affordability for poor citizens and 
employment in inefficient SOEs or private enterprises, Azerbaijan needs to also 
consider that it has to build up the non-oil economy on a sustainable footing: this 
applies to private enterprises and SOEs alike, some of which are in the petroleum 
sector but cannot yet afford to operate on international prices. A gradual policy to 
bridge the gap between domestic and international prices is necessary for the longer 
term.  The alternative is that fiscal revenues forgone as a result of tax expenditures 
from domestic oil and gas prices are not available for other, more efficient, use of 
public resources. A second set of strategic issues that needs to be addressed relates 
to tertiary services in health and education.  Azerbaijan need not maintain all 
tertiary services in health and education in public hands.  Azerbaijan is at a 
fortunate moment when long-term strategic visions for both sectors are being 
developed.  It is of critical importance that costing and financing plans at the 
strategic level be developed at an early phase of the public debate.  It is also 
important to draw in the public’s mind the difference between public provision and 
public financing of services: tertiary health and education services may be offered 
by the private sector but financed by the government for those in need.  Again, 
planning to take on too much of the financial burden on the part of government will 
hit against the strategy of gradually reducing the size of government. 
(b) Some medium-term fiscal issues.  It is important for the government to recognize 
implicit claims on itself, and potentially on the OF assets. These can be liabilities 
that may arise from the pension system, state enterprise debt (as is, in fact, being 
done), or financial sector risks (see discussion on Kazakhstan in Chapter 6). 
Appropriate provisions need to be made in fiscal expenditure projections, alongside 
all other claims on consolidated budget revenues.  It is also important for the 
government to review the efficiency of some large economic and social programs, 
such as energy subsidies, minimum salaries, and pensions. The government needs 
to consider the necessity of these programs in light of the continued improvement 
of the targeted social assistance scheme.  In addition, a closer look needs to be 
taken at the recurrent-capital budget split of the spending envelope, particularly as 
Azerbaijan does not budget in terms of programs (which cover both recurrent and 
capital budgets). The implementation of the 2007 investment program suggested 
that AZN 2.8 billion were difficult to implement––as can be attested by the 
challenges faced by the Bank’s and other development partners’ projects. We 
consider gradually returning to the 2007 level of investment as an envelope to strive 
for. 
(c) Shorter-term macroeconomic management issues.  Finally, while in the pre-crisis 
period, the government had to decide whether spending the full PI amount ran the 
risk of overheating the economy, during the crisis, it now needs to decide if 
spending the full amount of PI is not sufficient to maintain aggregate demand. 
Similarly, on exchange rate and monetary policy, in the pre-crisis period, there was 
a need to decide how to manage the real appreciation of the currency, which 
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stemmed from financing of the non-oil deficit in U.S. dollar. During the crisis, the 
pressure for appreciation is likely to lessen, and the currency may in fact depreciate. 
A Medium-term Objective 
3.23. Necessity to strengthen non-oil private investment… A medium-term fiscal strategy 
would count for naught if it did not contribute to economic growth.  The above discussion 
proposes a target fiscal policy that would result in a medium-sized government by 2024 and 
identified critical fiscal issues that need to be addressed in the process. While Azerbaijan may 
choose a larger government than proposed above, recent macroeconomic developments 
(Chapters 1, 2 and 5) suggest the need to: (a) curtail the growth of expenditures to alleviate 
pressure on domestic absorption; and (b) reduce the tax burden on the non-oil economy. The 
most immediate policy objectives need to be aimed at increasing the non-oil private investment 
rate relative to non-oil GDP and curtail the inflation rate. A third priority should be the growth of 
non-oil exports. 
3.24. ...through reduced taxation. As mentioned above, lower taxation would permit 
offsetting the burden placed by the real exchange rate appreciation on the tradable sector. The 
scenario envisaged in Box 3.2 proposes that the government reduce expenditures by alleviating 
the burden of non-oil taxation on the private sector. Non-oil revenues will decrease from 33 
percent of non-oil GDP in 2008 to 31.5 percent in 2009 and to 30 percent in 2010. Azerbaijan 
can alleviate these taxes over two years with phased reduction of direct tax rates (see analysis in 
Chapter 4). Additionally, although it does not spend much on pensions currently –only about 3 
percent of GDP for 1.2 million pensioners, Azerbaijan needs to urgently review the 
commitments under the social insurance and in particular pension system, as the current 25 
percent contribution rate is relatively high and might be discouraging investment and 
employment generation in the formal sector. 
D. BUDGET INCREASES AND CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE SPENDING (2005-2008) 
3.25. The scale-up in Azerbaijan’s budgetary expenditures through 2007 was 
approximately consistent with the PI approach to spending, before the global financial 
crisis, though estimated the non-oil deficit of the 2008 budget had surpassed the sustainable 
PI according to the estimates of this report. While Azerbaijan’s PI level of spending was 
estimated at $5.9 billion in 2007, the country’s primary non-oil deficit reached AZN 3.6 billion, 
or $4.2 billion (Table 3.1). According to the 2008 budget estimates, the non-oil deficit in 2008 
was estimated to be AZN 7 billion in current prices, or about AZN 0.5 billion in above the PI in 
2007 prices (as discussed in paragraph 3.17).   
3.26. The global financial crisis placed a dilemma before policymakers: refrain from 
large expenditure increases as in the past to be safe, or stay the expenditure course at your 
risk. The non-oil deficit for 2008 was estimated be AZN 5.5 billion (in 2007 prices), while the PI 
equivalent—with the moderate price scenario—came to AZN 5.1 billion. 
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Table 3.2: Consolidated Budget, 2005-08 
  In AZN 2007 Million As Percent of Non-Oil GDP 
  2005 2006 2007 
2008 
(estim.) 2005 2006 2007 
2008 
(estim.) 
Total revenue and grants 4190 6105 7949 22515 44.9 60.7 71.4 181.2 
Oil revenue 1628 3100 4247 18414 17.4 30.8 38.2 148.2 
Non-oil revenue 2562 3005 3701 4101 27.5 29.9 33.3 30.0 
                    
Total expenditure   3784 5,969 7,356 10,410 40.5 59.3 66.1 83.8 
   Recurrent    3040 4000 4595 5785 32.6 39.8 41.3 46.6 
   Investment & NL 744 1968 2761 4625 8.0 19.6 24.8 37.2 
Financing -428 43 -646 -7739 -4.6 0.4 -5.8 -62.3 
    Domestic (net) -581 -259 -830 -8258 -6.2 -2.6 -7.5 -66.4 
    External (net) 153 303 183 519 1.6 3.0 1.6 4.2 
Memo: 
Non-oil primary balance -1178 -3128 -3571 -5874 -12.6 
-
31.1 
-
32.1 -47.3 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Bank staff estimates 
  
3.27. All sectors of government activity benefited from the fiscal stimulus.  During 2005–
07, administration and education––to which most current expenditures go––accounted for 43 
percent of the total increase in public expenditures. Utilities, energy, and transport––in which 
most investments are made––benefited from 24 percent of the increase. Finally, the social 
sectors, excluding education, represented 25 percent of the fiscal expansion.  
3.28. Based on available 
information, the 
composition of current 
expenditures has changed 
significantly (Figure 3.4). 
Since 2006, defense has 
overtaken education as the 
largest budget item. The 
share of defense in 
consolidated current 
expenditure soared from 14.4 
percent in 2005 to 17.3 
percent in 2007, while 
education’s share decreased 
slightly from 16.3 percent to 
15.7 percent during the same 
period.. Justice and health are 
the only sectors, in addition 
to defense, whose shares in 
current spending increased during this period: those increases were from 7.3 percent to 9.7 
percent for justice and from 4.9 percent to 5.9 percent for health. In contrast, the shares of other 
sectors in current expenditures, particularly social protection and transport, declined. Given the 
large recent increase in total spending, the shift in the composition of spending away from 
human capital is puzzling, and suggests human capital has not been a top priority in the budget. 
Separately, increases in recurrent spending in education are puzzling because the increases have 
funded hiring of new teachers, despite the very low salaries in the sector; earlier policy 
discussion had suggested that it was important to contain the number of staff, so that notable 
Figure 3.4: Prioritization: Increase in Consolidated Government 
Expenditures by Function, 2005–07 (mil. manat and % of total increase) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Bank staff estimates 
Note: Based on available information. The height of each column measures the 
nominal increase in the budgetary allocation for the year.  The percentage indicated 
on top of each column indicated the share of the particular sector in the three year 
increases in the budget (all percentages sum to 100%) i.e. for the first column, the 
defense budget increased by about 450 million manat in 2005-7, and this amounts to 
11.5% of the increase in the budget over three years.  The 2007 data are for the 
approved budget, but exclude mid-year adjustments. 
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rises would be felt in the take-home pay, thereby reducing the need for gifts and other forms of 
support from parents.  
3.29. From 2005 to 2008, government spending on goods and services, wages, and 
transfers increased dramatically (Figure 3.5). Respectively, they account for 24.1 percent, 12.6 
percent, and 12.8 percent of total expenditure expansion during these years. In 2008 estimates, 
the main items in total current expenditure were the purchase of goods and products (42.3 
percent), social transfers (26.8 percent), wages and salaries (25.3 percent), and subsidies (2.8 
percent). 
 Figure 3.5:  Prioritization: Increase in Consolidated Government Expenditures by 
Economic Classification, 2005-2008 (Mil. Manat and % of Total Increase) 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Bank staff estimates 
Note: The height of each column measures the nominal increase in the budgetary allocation for the year.  The 
percentage indicated on top of each column indicated the share of the particular sector in the three year 
increases in the budget (all percentages sum to 100%) i.e. for the first column, the defense budget increased 
by about 450 million manat in 2005-7, and this amounts to 11.5% of the increase in the budget over three 
years.  The 2007 data are for the approved budget, but exclude mid-year adjustments. 
 
3.30. From 2005 to 2008, investment expenditures to improve utilities, energy 
infrastructure, and social services have risen from negligible amounts to AZN 4.6 billion. 
Outlays grew for all items, the composition of investment priorities changed from 2005 to 2007 
(latest available year on the composition of investment). Among social sectors, the share of 
housing for internally displaced persons (IDPs) decreased from 18.8 percent to 7.4 percent of 
total investment, while the shares of culture and sports increased from 5.2 percent to 8.7 percent. 
The shares of other sub-sectors, such as health and education, remained constant.  
3.31. Expenditures on leisure raise questions about the process of prioritization. 
Azerbaijan’s emphasis on leisure infrastructure is questionable for a country in which education 
and health should be the top priorities. In utilities and energy, the share of water and irrigation 
grew significantly between 2005 and 2007, from 0 percent to 8.4 percent and from 5.3 percent to 
10.4 percent respectively. The shares of other sub-sectors declined from 33.3 percent to 12.4 
percent. Concurrently, investment in the road network increased substantially. This sector 
represented 13.5 percent of total investment in 2007, compared to 5.9 percent two years earlier. 
In parallel to these initiatives, investment in administration to renovate and modernize 
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government facilities has increased from 12.5 percent to 14.9 of total investment from 2005 to 
2007.  Taken together, the need for all aforementioned expenditures is difficult to question—
even the ones on leisure, especially given Azerbaijan’s ample fiscal resources; however, the 
timing of the expenditures raises questions about the government’s priorities.  This is because: (i) 
the large expenditure envelope has created macroeconomic pressures that the government is 
trying to mitigate; (ii) Azerbaijan’s economy is already operating at absorption capacity, creating 
pressures on the private sector; and (iii) the government itself is operating at overcapacity to 
implement the large investment program.  All these pressures could have been mitigated with a 
more prioritized approach to implementing the much-needed investment program. 
Box 3.3: Use of SOFAZ Funds 
 
During 2004–08, the 
Oil Fund accumulated 
AZN9.1 bn in assets. 
Oil Fund expenditures 
consisted mainly of 
transfers to the budget 
(78% of total 
expenditures). Other 
expenditures were used 
to finance 
infrastructure for 
refugees and IDPs 
(6.9%), construct the 
Oguz-Gabala water 
pipeline (6.3%), 
finance the BTC 
pipeline (2.0%), and 
finance the Samur-
Absheron irrigation 
project (3.5%). 
 
3.32. Concerning current expenditures, the government should prioritize sectors that 
favor human capital accumulation, in particular, education and health. As noted above, in 
the last four years, defense, justice, and other administrations accounted for 46 percent of the 
increase in current expenditure, whereas education and health benefited from only 24 percent of 
this increase. In future years, the government should gradually reverse this trend by reallocating 
more resources to education and health, while reducing the shares of defense, justice, and other 
administrative expenses.  
3.33. Medium-term investment needs have been estimated at AZN 30 billion, which could 
be covered by annually investing an average of AZN 3 billion (at 2007 prices) over the next 
10 years (2008 included).82 In electricity, as demand is expected to grow at roughly 4.7 percent 
per year, new investments of up to $4 billion annually until 2015 are required to maintain 
sufficient power generation capacity. Another $3 billion is expected to be spent on water 
projects. More investment will also be needed to improve the gas and transportation networks. In 
                                                 
82 This is consistent with the fiscal scenario recommended above. 
AZN Millions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Oil Fund Revenues 322.8 660.5 985.9 1,872.3 11,864.7
Oil Fund Expenditures 163.5 233 981.3 1,061.2 4,291.8
  of which:
Transfer to state budget 130.0 150.0 585.0 585.0 3,800.0
Financing of improvement of the social & 
  economic conditions of refugees and IDPs 15.0 40.4 110.0 154.1 145.0
Formation of the statutory capital
  of the Azerbaijan Investment Company .. .. 90.0 .. ..
Construction of a water pipeline
  from Oguz-Gabala region to Baku city .. .. 82.7 132.9 211.8
Financing of Azerbaijan Republic's share in the 
  Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Pipeline project 17.8 41.0 75.4 .. ..
Financing of the Samur-Absheron
  irrigation system reconstruction project .. .. 37.0 76.9 120.6
Baku-Tblisi-Kars railway .. .. .. 20.7 5.3
SOCAR share in exploration and development of
  Azeri, Chirag and Ganeshi oilfields .. .. .. 87.6 ..
Ministry of Education .. .. .. .. 2.3
Fund's administration costs 0.7 1.6 1.2 4.0 6.8
Oil Fund extra-budgetary expenditures 2.6 91.9 17.6 -13.9 678.6
Assets Accumulation in the Oil Fund 951.5 845.2 1,280.5 2,100.1 9,010.1
Source: State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ)
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particular, from 2008, investments in transit corridors and roads around Baku, as well as regional 
and local roads (of which 45 percent are life-expired), will need to be increased. Many other 
investments are needed to develop the non-oil economy, namely, for irrigation systems, school 
renovation and construction, health facilities, and IDP housing. 
3.34. Implications for future budgets. The 2005–08 budgetary increases raise a set of distinct 
implications for future expenditures. First, the abrupt increases in spending locked the 
government into a high-spending scenario early in the oil boom. This dynamic encompassed 
salaries; transfers, in which rudimentary budget forecasting seeks stability relative to non-oil 
GDP; and expenditures on goods and services, which are also needed for maintenance of the 
government’s extensive investment program.  
3.35. On the revenue side, the government may suffer a loss in purchasing power because: (a) 
lower inflation in the medium term would reduce inflation taxes; and (b) the tax base might 
erode, should Azerbaijan seek to pursue more private sector-friendly policies. One area in which 
the country will have savings going forward is energy subsidies––assuming improvements in 
metering and collections proceed as planned through 2008. Chapter 1 also suggests that 
Azerbaijan’s economy is likely to overheat with the 2008 supplemental. If so, going forward, it 
needs to curtail the level of foreign currency inflows. In the absence of other policy changes that 
increase absorption and imports, Azerbaijan will need to significantly reduce public sector 
expenditure as a percentage of non-oil GDP. 
E. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES, BUDGET MANAGEMENT AND  
MAXIMIZING SPENDING IMPACT 
3.36. After important efforts in 2002-03, expenditure management reforms to increase the 
efficiency of spending have made limited progress. While Azerbaijan has increased its public 
spending by four and a half times between 2005 and 2008, important components of an efficient 
expenditure management system have not been established. The importance of such systems will 
be much higher as rapid increases in total public spending levels become less feasible. 
Azerbaijan’s Treasury Information Management System (TIMS) is in its sixth year of 
preparation, while its investment appraisal system is still under design.  The 2008 PEFA rated 
Azerbaijan’s system quite highly in the implementation of budgetary expenditures, but found it 
wanting in the practices surrounding prioritization and medium-term investment budgeting.  The 
2008 CPAR found the public procurement system to leave too much room for discretion 
regarding the use of restrictive procurement practices, limitation of bidders, and inefficient 
centralized decision-making. 
3.37. The Azeri government needs to introduce greater strategic content in the budget a 
five-year or ten year comprehensive strategic framework document could be useful.  
Medium- and long-term visions for the country’s development are plentiful in Azerbaijan, and 
largely consistent across sources.  They can be found in the Long-Term Oil Revenue Strategy 
(LTORMS), the State Program for Poverty Reduction and Economic Development (SPPRED 
2003-2005, and SPPRED II 2008–2015), and the State Program for the Socio-Economic 
Development of the Regions (SPESDR 2004-2008). The visions that emerge from these 
programs are reflected in Chapter 2.   However, the objectives stipulated in these programs 
would better serve Azerbaijan if they: (i) were organized into a single strategic document (not 
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necessarily very detailed in projects, but in general directions of activities and financing 
priorities); (ii) incorporate financing objectives, including FDI, private investment, and fiscal 
responsibilities; and (iii) if the single document received Presidential recognition that it is “the” 
reference document guiding the development of State Programs (with reference to strategic 
priorities and financing targets). Disciplining the government’s and the public’s thinking by 
introducing financing constraints is the only way to generate governmental and public discussion 
about efficiency. Strengthened coordination would be especially valuable during the time of the 
global crisis, should prioritization of expenditures be required. The aforementioned examples 
suggest that high-level coordination is needed to resolve institutional bottlenecks that prevent the 
desired development outcomes from materializing, despite the already significant government 
efforts. Many European, Asian and Latin America countries have found it useful to a single issue 
strategic document that sets the medium term priorities and key polices (and sometimes 
financing) for the entire government.  Within such a framework document, sector strategic plans 
(or State Programs) are developed and prioritized 
3.38. Azerbaijan may wish to introduce a fiscal rule to strengthen the implementation of 
the LTORMS, by quantifying the PI approach to spending oil revenues.  Indeed, discipline 
and efficiency in program development and implementation can only be introduced more 
efficiently with a hard budget constraint for the use of oil revenues.  This could be done by 
amending or supplementing the Presidential Decree on the LTORMS with quantitative 
information about the maximum fiscal revenues from oil than can be spent for a medium-term 
period (once the period is over, the ceiling could be revised, based on new oil price or reserve 
information). Another approach to strengthen the LTORMS is to submit the new or revised 
version of the LTORMS Decree to parliament for discussion. Azerbaijan’s Budget System’s Law 
already provides for a four-year rolling Medium-term Budget and Expenditure Framework.  The 
principal challenge in its implementation over the past few years has been the lack of a strategic 
expenditure ceiling. 
3.39. With a medium-term budgetary ceiling, strategic prioritization would become more 
meaningful, but would likely require more involvement from the President’s Office than in 
the past.   The governments of resource-rich countries face especially large expenditure 
pressures during budgeting cycles and Azerbaijan is no exception.  In order to discipline the 
resource allocation process, and to steer it toward strategic relevance and efficiency, it is 
anticipated that the highest decision-making office in the country would need to be involved in 
the early phase of the budget cycle. The involvement of the President’s Office would be required 
to: (i) confirm the relevance of the medium-term expenditures ceiling (based on the LTORMS 
and other tax and non-tax revenues); and (ii) outline budgetary priorities at such an early stage.  
One way to structure the engagement of the senior political leadership of the country is through 
the operation of an Economic Council—headed by the President, or advising the President in a 
periodic and systematic way—members being the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of Economic Development, the Chairman of the National Bank of Azerbaijan, and the 
Executive Director of the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan. The members of the council would 
advise the President on strategic issues, and allow the President to make early decisions (in the 
budget process) on strategic priorities and expenditure trade-offs in light of the discipline 
imposed by the LTORMS and current macroeconomic management needs.  In particular, 
regarding the annual budget process, after meeting with the Council early in the budget cycle, the 
President would be able to decide and endorse the medium-term macroeconomic framework, 
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including the level of oil revenue spending for the next four years and expenditure priorities, and 
offer guidance to the members of the Council on approximate sectoral expenditure ceilings.  
With the creation of the Macroeconomic Commission in early 2008, an Economic Council would 
be able to function very efficiently and with significant technical support.  
3.40. There is an increasing urgency to expedite the implementation of reforms of its 
expenditure management systems, including budget transparency, TIMS, project 
appraisal, budgeting, and internal and external control. In addition to implementing 
completion  of the TIMS and project appraisal system, Azerbaijan would also benefit from 
accelerated reforms to improve the budgetary planning process with a budgeting framework that 
sets the medium-term resources envelopes (ceilings) at the sectoral and agency levels (as 
documented in the 2008 PEFA exercise). Internal financial control and audit systems throughout 
the government will need to be developed to give greater assurance of efficiency and legality. At 
the same time, there will also be a need for greater transparency of the Parliament’s role in the 
budgetary process and the work of the Chamber of Accounts. Full publication of the budget 
approved by the Parliament, and publication of the public investment program would strengthen 
government accountability and the efficiency of public spending.  An integral part of efficient 
public spending is adherence to modern, fair, and transparent procurement regulations, starting 
from the regulatory framework to implementation.83   
Box. 3.4: Examples of Coordinated Economic Management* 
Even mineral rich countries with a history of instability and fractious politics can experience 
windows of opportunity for good management.  The experiences of Chile, Malaysia and Indonesia (at 
least during the first decade of the Suharto government) suggest a number of common elements that can 
support good management:  first, having twin goals—accelerating development and sustaining economic 
and social stability; second, a fairly broad basis of support for such goals; and third, close relationships 
between politicians and technocrats equipped to deal with complex problems of resource management.   
In Chile, technical capacity has traditionally been strong. In the early 1970s, the country suffered 
both serious macroeconomic instability and social polarization.  The period after the 1970 election of the 
Allende government and the September 1973 Pinochet coup was particularly traumatic; in 1973-75, the 
consumer price index rose by 3000 percent; this was followed by a deep debt crisis and economic 
contraction in the early 1980s.  Unemployment levels reached 33 percent by 1982. Following the return of 
civilian rule in 1990, the traumatic experiences of the two previous decades underpinned widespread 
consensus around preventing further disruptive boom-bust crises and avoiding conditions that might 
precipitate the political instability that could lead to a return to military government.  The result was a 
broad constituency in favor of both economic stability and public debt reduction.  The strength of this 
consensus is demonstrated by Chile’s current response to spiraling copper prices and the exceptional 
accumulation of surpluses in its copper stabilization fund after 2005. Net public debt fell to minus 14 
percent of GDP by 2008. Nevertheless, sustaining these policies has required continuous efforts by the 
                                                 
83 Ossowski, Villafuerte, Medas and Thomas (2008) in an empirical analysis show in a large sample of countries that 
oil funds and fiscal rules are associated with lower non-oil primary balances (contrary to what was expected), but 
not in a statistically significant manner. However, various indexes of broader governance indicators show that higher 
institutional quality is associated with higher non-oil primary balances.  Similar results are obtained with regressions 
using public spending as the explanatory variable, in place of non-oil balances. The paper recommends the use of 
institutions, public financial management systems, and medium term frameworks to ensure spending quality and 
fiscal sustainability –within these systems, oil finds and fiscal rules can play a constructive role. 
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technocracy to reach out to elected officials and explain the implications of over-spending.   
Indonesia, at least during the first part of the Suharto period, offers another interesting example of 
cautious and flexible macroeconomic management -- implemented without a dedicated fund, without 
transparency, and even in violation of fiscal rules.  As in post-Pinochet Chile, the Suharto government 
came into power with a huge stake in stability.  The last years of the “Guided Democracy” of the Sukarno 
period had been increasingly chaotic, including rice and ethnic rioting.  The 1975 crisis of Pertamina, the 
national oil company, reinforced the caution of the government, and added to the credibility of the 
technocrats – a very stable team of economic advisers widely known as the “Berkeley Mafia”84.  This 
team proved to have both great permanence and leeway to shape policies.  Through the oil booms of 
1974-81, the government formally adhered to a balanced budget law.  However, without disclosure to the 
public or the parliament, bureaucratic controls were applied to slow actual spending, creating a de facto 
surplus and doubling reserves. Indonesia also managed its spending programs with great flexibility. As oil 
prices fell after 1981, the government moved aggressively with a drastic re-programming of its 
development spending, cancelling projects, cutting subsidies and spending, as well as stabilizing the real 
exchange rate through progressive devaluation.    
 Malaysia, another success story, has faced a threat to social stability from either of two paths:  
growth with Malays politically dominant yet economically disempowered, or economic collapse caused 
by excessively redistributive policies. Neither of these options was attractive, leaving effective economic 
management and reinvestment of rents to encourage growth, especially employment for Malays, as the 
only option. +     
Chile, Indonesia and Malaysia are clearly very different cases, yet they have some common 
features, including a strong urge to maintain stability and a good appreciation of the risks in managing 
resources.  Another common feature has been the power of constituencies rooted in non-oil tradable 
sectors. In Chile, they included a range of other resource-based commodity exporters developed over the 
years of low copper prices (see below); in Malaysia, tin and rubber producers were influential. 
Agriculture played a similar strategic role in Indonesia, because of its importance in sustaining rural 
incomes and social stability.  Aside from Chile, Indonesia, and Malaysia, in Norway, fishing and other 
decentralized industries supported cautious spending policies; these interests have been important forces 
for stability; they have helped to restrain sharp exchange rate appreciations that would damage the sectors 
concerned. Similarly, in Botswana, traditional chiefs and cattle owners comprised a powerful 
constituency in the non-tradable sectors. 
*This section relies heavily on “Confronting the Oil Curse”, Alan Gelb and Sina Grasmann. Mimeo, World Bank 
2008. pp. 17-18. 
+See also Zainal Aznam Yusof and Deepak Bhattasali (2008) on the linkages between policy-making and leadership 
in Malaysia. 
 
3.41. Azerbaijan also needs to strengthen the implementation of the Budget Systems Law 
and to prepare to introduce an early variant of program budgeting.   On the program 
development side, Azerbaijan still needs to build extensive capacity at the line (budgetary 
agency) and central ministries level before program budgeting is recommended.  However, in the 
mean time, Azerbaijan can introduce Fiscal Impact Assessments as a requirement before any 
new State Program is adopted.  At the same time, it is important for line ministries and central 
agencies to initiate training in programs budgeting, focusing on medium-term implementation.  
                                                 
84 Pertiamina had been under the management of a military associate of the President, hence the crisis – which 
required a $1 billion bailout.  
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The training program should include training for budget managers; implement program 
budgeting to allocate resources to policies; identify the priority areas for spending; and provide 
information on efficiency. These actions would require the introduction of formal links between 
adopted state programs and the annual budget, including an adapted IT system and a new coding 
system for investment projects, as well as a comprehensive methodology for policy costing. The 
recently completed PEFA (February 2008) for Azerbaijan provides sufficient guidance to 
priority reform areas. 
3.42. Of critical importance is also the much-delayed appraisal system for public 
investment projects.  Azerbaijan has been preparing the introduction of an appraisal system for 
public investment projects for some time.  The current system is based on Soviet norms for 
construction and demand assessment.  Currently, decisions are based on a light form of financial 
analysis, not on modern project appraisal methods. Azerbaijan’s new system needs to be based 
on modern appraisal methods, but tailored to the existing, gradually expanding capacities of 
public administration.  There is also an opportunity for an innovative approach of training and 
using the private sector for appraisal analysis.  One priority for the new system should be that it 
has the ability to juxtapose the “development problem” in question, and private sector- and 
public sector-based solutions very early in the appraisal cycle. In terms of tactics, given the large 
number of public investment projects that have been approved through 2008, and the decision to 
fund mostly ongoing projects for 2009, it may be worthwhile for the government to consider: (a) 
emphasizing the monitoring of the 2006-2009 projects; and (b) approaching the 2010–13 projects 
as a new package to be appraised by modern methods. The year 2009 could then also be used to 
improve the procurement process, per the recommendations of the 2008 CPAR.  Taking time to 
review the 2006–09 package of investment projects, in aspects of strategic relevance and 
public/private role, project design, and implementation quality, would allow for lessons learned 
to be incorporated into the 2009–13 investment package. Some of these lessons are discussed in 
the next chapter. 
3.43. Azerbaijan needs to devote special attention to strengthening procurement.  The 
2008 Country Procurement Appraisal Report (CPAR) pointed to several areas in procurement 
that need to be strengthened;  most important are the overhaul of the legal framework for public 
procurement, including regulations, to eliminate gaps in coverage and implementation; introduce 
safeguards to limit administrative discretion; and to develop standard documents.  Azerbaijan 
can also improve the institutional management and capacity of its legal entities, including 
clarifying the role of the State Procurement Agency (SPA) and, at a minimum, make it consistent 
with the existing legislation, build capacity, and integrate public procurement into the country’s 
public sector governance system. The CPAR also recommended significant improvements in 
market practices and oversight. 
3.44. Better monitoring of existing programs would be a second essential contribution to 
improve budget management. The introduction of more strategic content in the budget will 
provide the foundation to monitor public policies and expenditures. As objectives are clarified 
and quantified, program performance assessment will be possible through internal or external 
audits, and conclusions should be drawn by the Parliament for the following annual budget 
exercises. This implies accountability and disclosure of assessment results, so that they can be 
debated by members of Parliament. At the aggregate level, consolidated budget figures and 
breakdowns should also be made public and easily accessible. Performance assessment could 
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start with a survey of 2005–08 PIP implementation, and a PIP appraisal. This would help tap the 
full potential of the PIP as an effective tool to assess and prioritize infrastructural needs.  
3.45. It is important to keep building capacity in government while the government 
carries out major efforts to improve the budget process and macroeconomic management. 
For instance, policy costing and program budgeting will have to be simple at the beginning in 
order to avoid imposing too heavy a workload on public employees at all levels. As more 
complex and accurate methods are gradually introduced, it will be necessary to train the staff so 
that the program can be a first contributor to improve budgeting. It also will be necessary to use 
as efficiently as possible the new institutional setting, particularly by publishing a budget process 
manual and making use of the Economic Council. 
3.46. To further strengthen governance, there is a need for more information about 
the budget and about the economy to be made available to policymakers and the general 
public… Azerbaijan publishes broad aggregates of its annual budget (revenues and 
expenditures) and provides occasional, not routine, updates of the implementation of the budget 
to the public. Full publication of the budget approved by the Parliament, and publication of the 
public investment program would strengthen government accountability and the efficiency of 
public spending.  At the same time, the country provides a lot of information to the public about 
the course of the economy, although availability in electronic for is limited. Nonetheless, the 
government’s information strategy could be further strengthened by ensuring that certain 
important information is made available on a timely basis to policymakers, external analysts, and 
the general public. This information should comprise detailed data on the consolidated budget 
(quarterly), real wages (monthly), real imports (monthly) and exports (monthly), and non-oil 
private investment (quarterly). Making available detailed high frequency data would strengthen 
the government’s and the private sector’s ability to monitor the economy.  
3.47. ...and issue an “Annual Report Card” on the quality of the country’s 
infrastructure.  The government is investing substantially to improve the country’s 
infrastructure.  While the ongoing projects are a response to tangible investment needs, the 
government can capitalize on the improvements in the country’s infrastructure by effectively 
advertising its completed projects.  The government can issue a “report card” on the quality of its 
infrastructure.  The report card can take into consideration not only outputs of investments (such 
as miles of highway repaved) but outcomes (such as average transit times from the Iranian to the 
Georgian or the Russian border).  The report card can track improvements in infrastructure, and 
progress can be  touted to attract foreign investment 
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CHAPTER 4.  
TAILORING INVESTMENT IN UTILITIES TO PRIVATE SECTOR 
NEEDS 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Azerbaijan’s government has made the improvement of 
infrastructure services the cornerstone of its development strategy.   The country inherited an adequate 
infrastructure network after independence, but the poor state of the economy during the 1990s and low 
availability of funding before the oil boom led to its significant degradation.  At the same time, the 
dilapidated network responded poorly to the needs of the growing economy, and was one of the factors 
that prevented the country from taking advantage of the transit corridor, getting agricultural products 
to markets, developing agro-processing industries, or other light industries, hindering the development 
of the service economy. 
The government’s decision to improve the infrastructure has accelerated investment in electricity, 
telecommunications, roads, railways, and water supply, as well as institutional improvements in the 
delivery of public infrastructure services. As a result, the coverage and access to such services have been 
greatly expanded. However, the efficiency and quality of infrastructure services remain less than 
satisfactory, and both aspects need to be improved substantially on a priority basis to enable businesses 
to strengthen their competitiveness. This would require: (i) completion of the financial viability agenda 
appropriately pursued by the government; and (ii) deepening the engagement of the private sector in 
infrastructure. The former requires securing financial viability with sound medium-term planning taking 
into consideration investment needs tariffs, input prices, and recurrent costs. The latter requires a 
comprehensive and sustainable solution based on strategic decisions regarding the market structure of 
each utility sector. This should be done to ensure the long-term role of the private sector, as well as to 
make sure that the appropriate regulatory framework and pricing policy are in place.  The nature and 
modalities of such an engagement will differ across infrastructure sectors, so choices should be made 
based on successful experiences elsewhere, as well as on local circumstances (market size, structure, 
and regulatory capacity).  The decisions regarding strategy are urgent, particularly since a decline in oil 
prices may hamper the country’s ability to continue to fund infrastructure development at such a high 
pace. 
A. INTRODUCTION  
4.1. Infrastructure is known to be among the most important factors to stimulate 
economic growth and reduce poverty. Infrastructure is usually expected to help the owners and 
managers of enterprises reduce their costs of production, communications, and transport, and 
strengthen productivity and external competitiveness. A number of studies indicate a robust 
linkage between infrastructure stocks and economic growth.85 Not only quantity (access) but also 
quality (reliability) of infrastructure is important to support continued growth.86 As such, the 
immediate goal of the government to improve infrastructure has been on target. 
                                                 
85 See World Bank 1994, Canning 1998, and Canning and Pedroni 1999.  
86 Calderón and Servén 2004. 
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4.2. However, sustaining quality infrastructure service provision is still challenging, 
particularly in transition countries. Many infrastructure services are not financially viable 
because facilities are often designed in a manner that exceeds usual capabilities and are exploited 
beyond their useful lives of 25–30 years. One vicious cycle in which transition economies tend to 
get trapped is that under-setting tariffs prevents infrastructure operators (public or private) from 
maintaining their facilities, due to a lack of financial resources. In turn, for some transition 
countries, the resulting poor quality of services––for instance, frequent power outages and water 
supply interruptions––prevents the increase in tariffs. Subsidized tariffs also convey incorrect 
incentives to customers, encouraging over-consumption. The latter makes it even more difficult 
for the operators to ensure the quality of services; it also exacerbates shortages.  
4.3. Azerbaijan’s progress on infrastructure varies by sector. Electricity services, which 
in the past, performed poorly,   have improved dramatically.  In recent years, Azerbaijan has 
achieved 24-hour uninterrupted service provision with a stable frequency to paying customers 
across most of the country. The government has invested heavily in the electricity sector to 
enhance generation capacity; it also invested substantial resources in highways. Investments in 
the water and railway sectors, although picking up lately, have been relatively slow. Importantly, 
it takes considerable lead-time to prepare and implement infrastructure projects with built-in risk 
assessments and sustainability mechanisms.   
4.4. While it has not been a fast reformer, it is noteworthy that Azerbaijan adjusted all 
tariffs on public infrastructure services across the board in January 2007, bringing most 
utility sectors to cost recovery levels (detailed below). The adjustments in tariffs, together with 
improvements in metering, billing, and collections, were significant enough to eliminate energy 
subsidies from the consolidated budget in 2008. However, the tariff adjustments themselves were 
based on domestic wholesale prices of AZN 47.2 per thousand cubic meters (TCM) for gas and 
AZN 100 per ton for oil to generate electricity. Water utilities also rely greatly on that electricity 
generation. Azerbaijan's domestic energy prices are far below current international prices. To 
illustrate, based on its fuel expense data for 2006, the opportunity cost or total implicit economic 
subsidy was estimated at $2.4 billion, or approximately 10 percent of GDP (Table 4.1). This 
estimate excludes negative social and economic consequences from an abrupt shift to 
international prices.  
 
Table 4.1: Implicit Subsidies, 2006 
 
 
4.5. Azerbaijan’s 2004 Law on Accounting is an important component of the country’s 
strategy to improve the governance of SOEs.  The Accounting Law, which took effect in 
2008, requires all public interest entities, including SOEs, to adopt International Financial 
Reporting Standards. In fact, the law provides for IFRS and national accounting standards to be 
used by the private sector, depending on the size of the enterprise, and for International Public 
Sector Accounting Standards to be used by budgetary agencies.  SOCAR, the largest SOE, has 
Gas Oil
Domestic wholesale price 47.2 manats/1000m3 100 manats/ton
Azerenerji purchase in 2006 420 million manats 89 million manats
International price 300 US$/1000m3 350 US$/ton
Exchange rate 0.86 manats/US$ 0.86 manats/US$
Implicit economic costs 2,181 million US$ 208 million US$
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invested heavily in the production of IFRS. It is currently anticipated that by 2009, Azerbaijan’s 
utilities will be compliant with IFRS, which will allow Azerbaijan to have, for the first time, a 
common (across SOEs), internationally accepted measure of revenues and expenditures.  The use 
of IFRS can make a significant contribution if the reports are publicly available, and if they are 
considered, together with other reporting and medium-term budget proposals, by the government 
at the time of budget preparation.  
4.6. Azerbaijan needs to strengthen the financial management of SOEs by pulling 
together the current arsenal of institutional and policy initiatives.  It can also improve 
service quality by introducing an Annual Report Card on infrastructure quality. Other than 
the relevant line ministries, SOEs are supervised by the Ministry of Finance, the State Committee 
for the Management of State Property (SCMSP), and the Tariff Council.  Armed with the 
Accounting Law, the need for the Ministry of Finance to approve SOE budgets, the role of the 
Tariff Council in approving rates, and the oversight responsibilities of the SCMSP, the 
government can strengthen the oversight of SOEs by bolstering medium-term planning and 
ensuring financial viability. At the same time, the government can improve service quality by 
standardizing a subset of existing infrastructure quality indicators (from various government, 
Bank and donor projects) and by preparing an Annual Report Card. Annual improvements in the 
scores will allow the government to use the Card to lure foreign investors. 
4.7. Chapter 4 reviews the status of electricity, telecommunication, road and railway 
transport, and water supply. The next sections describe the institutional and financial issues of 
each sector and summarize various reform options to improve service. 
B. INFRASTRUCTURE READINESS AND QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES 
General State of Infrastructure at the Beginning of Oil Boom 
4.8. Azerbaijan’s infrastructure is still a carry-over from the former Soviet Union era. 
The country inherited a large amount of infrastructure facilities, which were by and large 
acceptable. However, most infrastructure capacities in the country have been exploited beyond 
their useful lives of 25–30 years. In 
addition, these capacities are often designed 
in a manner that exceeds usual capabilities 
and is costly to maintain. Due to lack of 
financial viability, and the consequent lack 
of investment, most infrastructure has 
deteriorated physically and the quality of 
services has become suboptimal. However, 
the scale of problems varies by sector.  
Prior to the boom, about 56 percent of 
Azerbaijan’s main roads were in poor 
condition, and 30 percent needed 
immediate repair.  Up to 45 percent of 
regional and local roads were life-expired, 
which hampered all-year links between 
territorial units in a number of regions. Due 
Table 4.2: Total Investment Needs for Infrastructure in 
Azerbaijan (US$ mil) 
Source: Iimi 2008. 
1/Estimated at US$1,950 to US$3,600 million in the longer term 
(up to 2015). 
Total
investment
needs
Annual
average
Electricity (2008-11) 1/ 910.0 227.5
Gas (2004-10) 1,001.0 143.0
Water (2007-17) 2,681.1 243.7
Greater Baku area 1,208.1 109.8
Other regions 1,473.0 133.9
Roads (2005-10) 729.5 121.6
Railways (2008-11) 1,477.4 369.4
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to deteriorating rail infrastructure, Azerbaijan Railway was also unable to operate at full 
capacity. The reliability of public water supply, though has improved, especially in the capital 
area in recent years, remains low at 13 hours per day on average. In many parts of the country 
outside Baku, people receive as little as three hours of water supply.  
4.9. Based on estimates from the Bank’s Azerbaijan country team, the total amount of 
investment needed to develop infrastructure utilities (electricity, gas, water, and sewage) 
and other public services (such as 
roads and railway) is 
approximately $1.1 billion per 
annum over the next 10 years 
(Table 4.2). On an annual average 
basis, the railway sector’s financial 
needs will be the largest, followed by 
the water, gas, and road sectors, in 
this order. The estimates require 
updating in light of high inflation in 
2007 and 2008, which would increase 
the cost at least by 50 percent. Further 
prioritization is required in light of 
this report’s recommendations for 
fiscal sustainability, which propose a 
reduction in capital expenditures in 
the medium term (Chapter 3).  
4.10.  The poor quality of utility 
services imposes heavy costs on the 
economy. The quality of 
infrastructure matters to economic 
growth.87 With cross-country data, 
empirical studies estimate the impact 
of infrastructure volume and quality 
on growth. These show that growth 
could be stimulated by increasing the 
conventional quality proxies for 
infrastructure, particularly in the 
telecommunications and road sectors. 
However, those quality impacts tend 
to be overwhelmed by the quantity 
effects in a statistical sense. Calderón 
(2007) refines the model with ECA 
data only, showing that the impact on 
potential growth of improving 
                                                 
87 As per Calderón and Servén 2004. No doubt, the effect of infrastructure quantity is significant (see World Bank 
1994, Démurger 2001, Fay and Yepes 2003).  
Table 4.3: Potential Productivity Growth Gains from 
Infrastructure Development in ECA Countries (%) 
Source: Calderón 2007 
Note: Impact of catching up on infrastructure quality and quantity with the 
median industrial country.
Table 4.4: Firms’ Cost Elasticity to Infrastructure Quality 
Source: Bank staff estimates
Aggregate 
infrastructure 
stock
Aggregate 
infrastructure
quality
Bulgaria 0.39 1.49
Croatia 0.42 1.08
Czech 0.18
Estonia 0.02 1.52
Hungary 0.05 1.01
Kazakhstan 1.53 1.52
Latvia 0.31 1.69
Lithuania 0.11 0.38
Poland 0.27 0.87
Romania 0.47 1.60
Russia 1.29 1.49
Serbia & Montenegro 0.47 1.61
Slovak 0.30 0.20
Slovenia 0.12
Turkey 0.62 1.39
Ukraine 0.70 1.59
w/o sector 
dummy
With sector 
dummy
Number of days with insufficient services
Electricity 0.0083 * 0.0086
(0.0043) (0.0039)
Water supply 0.0127 0.0176
(0.0146) (0.0132)
Telecommunications 0.0148 0.0030
(0.0160) (0.0145)
Avg. duration of service interruptions
Electricity 0.0093 0.0393
(0.0185) (0.1681)
Water supply 0.0264 0.0683
(0.0457) (0.0416)
Telecommunications -0.0317 0.0173
(0.0387) (0.0352)
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infrastructure quality up to the regional top level could be 1.0–1.5 percentage points (Table 
4.3).88  
4.11. On the micro level, the continuity of electricity and water service provision affects 
firms’ operating costs.89 When estimating the cost function for enterprises with data from the 
2005 BEEPS for 26 ECA countries, the elasticity of firm costs with respect to the duration of 
electrical outages is estimated at 0.039 (Table 4.4). Similarly, the elasticity is 0.068 for water 
suspensions. It means that if a country eliminates all existing electric interruptions, firms could 
save approximately 4 percent of 
operating costs. If all water 
suspensions were rectified, the 
firms’ savings would amount to 
approximately 7 percent of operating 
costs. 
4.12. For the Azerbaijan 
economy, the predicted benefits 
from improving electricity and 
water service reliability are 
estimated at approximately 
3.5 percent and 6.5 percent of 
GDP respectively (Figure 4.1).90 In 
2004-05, the average duration of 
power and water supply suspensions 
was 3.7 hours and 3.3 hours respectively.  Since electricity provision has been fully restored, the 
estimated result can be interpreted to mean that Azerbaijan did gain approximately 3.5 percent of 
GDP in the past three years. The results also suggest that it is essential to reduce the utility 
service suspensions to 0 hours, especially in the water supply sector, because the benefits from 
quality water services are expected to materialize only when the remaining last four-hour 
interruptions are eliminated (Figure 4.2). These sizable benefits can justify that the government 
spend several percent of GDP for investment in infrastructure. 
  
                                                 
88 Applying this exercise to Azerbaijan shows that catching up with the median Western Europe country in 
infrastructures quantity would bring a permanent productivity growth gain of 1.5 percentage point. See Jamet 2008. 
89 For further details, see World Bank 2008.  
90 Since the 2005 BEEPS does not include any cost and sales information for Azerbaijan, several assumptions need 
to be made for inferring the impact of infrastructure quality on the Azerbaijan economy. It is assumed that the profit 
margin (ratio of sales to costs) for Azeri firms is the same as the regional average. Moreover, the sales information 
collected in the 2002 BEEPS is used with some inflationary adjustments. On the other hand, on a subjective basis, 
Azeri firms reported that the values lost due to electrical outages and water suspensions were estimated at 5.9 
percent and 3.5 percent of total sales, respectively.   
Figure 4.1: Estimated Benefits from Improving Quality 
Infrastructure, 2005-07 (% GDP) 
Source: Bank staff estimates. 
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C. DIRECTION OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM (PIP)  
4.13. Over the past five years, the government increased its consolidated public spending 
from AZN 2 billion to AZN 7 billion. Particularly in the last two years, increases in investment 
expenditures were remarkable and exceeded 50 percent a year (Figure 4.3). Most of the increase 
was attributable to capital investment increases, the majority of which were allocated to 
economic affairs, primarily public construction works (including infrastructure). Azerbaijan’s 
share of economic expenditures relative to GDP is the second highest in the region (Figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.3: Azerbaijan: Consolidated Government 
Operations, 1999-2007 
Figure 4.4: Allocation of Consolidated Budget: 
International  
 
Source: IMF. Source: IMF.  
 
4.14. In light of the large spending increases, it is useful to look at some specific sectoral 
utilities investments. The government has invested intensively in the electricity and road 
sectors. From 2004 to 2007, AZN 420 million, or approximately 15 percent of the PIP, were 
spent in the electricity sector, especially for generation and transmission (Supervision Control 
and Data Acquisition/Energy Management System, or SCADA/EMS) to secure sufficient supply 
capacity (Table 4.5).  The investments were focused on five modular power stations in Baku, 
Sheki, Astara, Naxchivan, and Khachmaz, at a total cost of AZN 350 million. Total installed 
capacity was increased from 5,140 MW to approximately 5,600 MW between 2004 and 2007. 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
M
ill
io
ns
 o
f m
an
at
s
Current expenditure Investment expenditure and net lending
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Poland
Slovak Republic
Bulgaria
Albania
Azerbaijan (2007)
(2006)
(2005)
Georgia
Ukraine
Percent of GDP
General p ub lic services
Defense
Eco no mic affairs
Health
Educatio n
Social p ro tect ion
Other
Figure 4.2: Predicted Operating Cost for “Average” Firm 
Source:  Bank staff estimates. 
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2
Duration of electricity service interruptions (hours)
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
op
er
at
in
g 
co
st
 o
f f
irm
s 
(1
,0
00
 U
S$
)
+2 Std Err
-2 Std Err
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2
Duration of water service interruptions (hours)
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
op
er
at
in
g 
co
st 
of
 fi
rm
s (
1,
00
0 
U
S$
)
+2 Std Err
-2 Std Err
 79 
 
Investment priorities in the power sector remain high to rehabilitate assets in power distribution 
to increase efficiency by reducing system losses. 
Table 4.5: Azerbaijan: Consolidated Investment   Budget2004–07 (000 AZN) 
 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities.  
1Financed by SOFAZ 
 
4.15. For roads, the government has given the highest priority to major corridors, mainly 
the East-West and North-South corridors. In particular, it has been emphasizing the 
importance of transport infrastructure to stimulate further expansion of the non-oil sector 
(especially agriculture, processing, and transit trade) and to improve the living standards of the 
poor. Road construction and rehabilitation accounted for approximately 10 percent of the 
consolidated government budget 
during 2004–07. To date, PIP has 
allocated approximately half of the 
road budget to highways (Table 4.6). 
Going forward, investments in other 
transit corridors and local roads need 
to be enhanced, because most of them 
are life-expired and require 
rehabilitation. The need for 
investment in roads and traffic 
management around Baku is 
emerging due to increasing traffic in 
the capital city.  
  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total 
2004-07 
Shares 
2004-07 
       
TOTAL 142.6 284.4 1,359.2 2,070.5 3,856.7 100.0 
       
Administration 19.7 28.7 112.1 309.3 469.7 12.2 
       
Social sectors 44.5 73.0 242.9 491.2 851.6 22.1 
Education 10.9 10.4 47.3 94.0 162.6 4.2 
Health 4.1 5.6 31.6 60.3 101.6 2.6 
Social Prot. & Social Welf. 7.3 4.9 17.5 33.0 62.8 1.6 
Culture, Art, Sports, etc. 4.2 12.1 36.5 179.9 232.6 6.0 
Housing of IDPs¹ 18.0 40.0 110.0 124.0 292.0 7.6 
       
Utilities and Energy 45.0 105.8 667.8 657.3 1,475.8 38.3 
Utilities, urban amenities 15.9 49.9 352.7 257.6 676.0 17.5 
Oguz-Qabala-Baku ¹ 0.0 0.0 90.0 184.0 274.0 7.1 
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fish. 11.1 34.9 66.1 138.7 250.8 6.5 
        Irrigation 9,1 13,2 71,2 148,7 242,4 6.3 
Government Share in BTC ¹ 18.0 21.0 110.0 0.0 149.0 3.9 
       
Transport and Communication 25.8 72.0 181.8 419.6 699.3 18.1 
Roads and bridges 12.7 12.5 113.9 279.8 418.9 10.9 
AZAL 3.0 13.0 22.0 25.0 63.0 1.6 
Baku subway 1.6 3.6 31.5 45.3 82.0 2.1 
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 1.3 
       
Other 7.7 4.9 154.6 193.2 360.3 9.3 
AIC - Statutory Capital ¹ 0.0 0.0 90.0 0.0 90.0 2.3 
SOCAR share in ACG¹ 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.0 89.0 2.3 
Table 4.6: Azerbaijan: Public Investment Program for 
Transport Sector, 2004–07 (AZN) 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities.  
FUNCTION 2004 2005 2006 2007
Transport and Communications 17,790 29,099 181,642 369,580
  o/w roads and bridges 12,740 12,513 113,917 279,750
Highways 12,740 9,147 50,604 131,294
Baku roads 0 0 55,018 146,026
Local roads 0 3,366 8,295 2,430
  o/w water transport 0 0 13,800 1,043
  o/w railways 450 0 400 15,350
  o/w AZAL 3,000 13,000 22,000 25,000
  o/w Baku subway 1,600 3,586 31,525 45,252
  o/w communication 0 0 0 3,185
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4.16. In the water supply and 
sewage sector, the highest 
priority is given to 
rehabilitation or 
reconstruction of water 
treatment plants and 
associated distribution 
facilities, most of which have 
reached or are approaching the 
end of their economic lives. 
Until 2006, the government 
focused on improving water supply in the capital city under the Greater Baku Water Supply 
Project (Table 4.7). Today’s focus is secondary citiessuch as Lenkoran, Shirvan, Masalli, Astara, 
and Mingechaur. The government is diverting a considerable amount of public resources to water 
supply and wastewater projects in secondary cities and rural areas, with the assistance of various 
foreign donors, including the World Bank.  It also initiated a large-scale water resource 
transmission project, the Oguz-Qabala-Baku Pipeline Project, to deal with the long-run water 
source problem around the capital area.  
4.17. Despite heavily deteriorated railway infrastructure and locomotives, few 
government resources have been allocated to the railway sector (Table 4.5). New investment 
is needed to fix deteriorated rail infrastructure and distressed mainline locomotives––primarily to 
maintain oil transport from Balajari (near Baku) through the Georgian border at Beyuk-Kasik to 
the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi. The government development program for the 
Azerbaijan State Railways for 2008–11 envisions substantial investments to the tune of AZN 1.2 
billion (or $1.5 million) over the next five years.  
D. ELECTRICITY  
4.18. Access to electricity is almost universal in Azerbaijan, and the quality of service has 
improved dramatically in the last two years. Access is approximately 95 percent in the Baku 
area and almost 100 percent in the rest of the country––although occasional power outages still 
occur. The reliability of services used to be among the worst in the region, but by 2007 the 
country had restored a 24-hour electricity supply to most paying consumers according to 
Azerenrji, as a result of improvements in generation and transmission. The electricity frequency 
has also been improved, to achieve stability, by operating in parallel mode with Russia. 
However, technical efficiency in the transmission and distribution system, although improving, 
needs to be brought to international standards (Figure 4.5). Once a large investment in 
SCADA/EMS is completed (expected in 2011), Azerbaijan will be able to better manage 
electricity service levels and handle system emergency situations.  
  
Table 4.7: Azerbaijan: Public Investment Program for Water 
Sector, 2004–07 (AZN) 
Source: Azerbaijan authorities.  
Water and Sewage 2004 2005 2006 2007
Counterpart share in the projects 860 1,037 10,040 12,135
Apsheron peninsula (Baku and 
Sumqayit)
1750 5,650 13,384 24,415
Rayons 13240 13,468 25,686 26,649
Meters installation 1,000 2,601
Oguz-Qabala-Baku pipeline 90,000 184,000
Total 15,850 20,156 140,110 249,800
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Figure 4.5: Electricity Service Quality And Technical Losses, 2004-05, Before Investments Initiated 
Sources: BEEPS and WDI 
 
4.19. The market structure of the power sector in Azerbaijan is characterized as a variant 
between the vertical integration and single-buyer models. The government has gradually 
involved the private sector in the electricity sector.  The distribution segment is partially 
unbundled. The Baku network is served by a state-owned distribution company, while two of the 
three other distribution companies91 are under a five-year private sector management contract 
with assets owned by Azerenerji. Nakhchivan has a separate distribution company. In the 
generation segment, the government is considering inviting independent power producers (IPPs) 
to add generation capacity.  
4.20. However, a critical strategic issue must be addressed. Except for power distribution, 
the government’s plans for the structure of the sector (division of labor between the public and 
private sector, scope to which private players could be involved, ownership, governance, and 
management practices) are neither clearly articulated to the participants in the sector, nor to the 
public. The future role of Azerenerji also is ambiguous. All options seem to be open, so it can be 
either a national transmission company or a generation company, or remain a national entity that 
generates and transmits power itself and possibly purchases additional electricity from IPPs. 
Azerbaijan also has the opportunity to explore its regional potential, given the possibilities for 
regional trade for electricity between the South Caucasus, Russia, Turkey and Iran. The 
government needs to make the important strategic decision for the country’s role in the 
development of a regional power market, and if Azerenerji will be expected to contribute to that. 
4.21. The regulatory responsibilities distributed among the Ministry of Economic 
Development, the Tariff Council, and Azerenerji also are not clearly defined, particularly 
regarding the governance of power purchase agreements with potential private generators 
–these,  in turn, will be  best developed once the strategic decision is made. At the moment, 
there is no independent regulatory body in Azerbaijan. There also is no consensus on who is 
responsible for governing power purchase agreements with potential private generators. It is 
generally recommended that a more market-oriented power structure be established (perhaps 
over the long term), linking distribution companies and power generators directly. Even though 
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some government intervention might be needed so as to involve the private sector for 
augmenting capacity, it should be on an interim basis; it is recommended to return to market-
based regulations by an autonomous regulator, once such initial contracts are completed. 
However, the government appears to be uncommitted, as it is not committing to a business 
model; this in turn delays critical decisions on investment, governance, and management. 
Consequently, the current approach to the provision of electricity continues to place 
extraordinary performance and financial risks on the government’s shoulders.  
4.22. Some of the financial issues in the 
electricity sector have been solved by recent 
tariff adjustments and metering efforts. 
Electricity tariffs seem to have achieved or are 
near cost recovery levels. The residential rate 
tripled in January 2007 (Table 4.8). By 
November 2007, the meter installation rates 
reached 100 percent in Baku and Sumgait, and 
nearly this level in the rest of the country.  
4.23. Nonetheless, the sector is not expected to be sustainable even at this cost level, unless 
collections are raised to near 100 percent. Even though no government transfers were needed 
at the writing of this report, unless collections by Azerenerji reach nearly 100 percent, there is 
potential for the company to run operational deficits. These may materialize in several forms, 
such as accumulated arrears from distribution companies to Azerenerji or from Azerenerji to the 
State Oil Company, or otherwise 
accumulated backlogs of necessary 
maintenance investments. Collections 
from distribution companies—in reality 
from consumers—are improving. The 
wholesale power collection rate increased 
from approximately 46 percent in 2005 to 
nearly 53 percent by September 2007 
(Table 4.9), and apparently has continued 
to climb significantly in 2008. However, 
the collection level is still unacceptably 
low and is undermining the financial viability of electricity distribution companies as well as of 
Azerenerji. It is necessary to improve commercial and technical efficiency, while containing 
additional unnecessary price increases in the future. Of particular note, the current tariff is a 
heavy burden on poor households, adding importance to providing an effective social protections 
system. Azerbaijan’s relative price of electricity to PPP-based GDP per capita is exceeding those 
of the Baltic States and Bulgaria. Some of these countries have not yet fully incorporated 
increases into international energy prices in their tariffs. However, it is clear that Azerbaijan’s 
electricity prices no longer are among the lowest in the region.  
4.24. Strengthened demand management has contributed to curb excessive power 
consumption since the beginning of 2007. Electricity used to be over-consumed because of 
uncontrolled non-payment or low electricity tariffs. Given higher power tariffs and universal 
Table 4.8: Electricity Tariffs in Azerbaijan, 2006–07 
(AZN  per kWh) 
Source: Tariff Council.  
Table 4.9: Electricity Tariff Collection Rate From 
Distribution Companies, 2005–07 (%) 
Source: Azerenerji.  
  
2006 2007 Increase (%) 
Residential 0.0192 0.0600 212.5
Non-residential 0.0260 0.0600 130.8
Trade and services 0.0600 0.0600 0.0
2005 2006 2007
Sep.
Total 45.8 35.3 52.5
Barmek 52.2 8.4
Baku electricity network 52.6 60.6
Sumgait electricity network 57.3 36.3
Baiva 34.1 24.2
Other areas by Azerenergy 55.3 61.0
Nakhchivan electricity network 38.5 47.2 63.1
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metering, consumers now have an incentive to use electricity more wisely. This approach should 
be applied to other infrastructure sectors as well.  
4.25. To sustain these positive outcomes, several reform agendas need to be strengthened 
further. Electricity tariffs tripled to achieve cost recovery, and meters were installed almost 
everywhere. First, however, raising both retail and wholesale collection rates to nearly 100 
percent is the most urgent and fundamental prerequisite for the sustainability of future sector 
reforms. Collections from distribution companies improved gradually but remain 50 percent to 
60 percent in most areas. Second, Azerbaijan has invested a large amount of public money in 
electricity generation.  However, large emphasis also should be laid on improvement in the 
distribution segment, which holds great potential for the sector to improve efficiency. It can be 
done through both physical investments and improved payment-incentive mechanisms. In this 
regard, rehabilitation of the transmission system and introduction of a SCADA/EMS system are 
important.  Private sector participation in power distribution, following the cases of the Sumgait 
and Sheki networks, could, if done right, contribute significantly to improving commercial 
efficiency (Box 4.1). Private distributors should be granted a sound legislative framework that 
specifies the commercial nature of power supply only to those who pay the bills, the right to 
deny services to any consumer who fails to pay, and simple, fast, and cost-effective measures to 
recover payment arrears.  
Box. 4.1: Private Sector Participation in Power Distribution in Georgia 
Private sector participation in electricity distribution can help utilities improve metering, collection, and thus, 
financial viability. For instance, Georgia invited a private operator to distribute electricity in Tbilisi in 1998. 
Collections from customers increased from 44 percent in 2000 to 86 percent in 2002. During this period, revenue 
jumped approximately 170 percent, while the tariff was raised relatively modestly by around 20 percent (from 8.6 
lari per kWh in 2000 to 10.3 lari per kWh in 2002). The tariff adjustment contributed to some revenue increases, but 
an aggressive tariff collection campaign through strengthening metering and enforcement measures explained most 
of Georgia’s success. In addition, Georgia’s experience indicates that this aggressive approach can be compatible 
with social concern by providing suitable subsidy and transfer to low-income households. The minimum amount of 
subsidy to cover lighting and some small electric appliances, but not heating, will mitigate the negative social effect 
to a large extent. In later years, following the Rose Revolution in 2003, the Georgian government used management 
contractors to enhance sector performance, followed by privatization of all the distribution networks outside the 
capital, both steps being important in securing the power sector’s financial viability. 
 
Source: Besant-Jones 2006  
 
4.26. In addition, the government needs to commit to a clear industrial structure to invite 
more private investment in the sector. Azerbaijan may be far away from what could be a 
competitive environment in power generation.  Nonetheless, IPPs could be allowed direct 
contracting with distribution companies and large customers. Direct, bilateral contracts have had 
a positive impact on payment collections in neighboring Georgia. They also proved to be 
effective in achieving a more competitive power sector. To oversee concessions, licenses, tariffs, 
and sector operations, a regulatory agency with sufficient autonomy, competence, and resources 
needs to be established. The Tariff Council, or regulatory body successor, also would have to 
articulate a transparent medium-term price adjustment mechanism, particularly responsive to 
non-competitive price elements (such as transmission fees) and inflation. Private investors in the 
power sector would seek predictability and public credibility in electricity prices. If the 
government fails to allow utilities to increase retail prices to the agreed levels, the public sector 
would be forced to compensate them for the possible negative spread between wholesale and 
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retail prices through transfers or subsidies. Otherwise, public credibility in private sector 
participation in infrastructure would be eroded (Box 4.2).  
Box. 4.2: Private Sector Participation in Power Generation 
In many countries, new private entrants to the power sector initially have been bound by contract rather than by a 
regulatory body. Such contracts may cause unintended impacts, such as underinvestment, wrong tariff level, and 
later become a hindrance to develop a liquid, competitive power market. A typical pitfall of the single-buyer 
approach is to involve excessive risk exposure when all commercial risk is transferred from private generators to a 
state-owned power purchaser under long-term power purchasing agreements (PPAs). The single-buyer model also 
does not involve direct market contract mechanism between generators and distributors, whence allowing a single 
buyer to commission excess generating capacity and pay too generous purchasing prices. In Poland, the electricity 
industry was unbundled in the early 1990s, and a single transmission company, Polskie Sieci 
Elektroenergetyczne, had as many as 24 long-term PPAs with independent power producers to cover two-thirds of 
total electricity required. These standard agreements complicated later efforts toward further liberalization. 
Hungary also was faced with the absence of linkage between PPA and retail prices, because the government did 
not raise retail prices to the full extent. It caused direct budget subsidies to be given to operators. It would be 
advisable to return to regulation by a regulatory body as soon as possible after an initial contract period.  
 
Sources: Newbery 2001, Kessides 2004, and Besant-Jones 2006. 
 
4.27. To achieve a more advanced, competitive power sector involving wholesale power 
liberalization and competition, Azerbaijan should develop more sophisticated institutional 
mechanisms. But this decision needs to be taken with a broader strategic approach, 
particularly regarding the potential regional market.  In Kazakhstan, Romania, Turkey and 
Ukraine, fully competitive structures were adopted through unbundling and privatization. In the 
same way, Azerenerji could be unbundled more unambiguously by entirely separating operation 
and ownership of power distribution from the upstream activities. Furthermore, separating 
generation from transmission would be in line with international practices, notably in EU’s 
competitive system.  In Azerbaijan, such separation would make most sense if, at the same time, 
there would be intent to allow multiple generation companies to compete for the customers. An 
autonomous regulator needs to be equipped with full powers to oversee new entries to the sector, 
transmission and retail tariffs, maximum generation tariffs (given the lack of a real, competitive 
market), customer service levels, and trading arrangements. In addition, a power market operator 
would be needed in future, if and when a regional power market is introduced. Such regional 
market (beyond the South Caucasus countries) holds significant potential for efficient service 
delivery. This can be done by providing access to markets and generation capacities that in part 
will be complementary and on a larger scale, and thus by letting competition better work in the 
interest of consumers.  
4.28. Top-priority, short-run sector reforms are to:  
•  achieve a near full  payment collection at both retail and wholesale levels;  
•  complete strategic decisions as to structure of markets and exploitation of regional 
potential in the power sector ; consider the role and ownership of Azerenerji in the 
future restructured power sector;  proceed with IPP contracts, as planned by the 
government;  
•  establish an autonomous regulator for independent tariff-setting and oversight of 
performance and operations of distribution companies, future IPPs, and Azerenerji;  
•  proceed with additional concession/management contracts for power distribution  
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E. TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
4.29. Despite a recent pick-up of the mobile market, Azerbaijan’s access to 
telecommunication remains relatively limited compared with that of other regional 
countries. Fixed-line teledensity is a very low 15 percent. Mobile access is increasing but 
remains at around 40 percent (Figure 4.6). The quality of telecommunications also is poor. 
Azerbaijan’s fixed-line telephone fault rate is 46 per 100 main lines, which is twice as high as 
Turkey’s and three times as high as Georgia’s.  
Figure 4.6: Fixed Line and Mobile Teledensity 
 
Sources: WDI, International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and Ministry of Communication and Information Technology
 
4.30. The government has embarked on some sector reforms. Retail prices in the mobile 
market have been fully liberalized, and, in principle, the market is open to foreign investment. In 
2007, a third mobile company, Azerfon (Nar Moblie), launched its operations, stimulating 
competition and expanding network access in the country. Interconnections are tightly regulated 
by the government but not in a transparent manner. To proceed with tariff rebalancing between 
local and long distance rates, the residential monthly fixed-line tariff increased from $0.70 in 
2005 to $2.30 in 2007.  In contrast, in 
2007, the long-distance call rate was 
lowered from AZN 0.09 to AZN 0.07. 
There were no adjustments in the 
telephone tariffs in 2008. 
4.31. However, telecommunications 
reforms are still largely stagnant –the 
government can act. The EBRD 
infrastructure reform index for 
telecommunications is the lowest in the 
region (Figure 4.7). There is still no 
independent regulator for 
telecommunications in Azerbaijan. The 
Ministry of Communications and IT is 
acting as both a regulator (except for 
tariff-setting) and a joint owner of 
telecommunications companies. Azerbaijan is one of the exceptional cases in which the 
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government still retains full state ownership of fixed-line companies and partial ownership of 
mobile carriers. The government can proceed to sell the fixed line operator to signal its openness 
to foreign investors. 
4.32.  In the fixed-line market, further tariff rebalancing is also necessary. The increased 
monthly charges are still considered below Azerbaijan’s norm and are cross-subsidized by other 
telecommunications segments. Business user tariffs are still kept high. Notably, Azerbaijan has 
no unit rate for local calls, meaning that the monthly fee is a fixed payment without unlimited 
use. Furthermore, long distance calls are still expensive, despite a slight reduction in 2007. A 
seven-minute long distance call costs the same as the monthly fee. The government needs to 
accelerate tariff rebalancing and remove price distortion, maximizing market-oriented 
competition in each market segment.  
Table 4.10: Interconnection Regulation
 
Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Regulatory and Competition 
database. 
 
4.33. Telecommunications can be led primarily by the private sector, but at least two 
areas still require government intervention: interconnection regulation and licensing. In 
Azerbaijan, Aztelekom and Azercell Telecom are significant operators in the fixed-line and 
mobile markets, respectively. The government should ensure effective competition through non-
discriminatory and cost-based interconnection arrangements between incumbents and new 
entrants, possibly by spinning off a regulatory role from the Ministry or establishing a new 
independent regulator with political autonomy, accountability, competence, and resources (Table 
4.10). Transparency and neutral dispute resolution measures are essential in regulating 
interconnection rates and access to essential facilities, such as local loops and international 
gateways. The state ownership of fixed and mobile operators also must be reduced further 
toward a more liberalized telecommunications market, because state ownership potentially 
complicates government regulations between incumbent and extant operators.  
Separate regulator Accountability to: Interconnection rates set by: 
Estonia Yes Line Ministry Operators
Latvia Yes No one Regulator
Lithuania Yes President Regulator, and operators
Turkey Yes Parliament Regulator
Bulgaria Yes Council of Ministers Regulator
Belarus No ... Operators
Azerbaijan No ... Other Ministry (Tariff Council)
Georgia Yes President Regulator, and operators
Uzbekistan No ... Line Ministry, and operators
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Box. 4.3: Accelerating Telecommunications Sector Reforms 
In order to proceed further with telecommunications sector reforms, Azerbaijan can examine how to bring the 
private sector to the fixed-line market, but it should be consistent with the information and communication 
technology (ICT) market development strategy, on which the country first has to agree. Advanced ICT can be used 
not only to improve firm productivity but also to develop some new ICT-enabled markets. Based on the national 
strategy, the current telecommunications legislative and regulatory frameworks may have to be updated. In parallel, 
an independent regulatory body must be established to supervise not only pricing but also technical standards and 
license issuance. This sector is technically complicated and evolving rapidly; thus the regulator should be equipped 
with competent professionals. Interconnection and spectrum right issuance are its important regulatory areas. As a 
part of the reform package, then, Aztelekom can partly and gradually be privatized to a strategic private operator. 
The policy over how to unbundle its current and potential ICT services, including international calls, mobile and 
DSL, must be consistent with the development strategy, with the marketability of the firm taken into consideration. 
If a new private operator is obliged to maintain or extend the fixed-line network under unprofitable conditions, 
especially to remote areas, a universal access fund mechanism has to be established, to which all ICT operators 
would contribute. But the exclusivity granted to a fixed operator, should be kept to a minimum or perhaps to nil.  
The long-lasting private monopoly would likely undermine rapid and dynamic development of ICT markets. Good 
pro-competitive regulations on interconnections, open access and number portability are rather essential.  
 
4.34. Given the growing demand for telecommunications, especially in mobile services, a 
mechanism to efficiently allocate new licenses also needs to be structured. Contestability for 
the market is crucial to maximize efficiency in license allocation. Predictable license issuance 
will facilitate dynamic market development among operators and across alternative information 
and communication technologies. There may be good potential to invite more mobile operators, 
perhaps to the third generation of mobile phone standards and technology (3G) market.  
4.35. The top-priority sector reforms in  telecommunications  are to: 
•  preparation  a comprehensive sector modernization strategy;  
•  establish an independent regulatory authority for telecommunications;  
•  sell Aztelecomm; 
•  set a transparent and non-discriminatory interconnection rule;  
•  reduce state ownership in the mobile joint ventures. 
F. ROADS  
4.36. In Azerbaijan, road infrastructure is sufficient in both length and coverage for 
regional and international connections. However, the condition of the majority of the network 
remains poor to dangerous (Figure 4.8). Unpaved roads account for 50 percent of the total 
network. Of the main corridors, 56 percent are estimated to be in poor condition, and 
approximately 30 percent need to be repaired urgently. Forty-five percent of regional and local 
roads are life-expired. Even though business users do not think transport is a serious constraint at 
the moment, the poor quality of roads represents a risk to Azerbaijan’s expansion as a transit 
country. Furthermore, poor road conditions increase accidents and harm to people, vehicle 
damage, and CO2 emissions. 
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Figure 4.8: Road Quality in Azerbaijan and Other Countries in the Region, 2005 
Sources: WDI, PAD for Highway 2 Project 
 
4.37. Azerbaijan’s recent economic buoyancy and accelerating motorization portend even 
greater risks to road quality. Every year since 2003, the country has experienced more than 10 
percent increases in registered motor vehicles. Without timely maintenance, local roads will 
deteriorate quickly due to greater domestic vehicle traffic. Finally, the poor quality of local road 
networks will likely   have a negative impact on the anticipated expansion of the non-traditional, 
non-oil sectors, and the improvement of social and economic conditions in rural areas. 
4.38. With the help of a large amount of donor assistance, and with its own   resources, 
the government has given the highest priority to major corridors, mainly the East-West 
and North-South corridors. From 2004 to 2007, road construction and rehabilitation accounted 
for approximately 10 percent of the consolidated government budget. In addition, PIP has 
allocated approximately half of its road budget to highways. Investments in other transit 
corridors and roads around Baku also will be enhanced to accommodate future traffic growth. 
From 2008, the government intends to accelerate rehabilitation of regional and local roads, of 
which approximately 45 percent are life-expired.  
4.39. Road-sector development is constrained primarily by the lack of administrative 
capacity to implement necessary projects rather than financial resources. The state road 
agency, Azerbaijan Road Services (ARS), continues to face a critical shortage of highly qualified 
transport professionals. Given an increasing number of road projects, of particular concern is the 
poor planning capacity, in which little attention is paid to the design and procurement process, 
including hiring consultants. In the past three years, the consolidated budgetary allocation to 
roads and bridges increased more than 20 times. As mentioned above, the acceleration of 
rehabilitation of regional and local roads from 2008 will impose additional tension on road 
authorities. Notably, the ARS routine maintenance unit tends to be unreceptive to modernization. 
There is a need to ramp up capacity in this unit by bringing in young and motivated professional 
staff.  
4.40. Another critical problem in Azerbaijan that affects roads is the lack of a sound 
multi-year budget system. The appropriate multi-year construction and maintenance 
programming requires a flexible medium-term budgetary formulation. Furthermore, Azerbaijan 
has not yet developed high-quality road data banks to underpin efficient expenditures. Efficient 
and transparent procurement-based quality road data would save considerable resources. In 
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Azerbaijan, the clarification of road agency accountability may be most important. Other 
countries often reinforce accountability by establishing road agencies and road funds under 
which transparently competitive tendering of works are implemented, desirably against 
performance-based specifications.92 Road funds also may attract private investment to develop 
road networks (Box 4.4).  
Box 4.4: Road Fund and Private Motorway Development in Poland and Hungary 
In 2004, Poland created a multi-annual off-budget financing institution, the National Road Fund (KFD), for road 
investments. KFD is designated to collect fuel surcharge revenues, concession fees, and toll revenues. It raises 250 
million euros, or approximately 20 percent of total road expenditure, every year. The total allocation of funds 
reached €1.1 billion in 2005 and €1.5 billion in 2006. In Poland, tolls are charged on 210 km of a total of 
approximately 540 km (nearly 40 percent) of motorways. For passenger cars, 0.22 zloty, or €0.05 euro per km is 
charged, for instance, on Motorway A2, which was contracted out to a consortium of 18 Polish companies in 2000. 
The collected tolls are one of the major financial resources of the road fund. A potential risk of road concessions 
might be the low acceptance of tolls among motorway users. The charged rate may be considerably higher than 
consumer’s willingness to pay, which is estimated at 0.10 zloty per km in the case of Poland’s A2.  
 
Similarly, Hungary’s motorway concessionaires have encountered difficulties in charging the maximum toll rate 
allowed under the contract (initially €0.15 per km, in some cases).  
 
Sources: INECO 2006, World Bank ECA 2006
 
4.41. To strengthen institutional capability, in 2007, the Azerbaijan government 
restructured the former road administration agency, the Road Transport Service 
Department (RTSD). RTSD was transformed into an independent joint stock agency, ARS, and 
separated from the Ministry of Transport (MoTr). ARS is intended to be in charge of ordinary 
road management; MoTr is expected to focus on monitoring and supervising road-sector 
performance. However, in practice, the exact division of responsibilities between MoTr and ARS 
is still unclear, so there is no systematic or accountable implementation mechanism for road 
investment and maintenance.  
4.42. Over the long run, Azerbaijan has the option to invite private operators for road 
construction and maintenance. Even though private companies may operate only a small 
fraction of the total network, they will become an important efficiency vehicle to maintain 
sustainability of road network development. To encourage private sector participation in the road 
sector, again, a sound and predictable regulatory framework must be established. Concessions 
and motorway tolls to finance the development of rural road networks may be a long-term option 
for Azerbaijan.  
4.43. In the short run, the priority reforms are to: 
•  complete road data-gathering to implement multi-year efficient road maintenance;  
•  obtain highly qualified road transport professionals for ARS;  
•  strengthen the monitoring functions of the Ministry of Transport through a 
management mechanism that articulates the discrete performance targets and 
mandates of MoTr and ARS.  
                                                 
92 World Bank IEG 2007 
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G. RAILWAYS 
4.44. Railway   is another strategic sector for Azerbaijan. The demand for railways is 
increasing strongly due to the increased freight operations for oil and oil-products, which 
dominate rail cargo traffic.  Azerbaijan exports approximately 2.2 million tons per month of oil 
products, mostly to and through Georgia. Passenger service represents only some 10 percent of 
railway traffic in Azerbaijan. The railway network is sufficiently covered.   
4.45. The oil and oil-product transport by rail is important not only for Azerbaijan but 
also for neighboring countries. The Central Asian Republics are seeking options for their 
exports and imports to provide competitive alternatives to transport through Russia. Kazakhstan 
exports a large volume of oil. The route through the Caspian Sea and rail over the Caucasus may 
be one of the options, but only if inefficient Caspian shipping and port operations are further 
improved and ambiguous rail prices are reduced. In 2007, the governments of Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey agreed on the long-considered Akhalkalaki-Karsakhi Railway to connect 
Baku through Georgia to Kars (near the Turkish port of Ceyhan). Azerbaijan Railway (ADDY) 
is a vertically integrated, state-owned enterprise. It will remain unable to operate at full capacity–
–80 km per hour for freight and 100 km for passengers––due to deteriorating rail infrastructure, 
unless proper maintenance and reinvestment take place. For example, on the East-West Corridor, 
62 percent of the track is operating under speed restrictions. The aging locomotive fleets often 
experience frequent breakdowns. Nearly two-thirds of the railway’s mainline locomotives are 
well past their service design lives and urgently need to be replaced. The railway’s electric power 
supply infrastructure is also in extremely poor condition.  
4.46. Financial transparency in the railway sector is still weak. The audited accounting 
indicates that in 2008 ADDY generated revenues of $346 million with net cash flow from 
operating activities of $95 million. In 2008, ADDY’s net profit was $45 million. ADDY shows a 
growing level of account receivables from its customers (AZN159 million), indicating the need 
to manage its receivables more efficiently.   Apparently, the profitable freight operations cross-
subsidize loss-making passenger services (particularly domestic and commuter services). Tariff-
setting also is not clear enough to outsiders. Actual prices paid for international and transit 
shipments are determined by government discount rates (in the order of 30 percent to 50 percent) 
applied to internationally-agreed tariffs. The discounts are not publicly announced. Therefore, 
since rail transport is arranged through freight forwarders, no customer can know in advance the 
discounted rate paid to the railway (as opposed to the freight forwarder) for its traffic.  
4.47. The railway structure must be adapted to a market economy. The draft state program 
to develop the Azerbaijan State Railways for 2011–15 recognizes the need to make the railway 
commercially viable and market-oriented, and to create stronger incentives to be efficient and 
thereby create better service and greater transit potential for Azerbaijan. The government 
envisages the railways as a commercial entity and plans to create separate entities (subsidiaries) 
under the different lines of business (for infrastructure, freight, passenger, and non-core 
activities). A step in this direction was taken with the Presidential Decree issued on July 20, 
2009, on the establishment of Azerbaijan Railways as a Closed Joint Stock Company. 
4.48. The government is encouraged to proceed with this corporatization and horizontal 
unbundling approach. In particular, the full audit of the ADDY is underway and should be 
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completed shortly. This audit will provide important information for designing the next step of 
sector reform. Given the asset evaluation, the government also must examine the ownership issue 
carefully by comparing the advantages and disadvantages of vertical separation and competitive 
access. In a vertically integrated system—even though being overseen by different 
departments—track, passenger, and freight operations will be coordinated to a large extent and 
the railway can make reasonable trade-offs between investment/operating costs in infrastructure 
and investment/operating costs in operations. In a vertically separated system, a more complex 
regulatory system is required for safety, coordination of operations, and investment.  
4.49. There may be potential for multiple passenger operators in the future, but it usually 
is difficult to inject competition in the railway sector, even in countries with large volumes 
of traffic. Although maintaining a state-owned monopoly is the most costly option, there are a 
variety of approaches to motivate the sector to improve efficiency. Private participation (such as 
concessions) in passenger and freight services is expected to increase productivity and service 
quality (Box 4.4). More importantly, however, several international experiences indicate that 
most of the benefits of structural reform come from flexible pricing and operational management 
granted to private operators, rather than from privatization per se.93 Inter-modal competition is 
another important element. In Azerbaijan, competition against the East-West highway and the 
BTC pipeline cannot be ignored in modernizing the rail sector.  
4.50. The top-priority, short-term reforms in this sector are to:  
•  conduct a full audit, asset inventory, and implementation of IFRS accounting;  
•  complete ongoing track and locomotive rehabilitation works;  
•  corporatize the railway and create a line-of-business structure;  
•  increase transparency in tariff-setting;  
•  assess introducing private participation in the passenger and freight operation 
segments.  
H. WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER  
4.51. In Azerbaijan, access to improved water sources remains very low in rural areas. 
While the access rate in urban areas, especially around the Greater Baku Area, is more than 90 
percent, rural access may be less than 40 percent, which is among the lowest in the region. The 
regional disparity between Baku and small rural towns is striking. While 93 percent of 
households in Baku have access to piped public water services inside their houses, this could 
range from less than 10 percent to 70 percent in other areas. In rural areas, the dependency on 
piped water supply is especially low. Only 11 percent to 33 percent of rural residents rely on 
piped water. The quality of water supply services also is much worse. Finally, the reliability (or 
continuity) of water supply remains one of the most critical problems in Azerbaijan. 
4.52. Azerbaijan’s wastewater treatment facilities are also poor, even in urban areas, 
including Baku.  In Baku, 78 percent of residents are covered by the sewerage network. 
However, only 50 percent of wastewater is treated due to poor treatment facilities. Sewerage 
network coverage in other urban areas is estimated at 32 percent, and the majority is not treated. 
                                                 
93 Kessides 2004. 
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In rural areas, people depend on on-site sanitation. Only 36 percent of the rural population is 
estimated to have access to improved sanitation facilities. There is no effective regulation to 
ensure on-site sanitation, which therefore is dependent on households for construction.  
4.53.  The most critical problem of the sector is that a state-owned nationwide water 
enterprise, Azersu, does not generate sufficient financial resources to maintain and 
improve its existing facilities. Azersu Group (Azersu and its subsidiaries) is a large public 
enterprise responsible for providing all water supply and sanitation services in 55 regions or 
districts (rayons) in the country. The exceptions are four cities served by independent 
subsidiaries and Nakhchivan. The Azersu Group has approximately 910,000 customers 
(connections); it produces approximately 660 million m3, and sells 500 million m3 of water a 
year. However, performance targets and mandates have not yet been clearly agreed upon 
between the government and Azersu. All water sector reforms, including billing and revenue 
improvement measures and demand management practices, such as universal metering, have 
been relatively slow in comparison with the electricity sector. Consequently, the financial 
outlook in the water sector has remained poor, in turn affecting the company’s ability to make 
sorely needed investments to improve service quality. The company still depends largely on 
government and donor funding to finance significant investments in the sector. In 2006, Azersu 
had $320 million of payables for Greater Baku and the Absheron Peninsula, most of which were 
due to Azereneji, because half of Azersu’s operating costs are electricity. At the same time, 
Azersu accumulated $321 million of receivables by 2006, mainly from customers.94  
4.54. To restore the financial viability of the sector, the government has just initiated 
gradual sector reforms. In January 2007, the residential water tariff was doubled from AZN 
0.09 to AZN 0.18 per m3 (Table 4.11). The total operating cost for 2006 is estimated at AZN 
0.12 per unit of water produced (m3), and, in theory, this amount should be covered by the 
current tariff level. However, Azersu is still running deficits, because the number of households 
directly affected by the tariff 
adjustment remains very 
limited, since the current 
metering rate is only 30 
percent. In 2007, the 
government reduced the 
consumption norm for a 
number of customers without 
meters from 0.4 m3 to 0.2 m3 
per capita per day. The full 
revenue effect will be realized 
once universal metering is fully 
achieved. Given the current 
metering rate, the average tariff 
would have to be AZN 0.53 per m3 to achieve full cost recovery. The metering program is 
progressing, but slowly, particularly for residential users. The total metering rate increased from 
6 percent in 2005 to 30 percent in 2007.   
                                                 
94 Based on unaudited 2006 accounts.  
Table 4.11: Water Tariffs in Azerbaijan, 2005–07 
 (AZN per m3) 
Source: Tariff Council. 
2005 2006 2007 Increase (%)
Major cities 1/
Residential 0.087 0.087 0.180 106.9
Commercial enterprises 0.630 0.630 0.700 11.1
Industrial use 10.000 10.000 12.000 20.0
Other areas
Residential 0.140
Commercial enterprises 0.700
Industrial use 12.000
1/ Baku, Sumqayit, Ganja, Mingachevir Ali-Bayramlı, Xirdalan cities 
and Absheron district. 
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4.55. In addition, ineffective water accounting and unaccounted for water is far above the 
recommended level in well-maintained systems (less than 15 percent). Unaccounted for water 
in Azerbaijan amounts to more than 25 percent of total water produced by Azersu (Table 4.12). 
Half of this is associated with leakages in service pipes within buildings. These technical losses 
are greatly hampering effective water provision and financial viability. 
4.56. Collections also need to improve significantly. The rate of water tariff collection is as 
low, approximately 60 percent, as that of the electricity sector. The collection rate increased from 
52 percent in 2005 to 57 percent in 2007 in the Greater Baku Area, and from 61 percent to 63 
percent in other regions during the same period (Table 4.9). The dismal performance is attributed 
primarily to the large amount of unaccounted for water, absence of meters, and weak legal 
measures.  To improve the situation, a short-term priority should be focused on completing 
universal metering, followed by strengthened efforts toward full tariff collection. Legal 
enforceability for non-payers also should be strengthened. Given the implementation of cost 
recovery tariffs, government funding for operational subsidies should be phased out.  
4.57. Experience elsewhere 
has shown that private sector 
participation in management of 
the water sector can 
significantly improve 
operational efficiency (Box 
4.4). There is a wide range of 
choices to improve efficiency: 
service contract, management 
contract, lease, concession, and 
divestiture. If some specific 
activities, such as metering or 
billing, are contracted out, 
service contracts or managements contract are appropriate. The majority of water-sector private 
participation in Latin America and East Asia takes the form of concessions. The reason is that 
some investments are needed to expand the coverage and rehabilitate the existing networks. For 
example, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland introduced water concessions.  
4.58. The important precondition for private participation is that the regulatory 
framework, including tariff-setting, must ensure private operators a return on their 
investments commensurate with the risks. Too low tariffs are out of the question. Effective 
legal measures should be granted to both protect and regulate operators. Moreover, the 
government’s ongoing works to rehabilitate water treatment plants and distribution networks 
would reduce the uncertainties in possible private operation, which would attract more private 
operators to the sector. For the same reason, Azersu also must reduce water leakage at the service 
pipe level to lower the rate of unaccounted for water. 
4.59. Toward possible private sector participation in the sector, following the universal 
metering and full tariff collections, Azersu must be corporatized, and the capacity of local 
governments to participate in the water supply sector built up. The next step is for the 
government to horizontally unbundle the sector into three to five regional utilities covering 
Table 4.12: Unaccounted-for Water in Azerbaijan, 2005-07 
Source: Azersu. 
2005 2006 2007
Sep.
Total 
Water production (million m3/year) 659.5 664.5 449.2
Water consumed (million m3/year) 497.6 493.1 271.7
Loss (%) 24.5 25.8 39.5
Greater Baku area
Water production (million m3/year) 550.6 541.7 371.8
Water consumed (million m3/year) 400.1 389.2 206.8
Loss (%) 27.3 28.2 44.4
Other regions
Water production (million m3/year) 108.9 122.8 77.3
Water consumed (million m3/year) 97.5 103.9 64.9
Loss (%) 10.4 15.4 16.1
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several rayons, to improve economies of scale and effectiveness in operation at the rayon level. 
Based on the assessment of financial viability and technical feasibility of individual rayons, the 
regional utilities could operate as subsidiaries under the performance contracts with Azersu. The 
supervisory regime, including the role of Azersu and local governments, needs to be streamlined 
at that time.  
4.60. The top-priority, short-term reforms in the water sector are to:  
•  corporatize Azersu, build up local governments’ capacity, and unbundle the sector 
horizontally to create three to five regions;  
•  achieve universal metering;  
•  achieve a near 100 percent tariff collection; 
•  complete ongoing rehabilitation works in secondary cities;  
•  reduce unaccounted for water.  
 
Box 4.5: Private Sector Participation in the Water Sector in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria 
Since the early 1990s, the Czech Republic has gradually privatized its water and sewerage sector. In 1999 in České 
Budějovice, the South Bohemian capital of the republic, a private operator was granted a 12-year lease contract. The 
private sector participation lowered the ineffective and unaccounted for water rate from 37.4 percent in 1999 to 24 
percent in 2004. Similarly, in the second largest urban agglomeration, Ostrava, privatization of the utility reduced 
unaccounted for water from 45 percent to 9 percent during the same period. Collections improved from 89 percent to 
100 percent. A private water operator in Prague, Pražské vodovody a kanalizace, a.s., decreased unaccounted for 
water from 32 percent in 2000 to 24 percent in 2004. Moreover, the collection rate was raised from 94 percent to 98 
percent during the same period.  
In many other cases, the agreed performance could not be met by private contractors. For instance, unaccounted for 
water and collections could not be improved as intended in Brno in  the Czech Republic, and in Sofia, the Bulgarian 
capital.  The results depend on the specific investment context as well as the regulatory and contractual design.  
Sources: World Bank ECA 2006, PPIAF database.
I. CRITICAL CROSS-SECTORAL ISSUES  
4.61. To date, Azerbaijan’s model to develop network utilities has been publicly funded 
and managed. The principal reforms have aimed to strengthen service delivery and to secure 
financial viability. To expedite the improvements in service delivery, Azerbaijan has at once 
sought to fund critical investments from the consolidated budget, while pursuing financial 
viability with increases in tariffs and the introduction of metering. The government also has 
embarked on some structural reforms, gradually implementing corporatization in some cases and 
inviting the private sector to operate infrastructure in other cases.  
4.62. Financial viability needs to be further strengthened by the adoption of a clear 
pricing policy that capitalizes on the 2008 adjustments. In preceding years, utilities have been 
subject to substantial indirect subsidies, which, in principle, were eliminated in 2008. The 
implicit subsidies on utilities were estimated at 4.7 percent and 3 percent of non-oil GDP in 2006 
and 2007 respectively. The tariff adjustment is expected to eliminate the need for these subsidies. 
However, going forward, the TC needs to render future tariffs more predictable by specifying a 
tariff policy that foreign investors can access and assess. The present process is opaque to 
outsiders. The MOF, the TC, and the SCMSP need to strengthen their coordination efforts to 
ensure financial viability. 
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4.63. Azerbaijan can further differentiate between regulators and service providers. The 
current regulator, the Tariff Council, is far from a standard independent regulatory model. Given 
the sensitivity of tariff adjustment to political developments, this arrangement may have been 
understandable until 2008. However, with rates now near cost recovery levels and the social 
assistance system in place, moving to an independent regulator should become a priority, 
particularly since the January 2007 tariff increases, which for the most part ended the need for 
energy subsidies (the 2008 consolidated budget included no subsidies for energy).  
4.64. Another important element missing from the government’s strategy is private sector 
participation. International experience has indicated that efficiency in the provision of service 
delivery, and service equality are more likely to be gained from: (i) a clear separation of service 
providers; (ii) structured incentives; and (iii) sound and credible regulation. Particularly given 
the more limited oil revenues during the next few years, the government needs to reinvigorate its 
efforts to improve the performance of SOEs, so that it can attract investors in the post crisis 
period. 
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CHAPTER 5.  
ENCOURAGING A BROADER, MORE COMPETITIVE PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
 
The preceding analysis, particularly in Chapter 2, provides two general observations: First, in spite of the 
surge in foreign exchange revenue from oil exports, Azerbaijan’s economy is still broad-based, although 
in dire need of modernization in order to enhance its international competitiveness.  Although public 
expenditures in infrastructure should contribute significantly to increasing productivity, private 
investments, foreign and domestic alike, are required for Azerbaijan to innovate and develop new 
products consistent with its new terms of trade.  They are also indispensable to generating employment 
and growth through diversification.  Second, despite strong growth of the non-oil sector, Azerbaijan’s 
economy often operates below its production frontier.  The reasons are diverse, ranging from scarce or 
poor-quality inputs to high cost of imports to lack of know-how. As   shown in Chapter 2, the common 
denominators are weaknesses in business environment and excessive presence of state, leading to 
politicization of corporate management and weaknesses in policies supporting agricultural 
development.   
 
This chapter recommends policies, hereafter referred to as “entry and expansion package,” designed to 
exploit untapped entrepreneurial potential of Azerbaijan through removal of some constraints in 
economic regime that suppress business activity. The package consists, among other things, of lowering 
formal and informal barriers to entry and expansion of the private sector in exchange for increased tax 
reporting of sales and income in the formal economy.  It follows naturally from the progress reflected in 
Doing Business and the new State Program for Customs Modernization.  Small firms may find the 
package attractive as due relief for the rising terms of trade that they face.  Larger firms may benefit 
from the growth in market size (although not necessarily in market share), higher-quality local inputs, 
and fewer hurdles to doing business. Officials accustomed to rent-seeking would lose rents but they 
would benefit from higher levels of compensation and professionalism and, in the end, more job 
security.  
 
The chapter, as does the rest of the report, considers that the forthcoming five-year period will be one 
of relatively high oil revenues for Azerbaijan (even should oil prices have dropped significantly) and 
presents a unique opportunity for the country to develop a non-oil tax base that would ensure 
sustainability of Azerbaijan’s economy while providing reduced disruption to private sector activity. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
5.1. Azerbaijan’s private sector is reputed for its trading capacity. It also carries a wealth of 
experience from operating in a diverse economy through the Soviet era and in surviving the 
transition after independence. For a developing economy, open access to world markets for 
goods, capital, services, and know-how is key to development. Likewise for Azerbaijan, growth 
and employment prospects are based on the expansion of agriculture (for domestic consumption 
and regional trade) and services (transport and transit along the traditional Silk Road route). 
However, manufacturing can also play a role in the medium term.  The government can do much 
more to enable the private sector to lead the country’s development, to reach its productivity and 
 97 
 
employment potential, and to capitalize on trade opportunities. Some indicators from 
international surveys suggest that Azerbaijan’s government is too involved in the private 
sector—much more than in other countries—which makes for an uneven playing field and a 
rather unwelcoming business climate.  Inconsistencies in customs data, among others, support 
this claim. The uneven playing field is exacerbated by a tax system that is biased against formal 
operation of enterprises––yet collects only approximately 20 percent of total revenues from the 
smaller “entrepreneurial” tax base. Informality entails efficiency costs for the economy and 
revenue losses for the state treasury.  
5.2. This chapter casts a broad net on the nature of productive sector activities in Azerbaijan, 
and looks into the relations between the government and the private sector.  The purpose of the 
chapter is to: (i) provide an overview of the operating environment; (ii) identify hindrances to 
formal operation; and (iii) offer recommendations to improve the private sector environment so 
that economic activity in the formal sector is encouraged. This chapter continues the discussion 
in Chapter 2 about the monopolistic nature of Azeri markets, which illustrates the low level of 
competition in most of Azerbaijan’s economic sectors.  This chapter seeks to understand how 
this low level of competition is sustained at a systemic (or “macro”) level and to recommend 
interventions that would mitigate its impact. 
B. INTERNATIONAL STANDINGS 
5.3. A snapshot of Azerbaijan’s private sector operating environment reveals substantial 
progress since 1995. However, it also leaves room for improvement, especially relative to 
comparators. The EBRD transition indicators of first-generation reforms show that although 
Azerbaijan started its transition rather late than  many comparators,  it has made relatively more 
progress than they have, particularly between 1997 and 2001  (Figure 5.1); the indicators include 
small-scale privatization, price liberalization, trade, and the foreign exchange system. However, 
from 2001 to 2007, the pace of Azerbaijan’s reforms slowed, particularly relative to neighboring 
countries.  
 
Figure 5.1: First-Generation Reforms Figure .5.2: Second-Generation Reforms 
Source: EBRD Transition Indicators. 
Note:  (*) Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
Source: EBRD Transition Indicators. 
Note:  (*) Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
0 1 2 3 4 5
CIS
Russia
Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan
Roman. / Bulg.
Armenia
Georgia
EU Accession*
1995 2001 2007
0 1 2 3 4 5
Azerbaijan
CIS
Armenia
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Russia
Roman. / Bulg.
EU Accession*
1995 2001 2007
 98 
 
5.4. Institutional underpinnings supporting competitive markets, as revealed in the 
progress achieved in second-generation reforms, are not yet fully in place.  Second-
generation reforms include large-scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, 
competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-
bank financial institutions, and infrastructure reform. By these measures, Azerbaijan lags behind 
all comparators (Figure 5.2) and has made little progress since 2001. While first-generation 
reforms are considered important to enable the price mechanism to function properly, second-
generation reforms are important to develop market institutions. The above ratings of second-
generation reforms imply that Azerbaijan’s economy maintains significant inefficiencies and 
distortions in allocation of capital. For example, public utilities and large infrastructure services 
is still primarily in the hands of the state.  To date, the privatization of any large public utilities 
has not taken place.  
5.5. Azerbaijan has recently made significant progress in facilitating some aspects of 
private sector operations. Azerbaijan ranks 33 in IFC’s global ranking in Doing Business 2009 
(the report ranks the business environment in 2008), up from 97 in the previous year. It won the 
title of the world’s number one reformer in 2008.  The most important reform has been the 
establishment of a one-window system to register enterprises, which   has dramatically cut the 
number of days it takes to register— from 114 in 2005 to 16 in 2008.  
5.6.  Yet, little progress has been made in some areas, which are critical if businesses are 
to take advantage of new opportunities created by reforms.  As can be seen from data 
presented in Figure 5.3, Azerbaijan’s rankings are low for three critical areas: (i) dealing with 
licenses; (ii) paying taxes; and (iii) trading across borders. Along with taxation, trading across 
borders   is of particular concern to Azerbaijan because the country’s diversification strategy 
rests on successfully integrating into global markets and transit trade. Of special interest to 
Azerbaijan are the ongoing reforms in Georgia and Turkey, which favor trading but also ensure 
the ease of paying taxes and protecting investors. 
 
Figure 5.3: Business Environment Regulations in 2008: Europe and Central Asia 
 
Source: Doing Business 2009 
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5.5. Azerbaijan’s private sector often must contend with significant government 
involvement in the economy… As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, Azerbaijan’s private sector has 
three defining characteristics: (i) it operates in the presence of a very large central government 
and competes with it for scarce, non-tradable resources; (ii) it operates  alongside a large state 
enterprise sector comprising small, medium, and large enterprises that often operate in a 
preferential playing field; and (iii), as discussed below, a good part of the private sector has close 
relationships with the government, either by design or necessity. The large role of the state sector 
in entrepreneurial activities also contributes to corruption (Figure 5.4).95 Relationships between 
the government and favored firms imply lack of contestability in domestic markets. This often 
results in higher prices, low quality products, and poor product diversity. Likewise, exports also 
may suffer, especially those requiring imported inputs, since imports of raw materials can be 
hindered by government agencies. These relationships appear to lead to the emergence of “local 
monopolies.”96   
5.6. …as supported by micro 
data on MSMEs (firms below 250 
employees). This environment 
restrains the MSME sector’s potential 
contribution to economic transition, 
diversification, and, more 
fundamentally, employment creation, 
raising concerns about policy barriers 
to entrepreneurial activities. Of 106 
countries included in the IFC database 
of MSMEs, Azerbaijan ranks 81 in 
the number of MSMEs per 1,000 
people.97  It also ranks much lower 
than new EU members from Central 
Europe, but higher than Moldova 
(Table 5.1). Research on transition 
economies has demonstrated the 
important role that MSMEs have 
played in the transitions of other 
countries by venturing into new products that steer the economy away from the “old sectors” and 
by being significant employers.98 Looking to the future possible size of its MSME sector as a 
successfully diversified economy with natural resources, Azerbaijan can increase the number of 
its firms six-fold (relative to the population) to match Chile, or three-fold, to match Malaysia 
today. Multiplying the number of firms would be one means to enable Azerbaijan’s private 
sector to play its critical role in diversifying the economy. 
                                                 
95 The figure is based on indicators that measure “the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”. See 
Kaufmann and others 2008. 
96 For illustrations, see Chapter 2. 
97 For instance, Albania, with a population of 3.6 million, had 78,000 active firms in 2007. By this rationale, 
Azerbaijan, with a population 2.4 times larger than Albania’s, should have 186,000 active firms. However, it had 
only 33,000 active firms, or 17% of the “population”-equivalent number of firms of Albania. 
98 World Bank 2002.  
Figure 5.4: Control of corruption (Comparison Between 2007, 
2000, and 1996, Top-Bottom Order) 
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C. THE STATE AS A MAJOR PRODUCER AND INVESTOR 
5.9. The rapid increase of the public sector since 2005 was intended to improve economic 
conditions in the country but it has, at least temporarily, stifled the development of the 
private sector.99 With Azerbaijan’s consolidated budget expected to reach 85 percent of non-oil 
GDP in 2008, its public investment will reach 37 percent of non-oil GDP. With total investment 
in the economy amounting to 50 percent of non-oil GDP, the government will be managing up to 
76 percent of the country’s non-oil investment in 2008. Given Azerbaijan’s poor corruption 
ratings, the generally slow progress in public sector reforms and increasing contestability of 
domestic markets, the risk of perpetuating an uneven playing field is quite significant. In fact, 
although the ratings are a subject of significant debate, Azerbaijan’s corruption ratings 
significantly deteriorated from 2005 to 2007. This suggests that domestic markets are being 
increasingly protected at the cost of entrepreneurship development. 
5.10. Non-oil private investment declined in 2007, suggesting that crowding out may be 
taking place.100 A careful examination of the 2007 non-oil private investment data for 
Azerbaijan shows investment fell by about 4 percent of non-oil GDP since 2006. Of this drop, 
about half was owed to a decline in residential construction, and one-third to the transport (Table 
1.6).101 Over 2006–07, this report estimates that non-oil private investment (excluding 
investment in government-owned sectors -mainly utilities and petrochemicals- and excluding 
                                                 
99  Note that SOEs account for more than two thirds of value added created by the non-oil private sector (see Chapter 
2). 
100 Crowding out typically refers to a reduction in private investment due to increased government spending financed 
by public borrowing.  The mechanism for crowding out is the interest rates.  Government borrowing normally raises 
the interest rate by increasing the demand for investable funds, which, in turn, raises the cost of investment. This 
results in declining private investment. 
101 Construction of residential buildings was essentially frozen in 2007, following the collapse of a building in 
downtown Baku. Construction is expected to resume in late 2008, once norms have been revised and inspections 
completed. In 2007, investment in transport, retail, and wholesale trade, dropped by 1.7 percentage points of non-oil 
GDP, while investment in processing industries, including food, increased by 0.7 percentage points of non-oil GDP.  
Table 5.1: MSMEs in Selected Countries (by size and per 1,000 people) 
 
  
Micro and small firms 
with employment 
below 50 
Medium firms with 
employment 50–250 
MSME employment 
(% in total) 
Total firms per 
1,000 people 
Albania (2004) (c) 98.5 1.5 44.3 12.3 
Azerbaijan (2006) 99.0 1.0 5.0 (d) 7.2 
Armenia (2005) 95.7 4.3 34.0 33.1 
Botswana (2005) 96.9 3.1 n/a 7.4 
Bulgaria (2003) 98.5 1.5 79.0 27.7 
Chile (2004) (a) 96.6 3.4 95.0 43.9 
Estonia (2005) 98.0 2.0 n/a 48.5 
Malaysia (2005) 9b) 97.8 2.2 65.2 20.5 
Moldova (2003) 89.3 10.7 21.6 6.1 
Poland (2001) 99.2 0.8 67.1 43.3 
Sources: For Azerbaijan, based on data from the Ministry of Justice. For other countries, based on data downloaded 
from World Bank, "Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises: A Collection of Published Data" database on April 5, 
2008. 
Notes: (a) Micro and small below US$750,000. (b) Manufacturing sector. (c) Dataset contains only firms employing 
fewer than 50 people; others include firms with 20–49 employees. (d) Data for 2003. 
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residential construction) dropped approximately 19 percent in real terms. This suggests an 
important decline in investment toward diversification of the economy.   
5.11. Azerbaijan also has a large number of SOEs (in this context excluding utilities and 
social services), which may hamper competition. In 2007, Azerbaijan had 11,666 state-owned 
enterprises out of the total of 74,534 enterprises.102 In 2006, the state sector accounted for 32 
percent of total employment (declining slightly from 34 percent in 2004). State enterprises are 
often attached to line ministries or budgetary agencies, and in effect implement projects that 
these agencies fund. In 2006, SOEs made up approximately 25 percent of construction, 25 
percent of transportation, and 13 percent of manufacturing enterprises. The June 2008 Country 
Procurement Assessment Review points to significant flaws in the Public Procurement Law that 
hinder fair competition. These  flaws underline  the fact that: (i) only contracts above a certain 
threshold need to be advertised; (ii) implementing agencies can restrict bidding by regulation; 
and (iii) the open bidding threshold is set at AZN 250 million.  
5.12. The regulatory gaps for SOEs create operational loopholes for public agencies that 
limit competition, and thus require further study. Citing the opportunities provided by the 
legal and regulatory frameworks to limit competition, several members of the business 
community have indicated that they do not bid for government contracts. This seems to be true, 
because the pace of privatization has slowed dramatically: 1,280 enterprises were privatized 
during 2002–05, compared to 125––just one-tenth ––during 2006–07. This suggests that the pace 
of government disengagement from production during a period of high oil revenue is slowing 
rather than accelerating. Two EBRD Transition Indicators for Azerbaijan––“large scale 
privatization” and “enterprise restructuring”––also show that it trailed its comparators in 2007.  
5.13. The aforementioned discussion raises a strategic question for Azerbaijan. Should the 
government seek to broaden the direct reach of the state, or should it just seek a greater 
regulatory role for itself and accelerate second-generation reforms? John Maynard Keynes 
usefully stated, “The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are 
doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at 
present are not done at all”.103 The unambiguous answer to Azerbaijan’s strategic quandary is 
that the state should focus on creating incentives for private business rather than on production. 
With great urgency, Azerbaijan needs to slow the increases in public spending and intensify its 
reform program. The oil boom provides ample opportunity to compensate potential “losers” for 
the consequences of second-generation economic reforms, particularly small- and large-scale 
privatizations. While legislative action on procurement and licensing may level the playing field 
for SOEs and the private sector, the pressures from SOEs for favorable treatment are likely not 
only to remain but also to prevail. As such, transparent privatization would be the best option to 
assure effective corporate governance. 
                                                 
102 While precise figures for comparators are difficult to come by, EBRD Transition Indicators suggest that 
Azerbaijan’s rating (2.00) is below the EBRD average (3.7 of 4+ scale) for large-scale privatization, while it is much 
closer to the EBRD average for small-scale privatization (3.7 for Azerbaijan vs. 3.9 for the average) and for 
enterprise restructuring (2.0 for Azerbaijan vs. 2.5 for the average). 
103 John Maynard Keynes, “The End of Laissez-Faire.” 
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D. INCENTIVES FOR ENTRY AND EXPANSION 
Overarching Framework, Competition, and Protection of Investors 
5.14. More than a decade after Azerbaijan submitted an application to join the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the country’s foreign trade policies and institutions still are 
not WTO compatible. WTO membership by itself does not guarantee a higher-quality foreign 
trade regime. However, it does require transparency, stability, and predictability in market access 
conditions for both exporters and importers. As long as Azerbaijan is not a member, its exporters 
will not enjoy the protections of WTO’s multilateral discipline.  Moreover, this lack of WTO 
protection also depresses trade-related investment, both foreign and domestic, and suppresses 
competition from imports. Therefore, the success of Azerbaijan’s diversification strategy hinges 
critically on WTO membership.   
5.15. Azerbaijan has also been facing delays in the preparation of its investment law and 
its competition law. Both have been submitted several times to parliamentarians, however, 
adoption of these laws continues to be delayed. At this stage, it remains important that these draft 
laws be adopted according to international standards. 
Registration, Licensing, and Land Issues 
5.16. Azerbaijan has undertaken a host of regulatory reforms in recent years, which 
culminated in a very high global ranking in Doing Business for 2007/8.  Because of its recent 
private sector enabling reforms, Azerbaijan had been recognized as a top reformer, globally and 
regionally.  In September 2007, it eliminated the minimum threshold for reporting loans to the 
public credit registry, which now records information on all loans made by the financial system.  
This has more than doubled the coverage of borrowers with credit histories.  Moreover, major 
amendments to the labor code in May 2007 made it easier to hire workers by allowing employers 
to use fixed-term contracts for permanent tasks, easing restrictions on night work, and reducing 
requirements for redundancy dismissals.  Azerbaijan also created a second commercial court in 
Baku, while increasing the number of judges dealing with commercial cases from five to nine.  A 
new law strengthened investor protections by requiring shareholder approval of all transactions 
between interested parties, who are allowed to vote on the matter.  In addition, directors who are 
held liable must now pay damages and refund profits.  Azerbaijan also introduced a new unified 
property registry, reducing the number of procedures required to register property from seven to 
four.  The State Registry Service now also has the option of expediting two of the four 
procedures, making it possible to register property in 11 days, down from 61 in the previous 
year. In the same vein, the country created a one-stop shop for company registration (below), 
cutting the number of procedures from 13 to six and reducing the time required by half. Finally, 
Azerbaijan has also simplified dealing with the tax administration by introducing online filing 
and payment system with advanced accounting software for calculating taxes due.  On average, 
this saves over 500 hours a year, thanks to reduced paperwork. 
5.17. Of most notable achievement has been streamlining of business registration.  
Azerbaijan’s new “one-stop shop” or “one-window” system for business registration, under the 
aegis of the Ministry of Taxes (MoT), has been welcomed by businesses.  They can now file all 
pertinent information in these one-stop shops, including the submission and approval of 
 103 
 
documentation by the MoT, registration with the State Social Protection Fund and Statistical 
Committee, and the opening of a bank account. Fourteen of these one-stop shops—called “State 
Business Registries”—have been opened across the nation.  A standardized two-page guide helps 
entrepreneurs through the new process; which includes the completion of a one-page form, 
which contains all relevant information for either registering a new entity or updating existing 
information. Consequently, registrations rose 45 percent in the first half of 2008; more than 2000 
enterprises were registered in Baku alone, and 3,465 limited liabilities companies were 
established across Azerbaijan. Not surprisingly, Azerbaijan’s global ranking for starting business 
rose in Doing Business 2009 from 97 to 33, becoming comparable to Bulgaria, Russia, and 
Turkey. 
5.18. Azerbaijan’s next reform priorities need to be in licensing and issuing permits… In 
the absence of a uniform system for issuing licenses, permits, and approvals, a major problem 
arises from discrepancies between the licensing and permit issuing systems. While the Licensing 
Rules establish a set of criteria to administer and issue licenses, no legal authority provides clear 
guidance on permits and authorizations. There is neither a clear definition of what constitutes a 
permit, authorization, or certification, nor a review mechanism to analyze their legal basis, 
regulatory purposes, or efficiency. Consequently, nearly all government agencies, executive 
authorities, and municipalities issue authorizations, permits, and/or certifications. The absence of 
a standardized licensing and permits regime risks allowing public institutions to engage in: (i) 
opportunistic behavior to supplement their budgets; and (ii) corrupt and arbitrary decision-
making.104  
5.19. ...and should include mechanisms for appeal, revocation, supervision, and 
suspension. While current laws specify limits to the time that agencies may take to process 
applications for licensing, they do not mandate any sanctions for non-observance of the deadlines 
by licensors. Additionally, the license-issuing authorities must supervise compliance of the 
licensee with the license conditions, because a standardized approach for supervision does not 
exist. The grounds for suspension and revocation of licenses are also very broad, giving 
significant discretion to the licensing authority and causing unpredictability for the licensee. 
Finally, Azeri licensing laws and regulations do not provide for an administrative appeal process 
for a rejected or revoked application.   
5.20. Azerbaijan needs to standardize its licensing and permits regime. To minimize the 
aforementioned administrative discretion in licensing and permits, Azerbaijan may wish to: (i) 
proclaim a list of legal permits; (ii) issue a regulation clearly specifying which ministries may 
issue which permits (and that any new permits will require amendments to existing regulations); 
(iii) introduce legal provisions that ensure the fees for any license or permit are sufficient to 
cover no more than “reasonable administrative costs” (to reduce attempts at supplementary 
financing);  (iv) publish a fee scale; (v) provide equal opportunity for all companies (state- and 
privately-owned) to compete; and (vi) grant applicants the right to review the explanations for 
any decision (rejection or revocation of an application).  Azerbaijan is also working on a one-
                                                 
104 Another fundamental governance problem is that the licensing regime discriminates between the state-owned and 
private companies. In Azerbaijan, enterprises or organizations established by a Presidential Decree or funded by the 
state budget can engage in licensable activities without a license. This decree can be, and is, used to limit 
competition between the public and private sectors. 
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stop shop to issue construction permits, following the collapse of a building in central Baku in 
2007.  
5.21.  Land issues. Azerbaijan has no legal barriers to urban land ownership. However, land 
rights are poorly defined. This ambiguity has led to privatization-restitution disputes, an anemic 
land market, and multi-family lands that have not been allocated to privatized buildings and 
dwellings. Azerbaijan also has problems with urban land use planning, zoning, and permits and 
approvals for land development. Following the June 2004 passage of the Law on State Real 
Estate Register, the State Service for the Registration of Real Estate is responsible for registering 
all land and building rights. It is making good progress in establishing a viable registration 
system.  
5.22. A new mortgage law has also been passed, reducing the number of legal 
impediments to the development of a land market. Therefore, the number of transactions is on 
the rise. However, the overall transaction rate remains low, suggesting that most people still do 
not use the official system to record property rights. As noted above, Azerbaijan has made 
significant progress across the board in the regulatory environment for businesses, according to 
Doing Business 2009.  Among the reforms made in 2007/8, the number of procedures required to 
register a business was reduced from seven to four, and the time it takes to register property was 
reduced from 61 to 11 days, putting Azerbaijan in approximately the top 20 percent of ECA 
countries.  Azerbaijan’s regional ranking in the cost of registering property is similarly in about 
the lowest 20 percent, and amounts to 0.3 percent of property value. Azerbaijan’s reforms 
propelled it from a global ranking of 61 in 2006/7 to 9 in 2007/8. Problems remain with foreign 
land ownership, accessing government land (buying or renting), and corruption. Although 
Azerbaijan is not doing worse than the regional average, it is engaged in a reform program with 
the World Bank. The Bank’s priorities are to establish a single cadastre for movable and 
immovable property, and to merge the two institutions that manage land transfers in Azerbaijan. 
Tax System for the non-Oil Economy 
Tax Policies: Rates 
5.23. Soon after independence, Azerbaijan was among the transition countries that 
adopted reasonable, market-friendly tax systems in the late 1990s.105  In the past five years, 
Azerbaijan’s tax system has not changed significantly. It consists of a VAT, a STR, corporate 
and individual income, social security contributions, excise taxes, and customs duties. Since 
2003, the most important rate changes have been regular increases in excise taxes, the reduction 
of the corporate tax rate in 2005 (from 24 percent to 22 percent), and the reduction of the social 
security contribution (from 28 to 25 percent) in 2004. On average, since 2003, the largest 
contribution to non-oil revenues from various taxes has been as follows: 38 percent from VAT, 
28.3 percent from income taxes, and 14.3 percent from social security contributions.106  
                                                 
105 Azerbaijan maintains a tax system differentiated between the oil and non-oil sectors. The tax treatment of foreign 
participants in Azerbaijan’s oil sector is governed by PSAs, as is the tax treatment of imports for PSA use and the 
taxation of foreign employees or contractors. The discussion in this section pertains to the taxation of the non-oil 
economy, namely, all sectors other than the foreign-managed extraction of oil and gas. 
106 Zermeno 2008. 
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Table 5.2:  Non-Oil Tax Revenue, 2003-07 
 
Figure 5.5: Breakdown of 2007 Fiscal Revenues (AZN 7.9 
Billion) 
Source: Zermeno 2008. Excerpt from Table 2. Source: Ministry of Finance and Bank staff estimates. 
Notes: LTU = Large Taxpayers Unit; AIOC = Azerbaijan 
International Oil Consortium; SOCAR = State Oil Company of 
Azerbaijan; SPF = Social Protection Fund 
 
5.24. The revenue performance of Azerbaijan’s non-oil tax system has been strong. Non-oil 
revenues increased from 19.4 percent of non-oil GDP in 2003 to 31.8 percent in 2007 (Table 
5.2). The primary cause of the rise has been the buoyant economy and the improvements made in 
tax administration, particularly for large taxpayers, especially SOEs.  
 
5.25. However, the tax system hides an important inefficiency, namely, that transitioning 
from a special regime intended for MSMEs to the “regular” tax regime is costly. The VAT 
imposes a very high marginal tax rate.  Azerbaijan’s STR of 2 percent (4 percent for Baku) is 
levied on enterprises with a turnover below AZN 22,500 per quarter, or AZN 90,000 per year.107  
Enterprises subject to the STR do not pay corporate income tax (CIT) of 22 percent or property 
tax, nor collect VAT (18 percent), although they do make social security tax (SST) contributions 
of 22 percent—as is mandatory under the regular tax regime.  However, the individuals engaged 
in entrepreneurial activities do not pay personal income tax (PIT). A firm’s “graduation” from 
the STR to a VAT regime not only increases the firm’s tax burden, but also significantly 
increases the number of mandatory procedures it has to go through with various government 
agencies. It is no surprise, then, that firms reportedly are splitting their operations into smaller 
segments to be able to continue hiding under the STR. A firm with a turnover exceeding the 
VAT threshold would either hide it entirely or split into two or more smaller firms, thereby 
entirely avoiding entering the regular tax system. Under the latter, instead of only paying 2 
percent on its turnover, a firm would have to pay VAT, SST and CIT, besides having to make 
multiple filings with the tax administration. Table 5.6 presents a simulation of a notional firm’s 
change in tax obligations when crossing the STR turnover threshold: for an AZN 10,000 increase 
in turnover (and jumping from below to above the STR threshold), total tax obligations can 
increase, in the most extreme case, from AZN 7,080 to AZN 14,380. The table does not illustrate 
the possibility that firms operating in the STR regime may hide or understate the number of 
employees—something that interviews indicated was an occurrence. 
                                                 
107 The STR profit rate is 2% for enterprises located outside of the Baku area. 
2003 2005 2007
    (In percent of non-oil GDP)
Non-oil taxes & SSCs 19.7 23.6 31.7
  Non-oil taxes 16.7 20.8 26.8
  SSCs 3 2.8 4.9
        (In percent of non-oil tax revenues and SSCs)
Income taxes 23.1 30 29
  Personal 15.3 19.2 16.7
  Corporate 7.8 10.8 12.3
SSCs 15.1 12 15.9
VAT and STR 42.8 38 34.7
Excises 6.8 8.5 11.4
Customs 6 6.1 4.5
Other 6.2 5.3 4.8
Total 100 99.9 100.3
Oil and Gas 
Profits
LTU-SOCAR
15%
Other
23%
AIOC
25%
Other
1%
VAT-Customs
7%
VAT-Other
3%
Excise
1%
Profit Tax
5%
Income tax
6%
SPF
7%
LTU-Other
3%
Othr Non-Tax 
Rev
4%
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Table 5.3: Simulation: Effect of Crossing the VAT Threshold on Tax Burden (In AZN) Using 
Statutory Rates 
Taxpayer characteristics Turnover STR
CIT 
assuming 
22% 
profit on 
turnover  
VAT ** 
w/ 40% 
value 
added on 
turnover  
SST  w/ two 
employees & 
annual salary 
of AZN 
12,000 each  
Total 
tax * 
Firm below threshold – Baku  90,000     3,600        -   5,280      8,880 
Firm below threshold – non-Baku   90,000     1,800        -    5,280 7,080 
Firm just above threshold  100,000        -     3,058    6,100       5,280     14,438 
Source: Bank staff estimates. 
Notes:   (*)  PIT is not included in the table since it is paid by individuals and not by firms, even though firms have to 
withhold it from their employees;  (**) Although firms merely collect VAT from consumers, the real tax incidence is at 
least partially on the firm, depending on price elasticity. 
 
5.26. Compounding the challenge is that Azerbaijan’s tax rates are generally high when 
compared to the region.  The Doing Business 2009 survey showed significant improvement in 
Azerbaijan’s global ranking, from 143 in 2008 to 102 in 2009.  The upgrading was attributed to 
important improvements in tax administration.  However, paradoxically, Azerbaijan’s total tax 
rate, estimated at 41.1 percent of profits in 2009, increased from 40.9 percent over the previous 
year.  Azerbaijan’s rate puts it in the middle of the ECA rankings for paying taxes, but above that 
of Kazakhstan (whose rate is 36.4 percent) and below Russia’s (whose rate is 48.7 percent); 
while Armenia and Georgia have rates of 36.6 percent and 38.6 percent respectively.108  
Estimated profit rates for Arab oil producers are lower than those of ECA countries. These are   
expected given their oil revenue profile, but are an interesting reference point for Azerbaijan, as 
it is seeking to front-load its oil spending (relative to GDP) and boost its economy. The estimated 
profit rates listed for Arab oil producers in Doing Business 2009 are: Qatar 11 percent; Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and UAE 14 percent; and Bahrain 15 percent.  Azeri businesses also are 
handicapped by the high “duty” costs of imports. In 2006, the simple average tariff rate was 9.4 
percent for imports to Azerbaijan. The rate was less than one-tenth ––0.03 percent––for imports 
to Georgia. In addition, although their imports are subject to the same VAT rate of 18 percent, 
Georgian importers can use bonded warehouses, which are unavailable in Azerbaijan. 
5.27. High direct taxation of labor (PIT and SST) in combination with weak enforcement 
fosters informal employment. With the exception of the employees of public sector and foreign 
firms, most of the working population has no formal labor contract and thus escapes PIT and 
SST entirely. In addition to the loss of fiscal revenue, this has created a potentially dangerous 
outcome—where a large proportion of the population is forced out of the social security system 
because their employers have no incentive to formalize their labor. When these individuals reach 
retirement age and leave the labor force, they will be left with no social or health protection, at a 
time when they will need it the most. This outcome may result in significant social tensions and 
burden future generations.  
 
                                                 
108 The European Tax Handbook (2008) of CIS countries shows that average corporate income tax (CIT) for the 
CIS is 18.1 percent (in Azerbaijan it is 22 percent, and has been legislated to drop to 20 percent  from 2010), the 
average for PIT for CIS countries is 19.25 percent ( in  Azerbaijan 14 percent and 35 percent, while the top rate has 
been legislated to drop to 30 percent from 2010), and the average VAT rate for the CIS 18.8 percent  (in Azerbaijan 
18 percent). 
 107 
 
Table 5.4: Tax Rates in the CIS Countries (%) 
Country Profits tax VAT Social security tax Personal income tax 
Armenia 20 20 AMD 7,000 + 18 Top rate 20 
Azerbaijan 22 18 25 Top rate 35 
Belarus 24 18 (RR10) 36 Top rate 30 
Georgia 20 18 0 
Combined with PIT 
Flat rate 25 
Combined PIT + SST 
Kazakhstan (2) 30 (15) 13 (12) 30 Top rate 20 
Kyrgyzstan 10 20 29 Flat rate 10 
Moldova 18 20 (RR 5 & 8) 29 Top rate 20 
Russia 24 18 (RR10) 26 Flat rate 13 
Tajikistan 25 20 26 Top rate 13 
Turkmenistan 8 & 20 20 22 Flat rate 10 
Ukraine 15 20 43 Flat rate 13 
Uzbekistan 12 20 (RR15) 25 Top rate 30 
Source: Adapted from Khadka 2008. 
Notes: “RR” = “reduced rate.” The column on total social security contributions illustrates contributions to be paid 
by both employers and employees. The percentage represents an illustrative indication. Some of the tax systems 
regard pension fund contributions as part of social tax or contribution; others do not. In addition, many countries 
employ sophisticated regressive or progressive schedules. For these cases, the top marginal rate is used in Table 2 
For Kazakhstan, proposed rates (in parentheses) are to be considered by the Parliament in September 2008. 
 
5.28. Taken together, the generally high rates and the progressivity of taxation from STR 
to “normal” regime likely contribute to most of the Azeri entrepreneurs operating entirely 
or in part in the informal economy. PIT is paid mainly by approximately 1 million employees 
in the public sector and municipalities, and by the over 60,000 local and foreign employees 
working for foreign enterprises. Most of the rest of the working population has no formal labor 
contract and thus escapes paying PIT. According to the State Social protection Fund, in 2008, 
1,828,376 contributors were paying SIT: 1,377,641 employees, 196,393 self-employed and 
294,342 farmers.  Most farmers do not pay contributions (it is estimated that agriculture employs 
about 1.6 million people). Of 74,534 enterprises, only approximately 10,000 are registered VAT 
payers. As in the case of PIT, most VAT is paid by public sector enterprises (which numbered 
11,666 in 2007) and foreign enterprises. There are very few VAT payers outside the public 
sector and foreign enterprises.109 For 2007, only 23 percent of total revenue came from what 
might generally be regarded as the private sector (non-oil and not large tax payers) (Figure 5.5). 
The rest came from AIOC profit taxes and SOCAR taxes on oil and gas profits (48 percent), the 
Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU, 18 percent), social security contributions that went into the Social 
Protection Fund (SPF, 7 percent), and other non-tax revenues (4 percent). If one excludes the 
part of the VAT that is levied at Customs, which collected 7 percent of total revenues, the 
aforementioned tax system collected 16 percent of total revenues in 2007, and at the same time 
provided significant incentives to operate in the informal sector.  
Tax Policies: Exemptions 
5.29. Although many problems associated with the VAT collection regime in Azerbaijan 
have been corrected in the recent past, problems resulting from the large number of 
                                                 
109 From interviews, it emerged that in a typical regional tax office, of the 14,600 registered taxpayers, 9,000 would 
be filing under the STR and only 857 would be VAT payers. 
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exemptions persist. The IMF estimated losses due to tax exemptions to be as high as AZM 62 
million in 2007, albeit lower than the estimated loss of AZM 209 million in 2006.110 Currently, 
firms participating in production-sharing agreements (PSAs) and joint ventures (JVs), largely in 
the hydrocarbon sector, are granted special exemptions. Their inputs have a zero-rate VAT. The 
PSA signatory companies and subcontractors of the PSAs are given certificates that permit them 
to acquire goods and services free of VAT. To purchase at zero VAT, these enterprises have to 
merely show a photocopy of their certificates to their domestic suppliers or, when importing 
goods, to the customs agents. This framework not only calls into question the integrity of the tax 
system but also makes compliance difficult to enforce. Moreover, although VAT exemptions 
have been granted to several other goods outside the hydrocarbon sector, their number has 
decreased.111 In fact, the IMF estimates that in 2007 nearly 32 percent of potential VAT was not 
collected because of the exemptions granted by legislation. 
Tax Administration 
5.30. Azerbaijan has most recently made improvements in tax administration, but the 
regulatory burden on taxpayers remains significant. Of the 181 countries listed in Doing 
Business 2009, Azerbaijan was ranked 102 globally in the ease of paying taxes category, up from 
141 in the 2008 exercise.  With the 2007/08 reforms discussed below, a hypothetical Azeri firm 
needs to make 23 payments a year (down from 38 last year), compared to 30 in Armenia and 
Georgia, and 47 for the ECA average, and 13 for the OECD average.  Azerbaijan has also 
reduced the time it takes a notional firm to pay taxes, to 376 hours in 2007/8 (down from 952 last 
year), compared to 958 for Armenia and 387 for Georgia.  For reference, the ECA average is 
267, while the OECD average is 367.  Azerbaijan’s policymakers will have to watch closely to 
ensure that changes in the regulatory system translate to a more dynamic, and more formal 
private sector.  To date, however, the character of the private sector (small and informal) is 
partially shaped by the difficulty of paying taxes through 2006/7 and the high existing tax rates. 
5.31. In the last two years, several improvements in administration appreciably reduced 
the compliance burden as well as taxpayer-tax official contact. Most notably: (i) Azerbaijan 
has introduced electronic filing  (96 percent of VAT payers and 35 percent of all taxpaying 
businesses took advantage of it in 2007); (ii) established nationwide call centres; (iii) enabled 
taxpayer account information on the Internet; (iv) reduced the number of forms approximately 
from  90 to 15, over the last several years, improving efficiency and reducing the close contact 
between taxpayers and tax officials; and (v) linked the tax database to those  of other agencies, 
namely, Treasury, Customs, commercial banks, and the Ministry of Interior. Consequently, most 
tax functions, including desk audits, have been automated.  Any mismatches in tax returns are 
generated without human intervention and sent to taxpayers within five days. Although initially 
controversial, the special deposit account for VAT seems to have been well received by the large 
taxpayers that form the backbone of the tax system. Six hundred large taxpayers are served by 
the Large Taxpayer Office, since they account for 80 percent of the total revenue collected by the 
Ministry of Taxes. 
                                                 
110 “Current and Proposed Non-Oil Tax System in Azerbaijan,” Zermeno, Mayra, IMF, 2008. 
111 At the beginning of 2008, numerous agricultural goods and fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, military equipment, as 
well as some food items were entirely exempt from VAT.   
 109 
 
5.32. Corruption is a serious issue in both tax and customs administration. The private 
sector repeatedly mentions corruption as an important hindrance to formalization of its activities. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that it is very difficult to obtain VAT refunds, even for genuine 
transactions. Interviews with the private sector suggest that the under-invoicing of imported 
goods has reduced import duties, VAT, and other taxes due at Customs. However, this practice 
has resulted in discrepancies between physical stocks available onsite—in establishments—and 
the receipts for these stocks sought by tax inspectors. Therefore, difficulty in clearing customs 
creates opportunities for both fraud and corruption by tax administrators. 
E. FOREIGN TRADE REGIME AND COMPETITION 
5.33. The existence of large discrepancies in figures between partners’ exports to 
Azerbaijan and imports received in Azerbaijan and registered at Customs indicates a 
significant number of unreported imports. Azerbaijan had a “positive mirror trade gap” in 
2006.112 In other words, the total value of all exports to Azerbaijan from its trading partners is 
much larger than the official imports of Azerbaijan. The value of unreported imports was large in 
2006 and is on the increase. In 2006, the value of all exports to Azerbaijan from its trading 
partners increased by 43 percent (in US$) over 2005, whereas the value of official U.S. dollar 
imports to Azerbaijan increased by only 23 percent. Over 2003–06, the value of official imports 
increased two-fold from $2.6 billion to $5.3 billion, whereas the value of all exports to 
Azerbaijan increased 2.2 times from $3 billion in 2003 to $6.7 billion in 2006. Increasing the 
value of mirror imports by an estimate of the cost of insurance and freight (15 percent of the 
value of mirror imports) would raise the 2006 mirror gap from $1.4 billion to $2.4 billion.  
5.34. Unreported imports are signs that competition in domestic market is distorted and 
that some firms have an unfair advantage over those that comply with foreign trade 
regulations. The presence of significant unreported imports implies that a good portion of Azeri 
imports receives differential treatment, due to either smuggling or collusion between importers 
and border authorities. However, the authorities also appear to grant additional differential 
treatment––VAT and duty exemption status––to certain importers. In 2006, the implicit duty 
collection rate, that is, the ratio of “taxes on international trade” to imports freight-on-board (fob) 
was 4 percent. However, the revenue from VAT collected on imported products amounted to 
merely 6 percent of the fob value of imports instead of close to 18 percent, that is, the VAT rate. 
Additionally, “preferential importers” do not have to incur the total transaction costs associated 
with complying with administrative regulations governing foreign trade activities. Both time and 
compliance costs in Azerbaijan are very high. Compared to a firm in Georgia, an Azeri firm must 
spend eight additional days to complete an export transaction and six additional days to complete 
an import transaction. Moreover, in Azerbaijan, these transactions cost $175 and $5 more, 
respectively, than for a firm registered in Georgia. The transactions costs are also likely affected 
by the small number of trained customs brokers and customs experts; their limited number is 
likely to cause bottlenecks in the clearance process. 
                                                 
112 The mirror trade gap is the difference between the value of exports (also referred to as mirror imports) to 
Azerbaijan, as reported by its trading partners, and the value of imports officially reported by Azerbaijan. Since 
imports include the cost of insurance and freight (cif) and exports are free on board (fob), the mirror trade gap 
should be negative. Considering the significant cost of transport to Azerbaijan, the difference should be 
approximately minus 15%, if not more. For Armenia, during 2003–06, it was approximately minus 20%. 
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5.35. Azeri exporters also are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis firms in WTO member 
countries. Conditions encountered in accessing foreign markets are not regulated by the 
multilateral trade agreements that form the basis of the WTO. They can be changed at the 
discretion of governments, since they are not constrained by WTO rules, vis-à-vis countries that 
are not members. This arbitrariness adversely affects investment in the export sector because 
potential investors cannot take current tariffs and other charges for granted. In contrast, exporters 
from WTO member countries are largely shielded from actions that violate WTO regulations. 
5.36. Azeri exporters and importers face higher transaction costs due to weaknesses in 
Azerbaijan’s “trade facilitation infrastructure”. The value of the Logistics Performance 
Indicator (LPI) includes both the perception of the extant logistics climate and objective 
measures shaping logistics friendliness for 150 countries.113 Azerbaijan’s LPI is below that of 
most other CIS economies (Table 5.5). Azerbaijan scores lower on the value of LPI than that of 
customs, not for reasons related to efficiency and effectiveness of customs, but to higher costs of 
local logistics. These include transportation, terminal handling, and warehousing; timeliness of 
shipments in reaching destinations; and direct freight costs. Azerbaijan’s score is 36 percent of 
that of the best performer, Singapore; and is on a par with Uzbekistan, slightly above the values 
of LPI for Kazakhstan (35), and significantly above Tajikistan (29). However, Azerbaijan’s LPI 
is significantly lower than those of two other land-locked economies: Kyrgyz Republic (42) and 
Armenia (40). 
5.37. In recent years the Customs department has made significant investments in 
infrastructure, facilities, and the IT system. These improvements need to translate to 
reduced clearance times in order to 
improve Azerbaijan’s international 
ranking, which is among the lowest in the 
world.  Serious commitment from Azeri 
leadership to reforming Customs’ 
regulation would significantly reduce the 
number of border clearance documents, 
move away from physical control of most 
transactions to a post-control audit system, 
use modern risk management techniques to 
control trade flows, and rely on a system-
based audit of enterprises rather than on a 
transaction-based audit. In particular, this 
would reduce the clearance time and 
compliance costs for enterprises in the low 
risk category, since these enterprises would not be controlled for every consignment passing the 
border.  They would instead go through a comprehensive audit of their accounts no more than 
once a year.  Although the single-window concept is being implemented in principle by Azeri 
Customs, several agencies control the de facto flow of goods at the borders. This considerably 
raises the cost of international trade and it is no surprise that the public attributes all delays to 
                                                 
113 LPI measures performance along the logistics supply chain within a country and has three parts: perceptions of 
the logistics environment of trading partner countries; efficiency and effectiveness of customs and other border 
procedures; and quality of transport and IT infrastructure for logistics. 
Table 5.5: Logistical Performance Indices and Customs 
Assessments of CIS Economies, 2006 
  LPI (Logistics  
Performance Indicator) 
Customs 
Ukraine  49 41 
Belarus  48 56 
Russia  43 31 
Kyrgyz Republic  42 40 
Moldova  41 38 
Armenia  40 41 
Azerbaijan  36 37 
Uzbekistan  36 31 
Kazakhstan  35 30 
Tajikistan  29 30 
Source: Derived from data available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/topics/exttransport/exttlf 
Note: No data are available for Georgia and Turkmenistan. 
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Customs.  In most modern border systems, there is only one agency at the border, usually 
Customs, with the power to control the respective concerns of the phytosanitary, veterinary, 
transport, and other government agencies.  However, in the case of Azerbaijan, these agencies 
continue to make policies in their respective areas and, where necessary, grant permits or request 
documentation.  Changing this would require the development of an integrated tariff system 
whereby, based on the consignment and documentation, a comprehensive IT system would then 
alert the appropriate official as to which documents are required and what fees are to be levied. 
F. PRO-GROWTH/DIVERSIFICATION REFORM PACKAGE 
5.38. An Integrated Reform Package should be implemented with the key objective of 
increasing employment and economic diversification through reducing the tax burden, 
eliminating distortions created by the tax regime, and liberalizing market access. 
Azerbaijan’s poor regulatory and tax regimes argue for simplification and streamlining while 
simultaneously reducing the tax burden. Liberalizing market access will increase competitive 
pressures and create new possibilities for Azeri businesses to participate in the global division of 
labor. Moreover, suggested measures to improve the business climate by reducing the transaction 
costs of doing business will increase the likelihood of a positive supply response. This report 
contends that Azerbaijan would benefit from adopting a “quick” approach to expanding the 
private sector by designing, announcing, and implementing the Integrated Reforms Package in 
the next two years. This package would consist of several medium-term measures necessary to 
achieve the key objectives. 
5.39. Azerbaijan’s tax policy strategy should examine how best to direct private 
investment to the non-oil sector and away from the shadow economy.  Due to the oil boom 
and improved revenue performance, Azerbaijan is in a good fiscal position, which gives it the 
unique opportunity to adjust its tax policy strategy.  Tax policy no longer needs to focus on 
maximizing revenue; it can now instead focus on helping formalize the shadow economy and 
encouraging voluntary compliance. Since the oil surplus is expected to peak soon, the period of 
2009–10 provides the opportunity to adjust tax policy and improve tax administration.  This 
would help Azerbaijan prepare for a broad tax base in the post-oil boom period. As part of a 
package to reduce the size of government and  public spending (by freezing spending in real 
terms, and adopting a PI approach), the government can potentially make a 3 percent reduction 
in revenues over 2009–10 (Chapter 3), depending on the course of non-oil revenues during the 
global crisis.   
5.40. Reduction of the non-oil tax burden would be consistent with relative spending 
reduction stemming from the “constant” real rule. Chapter 3 explains in greater detail the 
implications of adopting a PI approach to spending oil revenues. It suggests that if Azerbaijan 
were to abide by this rule, it would need to keep real spending constant for the foreseeable 
future. This would mean reducing spending by approximately 20 percent of non-oil GDP through 
2012 (that is the 2009–12 MTEF).  Of this 20 percent, the non-oil tax burden would be reduced 
by 8 percent of non-oil GDP. Azerbaijan would be overdrawing the OF by 15 percent of non-oil 
GDP above the PI strategy but, over time, would continue to accumulate assets. However, not 
keeping real spending constant would mean that, in the event of adverse circumstances, 
Azerbaijan would have no margin of error and would have to cut back further on expenditures or 
deplete the OF assets. 
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5.41.  The tax regime should be attractive enough for domestic investors to invest in the 
formal economy, and competitive enough intra-regionally for non-oil foreign investors to 
consider moving to Azerbaijan after the crisis, in preference to other countries in the 
region. A pro-growth tax package that helps broaden the tax base should envisage a significant 
reduction in the rates of direct taxes (CIT, PIT and SST) and very significant improvements in 
tax and customs administration, both of which are important reasons for driving much of the 
economy into the shadows. Such a strategy would greatly alleviate pressure on the tradable 
sector and enable it to pursue new categories of products, consistent with Azerbaijan’s new terms 
of trade as an oil producer. This report has prepared first round estimates of the potential impact 
of reducing CIT, PIT and SST for the purpose of illustration during the 2009-2010 period: (i) a 
replacement of the current PIT rate structure (14 percent and 35 percent) with a flat rate of 11 
percent; (ii) a gradual reduction of SST from 25 percent (22 + 3) to 20 percent (18 + 2) in the 
period 2010-2012, with an adequate arrangement to cover the potential deficit in revenues of the 
SSPF to avoid any disruption in benefit delivery; and (iii) the reduction of CIT from 22 percent 
to 18 percent by 2010. Table 5.6 shows how the proposed measures would help reduce the non-
oil tax-GDP ratio from 34.3 percent in 2008 to 30 percent in 2010. Naturally, such reductions 
would only be warranted if fiscal balance can be maintained during the global crisis period. 
Should non-oil revenues decline significantly during the crisis period, the brunt of the reduction 
in the “tax-burden” (broadly defined) will have to be carried by improvements in tax and 
customs administration. 
 
5.42.  Reduction in CIT and SST rates would be expected to reduce the tax burden of 
firms and increase their competitiveness. The reduction in CIT rate from 22 percent to 18 
percent will bring it below that of neighboring Armenia and Georgia (both 20 percent) and may 
attract non-oil foreign investment into the country. The reduction in the employer’s contribution 
Table 5.6: Estimated Effect of a Reform Package on Reducing Tax GDP Ratio: An Illustration 
Reform Package  
2009-2010 Measures 2007 2008 2009 2010 
    % of non-oil GDP 
PIT  11% flat rate in 2009 5.3% 5.5% 3.0% 3.0% 
CIT 18% rate in 2010 3.9% 4.0% 4.0% 3.3% 
VAT No change 10.6% 12.6% 12.6% 12.6% 
SST* 20% rate in 2010 4.9% 4.2% 4.0% 3.2% 
Excise No change 3.6% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 
Land tax No change 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
Property tax No change 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 
STR No change 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
Customs tariff No change 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 
Other revenues No change 2.1% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 
TOTAL   33.2% 34.3% 31.5% 30.0% 
Note (*): The policy of decreasing SST rates will need to be carefully examined and planned to ensure that 
State Social Protection Fund (SSPF) delivers pensions and other social insurance benefits in timely fashion. 
Currently, the SSPF covers about 2/3 of expenditures from SST revenues, while 1/3 is covered from the state 
budget. The decreased rate will inevitably drive the revenues down requiring higher budget transfers.  One 
potential policy option would be to keep pensions constant.  However, the pensions in Azerbaijan are low 
(about 20-25% of the average wage); extremely important for poverty reduction and an important political 
economy issue. 
Source: Bank staff estimations. 
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to SST (from 22 percent to 18 percent) would encourage private sector employers to formalize 
contracts with their employees. The proposed SST rate of 18 percent will be lower than in most 
countries in ECA region (it will still be higher than the rate in Georgia, which currently has a 
combined PIT/SST rate of 25 percent). Table 5.7 presents a simulation to show the effect of the 
proposed tax reduction on the tax burden of typical small, medium and large enterprises. 
Table 5.7: Effect of Rate Reduction on Tax Burden of Firms 
 
 
5.43. The government should not keep high tax rates with the purpose of extracting 
resources from the SOEs, but instead avail dividends on equity and interest on loans. 
Reportedly, the government is reluctant to lower tax rates out of fear of losing significant 
revenues it receives from SOEs. The consequence has been to maintain high rates for private 
firms and agents in the nonoil economy, thus castigating entry. This report recommends that 
when reducing the tax rates, the government maintain the same tax burden on SOEs, but extract 
those revenues through regulation, or through dividends.  
Table 5.8: Effect of Rate Reduction on Tax Burden of Firms 
 
5.44. The reduction in PIT and SST rates would reduce the cost of labor for firms and 
individuals, and combined with improved enforcement it is expected to encourage private 
sector employers to formalize contracts with their employees and to stop the practice of 
underreporting wages for the purpose of taxation. Ultimately, the coverage of the population by 
social insurance may improve. Table 5.7 presents a simulation to demonstrate the effect of the 
proposed tax reduction on the cost of taxes on labor. It shows that, at a salary of AZN 1,000 per 
Current rates Proposed rates 
Taxpayer characteristics 
CIT 
assuming 
20% profit 
on turnover 
SST  
assuming    
annual 
salary of 
AZN 1000 
per month 
each Total tax 
CIT 
assuming 
20% profit 
on 
turnover 
SST  w/ 
annual 
salary of 
AZN 
1000 per 
month 
each Total tax 
Small firm (turnover AZN 
200,000 with 5 employees)       8,800     13,200     22,000      7,200   10,800     18,000  
Medium firm (turnover AZN 
1 million with 50 
employees)     44,000    132,000    176,000     36,000   108,000    144,000  
Large firm (turnover AZN 
20 million with 200 
employees)    880,000    528,000   1,408,000    720,000   432,000   1,152,000  
Current rates Proposed rates 
Taxpayer characteristics 
CIT 
assuming 
20% profit 
on turnover 
SST  
assuming    
annual 
salary of 
AZN 1000 
per month 
each Total tax 
CIT 
assuming 
20% profit 
on 
turnover 
SST  w/ 
annual 
salary of 
AZN 
1000 per 
month 
each Total tax 
Small firm (turnover AZN 
200,000 with 5 employees)       8,800     13,200     22,000      7,200   10,800     18,000  
Medium firm (turnover AZN 
1 million with 50 
employees)     44,000    132,000    176,000     36,000   108,000    144,000  
Large firm (turnover AZN 
20 million with 200 
employees)    880,000    528,000   1,408,000    720,000   432,000   1,152,000 
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month, the annual reduction is AZN 940, while for a salary of AZN 10,000 per month the 
reduction is approximately AZN 9,000. At the same time, while pursuing tax rates reduction 
policies, the government should ensure that potential deficit in the SSPF revenues is covered and 
social insurance benefits delivered.   
Table 5.9: Effect of Rate Reduction on Cost of Labor Taxation Assuming Taxes are paid in Full 
Monthly 
salary 
levels 
AZN 
Annual taxes at current rates Annual taxes at proposed rates 
PIT     
AZN 
SST   
paid by 
employer  
SST   
paid by 
employee 
Total 
tax 
PIT     
AZN 
SST   
paid by 
employer 
SST   
paid by 
employee  
Total 
tax 
1,000    1,680    2,640      360    4,680    1,320     2,160      240    3,720  
2,000    3,360    5,280      720    9,360    2,640     4,320      480    7,440  
3,000    7,560    7,920     1,080  16,560    3,960     6,480      720   11,160  
5,000   15,960   13,200     1,800  30,960    6,600    10,800     1,200   18,600  
10,000   36,960   26,400     3,600   6,960   13,200    21,600     2,400   37,200  
 
5.45. Although the World Bank, the government, and the IMF will review the 
recommendations and further analysis is needed, preliminary analysis suggests that the 
recommendations might have to be adjusted upward (higher rates than in Paragraph 5.39) 
to produce the 4 percent cut in non-oil revenues sought over the next three years.   Closing 
the loopholes in the foreign trade regime, together with a uniform tariff rate of 5 percent, would 
generate extra revenue of between $233 million and $330 million in terms of 2006 imports, 
counted as either fob or cif, respectively.   The experience of countries that have cut their tax 
rates and simplified their tax codes amply demonstrates that tax revenues tend to increase and the 
tax base to widen. 
Table 5.10: Effect of Rate Reduction on Cost of Labor Taxation Assuming Taxes Are Paid in Full 
Monthly 
salary 
levels 
AZN 
Annual taxes at current rates Annual taxes at proposed rates 
PIT     
AZN 
SST   
paid by 
employer  
SST   
paid by 
employee 
Total 
tax 
PIT     
AZN 
SST   
paid by 
employer 
SST   
paid by 
employee  
Total 
tax 
1,000    1,680    2,640      360    4,680    1,320     2,160      240    3,720  
2,000    3,360    5,280      720    9,360    2,640     4,320      480    7,440  
3,000    7,560    7,920     1,080  
 
16,560    3,960     6,480      720   11,160  
5,000   15,960   13,200     1,800  
 
30,960    6,600    10,800     1,200   18,600  
10,000   36,960   26,400     3,600  
 
66,960   13,200    21,600     2,400   37,200  
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CHAPTER 6.  
AZERBAIJAN’S FINANCIAL AND BANKING SECTORS 
 
Azerbaijan’s financial sector is in the early phase of development and has played a limited role in 
intermediating financial resources and pooling risk between savers and investors.  Its  banking sector, by 
far the largest component of the financial sector, has nevertheless been growing particularly fast since 
2005, as credit has been increasing—mirroring the increases in the monetary base that have supported 
the government’s stable exchange rate policy against the US dollar.   The regulation of Azerbaijan’s 
banking sector has been improving, though it has been shielded from external competition as none of 
the large international banks are operating in Azerbaijan. This may have inadvertently helped dampen 
the impact of the global financial crisis.  Azerbaijan seems to also have largely avoided one of the pitfalls 
of natural resource economies, which borrow internationally during booms and rely on the appreciating 
local currency to ease the borrowing terms. While Azerbaijan does have some international debt, the 
amounts are still relatively small and, in the event of an adverse situation (exchange rate appreciation, 
or as has occurred, the global crisis), the external liabilities of the banking system could be covered by 
national reserves in the extreme situation.  However, given the volatile course of developments in the 
global economy today, in order to mitigate vulnerabilities that exist or may arise, high frequency 
monitoring of the banking system should be maintained.   
Azerbaijan’s challenge is, nevertheless, to develop its financial system so that it plays a more proactive 
role in channeling credit to private enterprises rather than to households.  It needs to strengthen some 
of the institutional infrastructure (credit bureau, collateral, etc.).  It must also prepare to attract more 
international banks once the global crisis subsides and once it becomes clear which banks are the 
healthiest.  The prospects for the Azeri economy are still good, and the country should be attractive to 
foreign banks.  Azerbaijan should also maintain supervision efforts on the part of its monetary 
authorities. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
6.1. Azerbaijan’s financial sector has seen large swings in foreign currency inflows in the 
past 10 years.  Chapter 1 documented the large FDI inflows that came in two cycles (late 1990s 
and mid 2000s), supporting the construction of the oil and gas installations and the BTC pipeline.  
These cycles were associated with conservative fiscal policies, large oil sector imports and low 
inflation.  In 2006–08, the increase in public spending, coupled with a stable exchange rate 
policy, discussed in Chapter 1, brought large swings in foreign currency inflows.  These inflows 
were accompanied by much smaller inflows by commercial banks and the private sector. The 
challenge then—at the macro level—had been to: (i) avoid excessive foreign borrowing by 
commercial banks and avoid the creation of contingent liabilities by SOEs; (ii) mitigate the 
possibly destabilizing impact of inflows on inflation, by encouraging a more flexible exchange 
rate; and (iii) improve institutional factors to ensure that credit to the private enterprise sector 
increased.  The government took many important measures to strengthen macroeconomic 
stability before September 2008.  Most notably, these included reduction of the discount rate, 
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increase of reserve requirements, the introduction of additional reserve requirements on foreign 
borrowings, and strengthened supervisory efforts. 
6.2. In October 2008, the world changed, and the implications for the short-term future 
of global finance are still being worked out.  With the global financial crisis materializing in 
October 2008 and global credit markets drying up, the world found itself in turmoil.  Short-term 
implications are that otherwise creditworthy countries no longer have access to credit.  For 
Azerbaijan, this means that the risks for some individual banks identified in 2008 as this chapter 
was prepared may well materialize. It may also mean that roll-over of short-term debt may not be 
feasible.  A third implication may be that the real appreciation pressure on the exchange rate may 
subside, if the government curtails spending (as is recommended in Chapter 3) or the 
appreciation of the currencies of the trading partners subside.  But Azerbaijan—to date—seems 
to have been relatively isolated from the international financial system and did not suffer very 
significantly in the early part of the crisis, as have the U.S. or Europe. However, given the 
volatile course of developments, in the global economy the aforementioned risks need to be 
monitored vigilantly. 
6.3. This chapter suggests that the best policy for Azerbaijan in the uncertain global 
environment is prudence for the short term, and deepening of structural reforms for the 
medium to long term.  This chapter reviews recent financial sector developments to establish a 
context for the future reforms.  It reviews the level of financial intermediation, the behavior of 
the banking sector, government polices to increase access to credit, and risks to the banking 
system before the global crisis.  The global crisis may turn some of these risks into reality.  
However, the crisis does not alter the institutional challenges faced in financial intermediation in 
Azerbaijan before the crisis; it will alter how Azerbaijan addresses the challenges. 
B. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
6.4. Azerbaijan’s financial sector plays a limited role in intermediating resources, 
pooling risks and diversifying the economy... In 2008, gross domestic savings were 65 percent 
of GDP, among the highest, regionally and internationally.  However, Azerbaijan’s financial 
depth was still relatively low (Table 6.1 compares financial intermediation in Azerbaijan and 
other economies in the region, several of which are resource rich). Credit expanded rapidly from 
2005 to 2008, due to a combination of monetary, exchange rate, and fiscal policies (see Chapter 
1 and below). In June 2008, the ratio of total lending to GDP was approximately 17 percent, 
while the ratio of total lending to non-oil GDP was 50.2 percent; in comparison, the lending to 
GDP was about 50 percent for EU-accession countries. This is especially low given that banks 
are by far the most important financial intermediaries in Azerbaijan.  
6.5. ...even though the regulation of the sector has improved.  Azerbaijan’s financial sector 
was the first to adopt International Financial Reporting Standards.  It has also been the first to 
strengthen the corporate governance of its banking sector, based on extensive collaboration with 
IFC, EBRD, and other development partners. The National Bank of Azerbaijan has developed 
key legislation to improve the legal and regulatory framework in the sector and to bring it closer 
to international standards, and to strengthen its capacity as a regulator 
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6.6. However, in recent years, financial depth in Azerbaijan has increased very rapidly. 
Under those circumstances, international experience indicates that, in a slowdown, the 
quality of banks’ loan portfolio may well deteriorate rapidly. In this regard, the introduction 
of dynamic provisioning might be appropriate and prudent. From 2005 to 2008, money and 
domestic credit grew almost 360 percent in nominal terms and have doubled as a ratio of non-oil 
GDP.  This increased money supply reflects the oil revenue financing of the non-oil deficit.  Due 
to the limited flexibility of its exchange rate regime (especially through March 2008), the 
National Bank of Azerbaijan (NBA) has responded passively to foreign exchange (FX) 
movements.  Consequently, the monetary base has mirrored changes in these FX inflows (Figure 
6.1).  
Table 6.1: Financial Intermediation, 2008 (% of 
GDP) 
Figure 6.1: Monetary Base and Net International 
Reserves (Rate of Change) , 2003-08 
Source: World Bank database. 
Notes ** 2006 Assets/GDP, Source: Moody’s Global Banking.
Source: NBA.
Market Participants 
6.7. Azerbaijan has a growing banking sector relative to its loan portfolio. While still 
concentrated, the sector has opened up in recent years. As of end 2008, 46 banks have been 
operating in the market, indicating the end of the restructuring period that started in the mid- 
1990s.114 In 2006 and 2007, the number of branches increased sharply, mirroring the system’s 
growth. Azerbaijan’s two largest banks—the International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA) and Kapital 
Bank—hold a dominant share of banking system assets. While the IBA is a state bank, the 
Kapital Bank was privatized in 2008.  From 2004 through 2008, the loan portfolio of state banks 
grew almost 50 percent faster than that of private banks: 776.9 percent versus 568.3 percent. For 
the banking system, the loan to deposit ratio reached 173 at end 2008. 
6.8. However, the banking system remains highly concentrated.  As of the end of 2008, 83 
percent of total bank assets were concentrated in Azerbaijan’s five largest banks.   At end 2008, 
42.5 percent of banking system assets were held by the state-owned bank, IBA. Of the remaining 
45 banks, the top 9 banks by assets held about 35 per cent of total banking system assets with the 
share of each individual bank being 6 percent or less. The number of banks with foreign capital 
increased and is now 23 from 15 at end 2004, with seven banks having majority foreign 
                                                 
114 From end 1996 – end 2004, 97 banking licenses were cancelled, and only 5 were granted. 
Financial 
Depth, 
Banking 
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Domestic 
Credit by
GDS M2/GDP Penetration*  Banking Sect.
Azerbaijan 65 19 27 17
Estonia n.a. 50 n.a. 99
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ownership. However, only one such bank is controlled by a prominent western bank, UniCredit 
of Italy.115  
6.9. The number of other financial institutions has also increased significantly, but their 
contribution to the sector remains small. The number of non-bank financial institutions has 
nearly doubled—from 47 in 2002 to 94 in 2008.  In 2007, leasing comprised 4 percent of total 
bank loan financing; non-bank financial institutions, approximately 2.7 percent; and micro 
financing loans, approximately 2.8 percent.  Since 1999, a number of government financial 
institutions have been created to help channel oil money to the non-oil private sector. Box 6.1 
presents evidence from the benefits of greater competition in the banking sector.   
6.10. Micro financing is rapidly expanding through the Micro Finance Bank of 
Azerbaijan. This institution has a number of international donors as its shareholders, including 
the EBRD, IFC, and the German Government Development Bank. From December 2005 to 
November 2007, the Micro Finance Bank’s loan portfolio increased by 515 percent and its 
number of outstanding loans by 653 percent. In 2007, the bank issued 60,000 loans, averaging 
less than $3,000 (totaling $170 million).  
Box 6.1: The Impact of Competition  in the Banking Sector 
Bank finance is the main source of financing for firms across the globe.  High transaction costs for banking 
services are often banks’ rational reactions to the level of competition they face.  Banks that are open to foreign 
competition are forced to adopt the latest technologies and lower transactions costs.  Cross-country evidence in 
Beck, et al (2004)116 shows that bank development disproportionately boosts the income of the poor as income 
inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) falls faster in countries with superior banking sectors, as resources 
are allocated more efficiently.  Beck, et al, (2007)117 look at a sample of 209 banks in 62 countries.  They note that 
private credit in Switzerland exceeds 150 percent of GDP and there are no fees for SME loans, which on average 
gets processed in 1.6 days. This compares with the entire sample where the average fee for a SME loan of 3.5 
percent of the country’s per capita GDP and it takes 10.7 days on average to process.  Pasadilla and Milo118 (2005) 
found that after the Philippines eased entry restrictions into banking, the number of new banks jumped over 50 
percent from 1990 to 1995.  Therefore, from 1995 to 2003 the spread of Bank lending rates over deposit rates were 
cut by almost half. 
 
6.11. Azerbaijan’s formal capital market is very shallow. Approximately 90 percent of 
securities transactions take place over the counter (OTC) and are not disseminated as market 
information.  This has led to poor price discovery and market transparency. In 2007, annual 
equity turnover on the organized exchange was about 1 percent of GDP, and in 2008 that ratio 
dropped to about half.  Approximately 90 percent of the primary and secondary turnover on the 
organized exchange is in short-term government debt instruments (T-bills and NBA notes). The 
remaining 10 percent is highly dominated by banks. Nearly 50 companies’ shares are admitted 
for trading but, importantly, are not listed on the organized exchange. Corporate bond issuance 
has increased rapidly from a very low base over the last two years, but maturities do not exceed 
                                                 
115 In fact, at the drafting of the report, Yapi Kredi Azerbaijan, Microfinance Bank and Nikoil Bank were operating 
in Azerbaijan with 100 percent foreign capital, Pakistan Milli Bank and Iran Milli Bank had branches, and 18 banks 
had some foreign capital. 
116 “Finance, Inequality and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence,” Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3338, June 2004. 
117 “Banking Services for Everyone?  Barriers to Bank Access and Use Around the World,” Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Martinez Peria, World Bank, February 2007. 
118 “Effect of Liberalization on Banking Competition,” Pasadilla and Milo, World Bank (2005) 
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15 months.  The problems faced by the Azeri capital markets are discussed further in Box 6.2 
below. 
Interest Rates and Maturity  
6.12. Because of a high rate of savings, one would expect real interest rates to be relatively 
low. Also, a contributing factor to low (ex-post) real interest rates should have been the 
high rate of inflation and international arbitrage. However, because of extremely high-
income growth, demand for resources was very high and, during 2006, real lending interest rates 
were as high as 12 percent, compared to the CIS average of 4.7 percent.  Nonetheless, inflation 
jumped from 8.4 percent in 2006 to nearly 20 percent, year over year, from June 2007 to June 
2008.  At the same time, the reported, or nominal lending rate, changed very little, from 18 
percent in 2006 to 20 percent in June 2008.  This implied a real interest rate of close to zero 
percent.119  The lending interest rate is evidently being restrained by increasing international 
arbitrage. Encouraged by expectations of appreciating local currency prior to the global crisis, 
arbitragers could take out single-digit, foreign-currency-denominated loans and lend them at a 
rate of 20 percent domestically.  
6.13. The trends in the lending rates in Azerbaijan through mid-2007 suggest that 
banking sector competition was limited, although some progress toward competition was 
being made given the gradually shrinking spreads and the increased proliferation of 
banking products. However, the subsequent developments toward de-dollarization from 
mid-2007 till the crisis, and toward dollarization during the crisis, have come with 
increasing spreads.   Azerbaijan’s deposit rates increased significantly since 2005; the decline 
in the spreads (lending rate minus deposit rate) for both domestic and foreign currencies through 
end-2006 or early 2007 was very encouraging.  While under strictly limited competition rising 
deposit rates would have been expected to push lending rates up, the observed decline in the 
spreads through mid-2007 (see charts below) suggests that monopolistic profits began to 
gradually diminish during the period.120 However, since end-2007, the financial crisis seems to 
have disrupted the rules of the game, as interest rates began to show significant changes. The 
local banking customers, slowly but steadily, switched to foreign currency deposits away from 
manat-denominated deposits, and to avoid currency mismatch some banks pressured their clients 
to switch their loans from  Azeri manats to US dollars. Consequently, the average borrowing and 
lending rates in dollar-denominated currencies fell and the opposite was experienced in manat-
denominated operations. The crisis probably disrupted any “follow the leader” rule or other non-
competitive arrangement regarding interest rates, and we do no longer observe flat lending rates. 
The spread in foreign currencies shows typical volatility of the drastic changes involving the 
crisis, and no trend can be ascertained yet. The spread on local currency deposits edged upwards 
as banks increased borrowing rates to discourage clients to borrow in domestic currency.   
  
                                                 
119 This compares with real lending rates in June 2008 of 3 percent in Armenia, 18 percent in Georgia, and minus 4 
percent in Russia. 
120 The argument for more competition is supported by studies carried out by Freixas and Rochet, based on the 
Monti-Klein model of a monopolistic bank (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). 
 120 
 
Figure 6.2: Average Interest Rates: Domestic 
Currency, 2005–2008  
Figure 6.3: Average Interest Rates: Foreign 
Currency, 2005–2008 
 
6.14. The global financial crisis should not deter Azerbaijan from continuing to seek 
prominent international banks to increase competition and innovation in the banking 
sector.  Prior to the global crisis, it was expected that one or more of the large international 
banks would enter the Azeri market in the coming year. Their presence would boost competition, 
increase innovation and decrease borrowing costs in the financial sector.  However, as discussed 
below, in the midst of the global crisis, large foreign financial institutions are making recent 
inroads into Kazakhstan and Vietnam—they should be invited to come to Azerbaijan as well.121 
C. ACCESS TO COMMERCIAL BANK FINANCING 
6.15. Azerbaijan’s very significant credit increase has primarily benefited households, but 
has had limited impact on the trade and service sectors. Credit in Azerbaijan nearly tripled 
from 2005 to 2008.  In Q3 2008 approximately 36 percent of total credit went to households, 23 
percent to trade and services, and much smaller proportions to agriculture (4 percent) and 
industry/manufacturing (6 percent).  
6.16. The increased proportion of longer-term loans can be attributed to increased loans 
to households (Table 6.2).  At the same time, the ratio of short-term credit to total credit 
dropped from 73 percent in 2001 to 31 percent in September 2008.  This ratio declined even 
faster for credit in domestic currency in the same period, from 95 percent to 39 percent.  
 
6.17. Agriculture and agri-processing have encountered problems in accessing credit. 
Agriculture and agri-processing have faced the most difficulties in accessing credit. From 2005 
to 2008, total sector credit increased nearly 168 percent, while credit to A&P grew only 90 
percent. Relative to non-oil GDP, total credit grew from 20 percent in 2005 to an estimated 42 
percent by the first half of 2008. During the same period, agriculture and agri-processing were 
granted credit in the equivalent of a low 1.1 percent of non-oil GDP in 2005, and approximately 
                                                 
121 To date, CitiBank, CommerzBank, and Société Générale have representative offices in Azerbijan, although 
branch offices or subsidiaries remain to be established. 
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1.7 percent by the first half of 2008. Considering the low base and the tremendous growth in 
total credit, the increment in credit to agriculture and agri-processing has been very small. 
Table 6.2: Credit by Sector (AZN mil., end of period)  
  2003 2007 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
%Δ Composite prop. 
 03-08 ’03         ’08Q3 
Total 670 3757 7163 969 100 100 
Households 143 1376 2335 1533 21 33 
Trade & services 113 989 1911 1591 17 27 
Constr. & real estate  30 255 461 1438 4 6 
Industry & mfg. 44 270 428 872 7 6 
Transport & comm. 57 278 669 1074 9 9 
Power, chem.  39 179 856 2095 6 12 
Agri. & processing 30 163 262 773 4 4 
Claims on banks 47 95 95 102 7 1 
Cr. to fin. sector 21 83 181 762 3 3 
Cr. to other sectors 111 47 16 .. 17 0 
Cr. to gen. gov.  35 44 .. .. 5 .. 
Cr. to pub. orgs. 0 3 .. .. 0 0 
Source: Central Bank of Azerbaijan 
 
6.18. At the same time, smaller MSMEs also have had difficulty in accessing credit.  A 
survey of 1,800 MSMEs in January 2008 found that approximately 20 percent of them had 
applied for credit and half of their applications had been rejected. The main reason cited (nearly 
60 percent) for rejection was lack of collateral.  In the survey sample, only 10 percent of the 
MSMEs were in agriculture and 5 percent in agri-processing. 
6.19. Today, in Azerbaijan, access to credit 
is more likely to be limited by the legal 
infrastructure and the credit culture of the 
economy than by the availability of credit. 
Financial institutions provide financing based 
on information about the borrower, and the 
availability of collateral.  Collectively, data on 
credit information from surveys and field visits 
suggest that the most important factors 
constraining access to credit are the lack of 
necessary credit information and the weak 
enforcement of property rights.  Reducing the 
cost to creditors of getting borrower 
information and reducing the time and 
recovery costs to execute on collateral would substantially enhance credit access, for both the 
agricultural and MSME sectors.   
6.20.  Azerbaijan’s access to credit ranking improved significantly in the Doing Business 
2009.   Its ranking in Doing Business 2009 is 12 out of 181 countries in. The credit ranking 
surpasses the overall ranking of 33 in the overall Ease of Doing Business for Azerbaijan.  Doing 
Business’s access to credit indicator, actually called Getting Credit, is based on the coverage of 
Figure 6.4: Credit Granted for Agriculture and 
Processing, 2000–08 
Source: NBA 
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public and/or private credit registries and the strength of legal rights of borrowers and lenders. It 
is not a measure of the relative or absolute volume of credit that goes to any part of or-- the entire 
private sector.  Azerbaijan ranks in the top 20 percent of the ECA countries on the strength of 
legal rights. The country’s public registry covers 3.1 percent of the adult population; no private 
registry exists in the country. Armenia has a public registry covering 2.6 percent and a private 
one covering 24.4 percent of the adult population.  Kazakhstan’s private registry covers 25.6 
percent of adults while Turkey’s covers 26.3 percent, and Russia’s 10 percent, and Georgia’s 4.5 
percent. 
6.21. Azerbaijan can improve access to credit for the private sector.  In order to improve 
access to credit by increasing the availability of information to creditors, Azerbaijan may wish to 
extend the coverage of the public registry to both small borrowers and firms, and broaden the 
scope of the registry to distribute credit information from retailers, trade creditors, or utility 
companies as well as financial institutions. To strengthen the accessibility of collateral, 
Azerbaijan may wish to: (i) amend legislation to enable all citizens to be party to collateral 
agreements; (ii) create a unified registry for all security rights in movable and immovable 
properties; (iii) amend legislation to enable parties to have recourse to out-of-court enforcement 
without restrictions; and (iv) reduce the costs of enforcing financial contracts, including seizure 
of collateral. 
• Azerbaijan may also wish to further the development of leasing and introduce 
legislation on warrants.  Both instruments “transform” illiquid collateral into a 
liquid financial instrument that is easy to recover in the event of default by the lessee 
or borrower.  Leasing has been developing; total assets are less than $150 million (4 
percent of the banks’ loan portfolio).  Legislation on financial trusts could make the 
financing of leasing companies much more effective and accessible. We understand 
that a draft of such legislation has already been presented under the aegis of technical 
assistance from the IFC.  Under this framework, leasing companies will be able to 
securitize the portfolio of credits by transferring them to a financial trust, providing 
liquidity to the leasing companies to initiate the next round. 
• Similarly, introducing legislation on warrants122 could help small firms, especially 
from the agricultural sector, finance their crops by pledging (in a warrant house) their 
products. The warrant house issues a warrant certificate that can be discounted in any 
financial institution. 
D. EQUITY FINANCING 
6.22. Capital markets, once developed, can mitigate credit, foreign exchange and rollover 
risks by enabling firms to issue debt or equity, minimizing their reliance on bank 
borrowings.  However, Azerbaijan must consolidate certain fundamentals of equity financing to 
make it viable.123  Enterprises do not currently turn to the equity market for financing because 
barriers remain high.  The tax structure provides incentive for enterprises to engage in shadow 
                                                 
122 A loan secured with goods stored in a bonded warehouse. 
123 The Azerbaijan Investment Corporation, set up by the government in 2006 to provide equity financing to 
strategic enterprises, is discussed in the next section. 
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activities, as well as rent-seeking opportunities by some government agencies. This is a 
disincentive for formalization and transparency, as shown by the IFC 2008 SME Survey.124  
However, to make equity financing a reality, Azerbaijan can move on reform in three areas. 
6.23. First, technical improvements in the operation of the equity market. The Azeri equity 
market is still awaiting its first listing on the Baku Stock Exchange; moreover, there is no liquid 
secondary market.  It will be essential to: (i) establish a balanced set of listing requirements, thus 
better ensuring transparency, accountability, and governance practices for listed companies; (ii) 
establish a relevant segmentation of the equity market; (iii) promote independent initial public 
offerings (IPOs); and (iv) build new investor groups with a longer-term (passive) portfolio 
approach rather than seeking control.125    
6.24. Second, strengthening minority shareholder rights protection.  Portfolio equity 
trading is virtually non-existent, a fact that indicates poor protection of minority shareholder 
rights as well as embedded asymmetries of information. This calls for the robust regulation of the 
related-party transactions that currently could allow siphoning resources off of the public 
enterprise into a closely held one, leaving minority shareholders vulnerable to potential abuse.  
Box 6.2: The Development of  Bond and Equity Markets 
A seminal work on the relationship between economic growth and financial market development (Gurley and 
Shaw, 1967) describes financial innovation as a dynamic process that both influences and is influenced by the 
development of the real sector.  As the economy grows, specialized lending institutions, such as banks, emerge 
and help finance additional capital investment.  With further increases in per capita income and wealth, markets 
for tradable securities, first debt and then equity, emerge and complement bank lending.  This issue is further 
examined theoretically by Greenwood and Smith (1995) and Boyd and Smith (1996), and they have similar 
findings. 
Azerbaijan’s bond and equity markets are currently illiquid and small.  There are several coordination 
problems that hinder the development of bond and equity markets.  These problems arise from shortcomings in 
markets for information and in markets for sharing risk. Both types of problems exist in all economies, but the 
problems and the consequences tend to be worse in developing/transition economies.  (See Stiglitz (1993) for a 
more detailed analysis of the various market failures inherent in the financial markets of all economies, and why 
these problems are likely to be more pronounced in developing/transition countries). 
Azerbaijan’s poor accounting standards and lack of merchant banks and other institutions to monitor corporate 
performances have resulted in both bond and equity markets being almost entirely absent.  Moreover, the 
transformations inherent in transition, such as the creation of new firms and new industries, and the absorption of 
new technologies heighten insecurities among potential investors.  Finally, Azerbaijan does not have a large 
number of personnel with experience and training in evaluating corporate debt and equity.  With time, market 
participants will gain experience and learn to price equity more effectively.  It is likely that, as noted above, 
economic growth will lead to capital market development, which, in turn, will further stimulate economic 
growth. 
 
6.25. Third, adoption of international accounting standards. Adopting international 
accounting standards is another essential step. In turn, this action would require the development 
of a corps of well-trained accountants and relevant educational programs.  
                                                 
124 See for instance the 2005 EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. 
125 World Bank, Azerbaijan - Financial Services Modernization Project, 2008.  
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E. GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
6.26. The traditional role of government in the development and regulation of financial 
markets for developed as well as developing countries may seem to have been overturned in 
the last few months of 2008, but it is important to keep the context in mind. October 2008 
saw unprecedented government efforts to save the global financial system by, first and foremost, 
seeking to strengthen the banking sector in many countries.  However, these efforts are evolving 
at the time of writing of this report.  These actions by world governments should, however, be 
interpreted as unique solutions taking place in unprecedented circumstances.  Economic 
historians will determine if the cause of the global crisis was lack of regulation or too much 
government involvement in economic activity, which created a self-fulfilling expectation (and 
moral hazard) that if large sectors of the economy, including banks or other financial 
intermediaries failed, then governments would step in. 
6.27. Direct government involvement in finance, through government financial 
institutions, is often attractive and feasible in resource-rich countries—but poses many 
risks.  Developing countries in general—and cash-abundant, resource-rich countries in particular 
—often try to leapfrog the time-consuming development of the legislation and institutions to 
enable the growth of banking and securities markets. They are also often keen to boost 
production in specific industries or specific parts of the country to ensure employment 
generation.  Most of these institutions, particularly development banks, failed in the 1970s and 
1980s because they could not break away from their political and financial ties to governments.  
Either below-market interest rates created shortages in funds, and political links were needed to 
access credit, and/or these institutions funded poorly managed businesses and collapsed under 
the pressure of non-performing loans (NPLs).  Some government-backed financial institutions, 
such as the Dutch agricultural bank or the BNDESAR equity fund in Brazil, were successful 
because these countries chose a corporate governance framework that enabled the institutions to 
work on market principles (i.e., like private institutions).  
6.28. For Azerbaijan, while international lessons are relevant, there is an important 
macroeconomic dimension that was particularly relevant before the global crisis.  Like 
many developing countries, Azerbaijan has had difficulties with inefficient, state-run financial 
institutions (State Savings Bank, AGROPROM, and PROMINVEST).  These lessons, together 
with lessons from international practices, provide Azeri policymakers with guidance on where 
the pitfalls of government financial institutions lie. But Azerbaijan’s policymakers should also 
review the macroeconomic framework when considering the role of public financial institutions.   
Its fiscal and monetary policies placed heavy pressure on the private sector for two reasons: (i) 
the non-oil deficit requires large inflows of foreign exchange; and (ii) the undervalued nominal 
exchange rate encourages private capital inflows.  Any policy to broaden the government’s role 
in increasing access to credit by injecting oil revenues in U.S. dollars into the domestic economy 
needs to be weighed against the downside risks of further increasing appreciation pressures. 
6.29. Azerbaijan recently created three state financial institutions. The Azerbaijan 
Investment Company (AIC), with announced capital of AZN 90 million, was established in 2006.  
AIC takes equity stakes (of at least $1,000,000) in well-established companies and provides 
venture capital. The AIC’s strategy has been to provide equity support for approximately five 
years and then exit according to a previously planned strategy. Since it started operating, it has 
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invested AZN 55 million in different projects, which have led to domestic and foreign 
investment of AZN 600 million.  On November 6, 2008, AIC announced that it would be 
expanding its activity and is currently considering a package of new investments totaling AZN 
64 million.  This, in turn, is expected to result in additional domestic and external investment of 
AZN 697 million.  The National Entrepreneurship Fund (NEF) provides highly subsidized loans 
(of up to $3.2 million) to SMEs. The Mortgage Fund has two groups of borrowers, both 
receiving highly subsidized loans.  These funds deserve special attention as they issue debt at 
below market rates and are non-sustainable.  Since they are using oil resources, they add to fiscal 
expenditure and also create microeconomic distortions in the financial sector.  The IMF 
guidelines regarding Sovereign Funds could be a reference for these institutions regarding 
disclosure and other governance issues.   
6.30. The AIC requires an adequate rate 
of return and minimum standards of 
corporate governance and accounting 
practices. During the investment period, the 
fund’s purpose is to support progress in 
accounting to attain internationally accepted 
practices, improve corporate governance, and 
enhance transparency. While it is not clear 
how these objectives may be achieved by the 
AIC, all of these steps are in the context of 
preparing the company for an eventual IPO or 
direct divestiture after a period of maturity.  
6.31. The Mortgage Fund has two groups of borrowers, both receiving loans at highly 
subsidized interest rates. The government’s desire to subsidize housing loans for specific 
groups would be more transparent and less distortionary if the government refrains from 
regulating  the interest rate and instead provide an initial, or one-time, explicit subsidy on the 
capital.126 Because the fund does not address the root causes of lack of term financing in the 
housing market, the fund will not likely result in the development of longer-term financing or the 
housing market.  Moreover, as do most subsidization schemes, the fund raises serious concerns 
regarding its opacity and incentives for corruption.  
6.32. The Mortgage Fund and the NEF have certain common features and yield similar 
consequences: (i) substantial subsidy is granted by negative interest rates; (ii) size of subsidy is 
uncertain because it depends on the inflation rate; (iii) interest rate subsidization distorts resource 
allocation; (iv) favored individuals/enterprises are chosen/short-listed by the government; (v) 
subsidies give incentives for opaque practices; and (vi) real estate finance will not develop, as a 
consequence of the Mortgage Fund. To expand and make sustainable such longer-term financing, 
institutional reforms and macro-economic stability are needed.  
                                                 
126 The American Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, requiring all Banks to provide loans to low-income 
borrowers, is thought to have contributed to the explosion of high-risk credit in the last 10 years, which, in turn, led 
to the current global credit crisis. 
Table 6.3: State Financial Institutions in Azerbaijan 
State financial 
institutions 
Target Assets (mil. 
AZN), Sept. 
2007 
Mortgage Fund Housing 45
Azerbaijan Investment 
Company 
Equity support 100
National 
Entrepreneurship Fund 
SME financing 280
Source: Bank staff.  
Source: Bank staff.  
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6.33.  Azerbaijan’s efforts to increase access to credit with government-supported 
institutions should rely on enhanced governance systems... Azerbaijan’s three special funds 
try to facilitate market development and expand access to credit. While the IMF has published 
guidelines for the governance of sovereign funds, international experience suggests that such 
funds are often vulnerable to political pressure.  If Azeri policymakers feel the need to maintain 
the three funds, inter alia, they should build up the governance and financial reporting of the 
funds as the first priority and consider subsidizing capital rather than interest rates.  
6.34. ...and should not undermine or kill the efforts to bring in international banks.  
Nevertheless, government efforts to improve access to finance are most likely to pay off by 
attracting foreign banks to open local branches, strengthening the institutional framework for 
micro-finance, leasing and warrants, and putting in place the institutional infrastructure for the 
development of equity markets.  Even during a time of global crisis, developing countries are 
attracting foreign banks, as can be seen recently in Vietnam127 and neighboring Kazakhstan,128 
where private credit flows into developing/transition economies have not entirely dried up.  Both 
of these countries have enabling environments and prospects that make them attractive 
destinations for private capital.  Azerbaijan can replicate those experiences. 
F. RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
6.35. Azerbaijan reported substantial improvement in Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) 
through September 2008 –but caution is warranted.  The banks’ asset quality is likely to 
deteriorate sharply amid a slowing economy and significant amount of recent loans in the 
portfolio.  In September 2008, NPLs were 2.2 percent, less than one-tenth of their levels in 2001 
(29 percent).  Despite this dramatic improvement through that time, the ratio of NPLs to total 
loans remains high by international standards. In addition, it is probable that the observed 
improvement of the quality of the credit portfolio is partly due to the recent rapid growth of 
credit.  A the drafting of the report, the level of provisioning in the banking sector (on average 
more than 100 percent of NPLs) has seemed adequate; 16 banks with a ratio of Specific 
Provisions/NPL less than 100 percent but no banks with a ratio for Provisions/NPL less than 100 
percent.129  
6.36. Although the composition of assets and liabilities of the financial sector does not 
suggest the existence of currency mismatches indirect credit risks are significantly 
increased due to higher foreign currency lending in 2008.  The proportion of banks’ 
outstanding lending in U.S. dollars increased to 49 per cent at end 2008, after declining sharply 
from 2004 to 2007, from 64 percent to 44 percent.   
                                                 
127 Foreign investors responded to declining real estate prices in Vietnam by increasing their investments.  On 
November 4, VinaCapital announced the creation of a new fund of US$400 million to invest in real estate.  
Additional real estate investments in Vietnam were announced in November by Aseana Properties and Prudential 
Insurance. 
128 In September 2008, both Raiffeisen International and Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi announced that they would be 
opening offices in Almaty, in 2009, for corporate lending.  Alnair Capital also bought a stake in a local bank, 
Kazkommertsbank, while HSBC announced the opening of another new office in Astana. 
129 Specific provisions are the provisions created for the possible losses of the non-standard banking assets. Banking 
assets are divided into two categories: standard and non-standard. Standard assets are satisfactory assets and assets 
under watch. Non-standard assets are non-satisfactory assets, doubtful assets and bad assets. 
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6.37. The banking system became more long-term oriented through 2008. The ratio of 
short-term credit to total credit declined from 73 percent in 2001 to 39 percent in September 
2007, and further to 32 percent in December2008.  This trend is even stronger for domestic 
currency, for which this ratio declined from 95 percent to 36.9 percent in December 2008.  
Developments during the crisis could halt this healthy trend.  
6.38. The overall banking sector indicators show strong performance, however 
profitability could come under pressure as access to external funding sources is drying up.  
In the first nine months of 2008, the average return on assets was 2.2 percent.  This is slightly 
lower than in 2007, when it was 2.4 percent, but was more than double the international 
standards.  In addition, in the first nine months of 2008, return on equity was 18.7 percent, much 
higher than in 2007 (14.3 percent).  Banks are indirectly benefiting from the implicit inflation tax 
on sight deposits, since they pay no interest. This situation generates extraordinary profitability, 
close to 13 percent of total equity.  However, in light of the current global credit crisis, this is 
unlikely to last, as credit becomes scarcer and more expensive to borrow from abroad. 
6.39. The main sources of vulnerability are lending to related parties, the dominance of 
the state-owned bank in the market, external borrowings and the low supply of human 
capital for risk assessment.  Lending to related parties is the banking system’s main cause of 
concern, and as such it is recommended that the NBA put special emphasis on this matter. In 
addition, 13.7 per cent of all loans are to state owned enterprises and are primarily concentrated 
in the portfolio of IBA.   Moreover, there is considerable merit in Moody’s observation on July 
9, 2008 that high concentrations on both sides of bank balance sheets have raised the risk of large 
losses as well as liquidity strain, if adverse scenarios were to arise.  Similarly, in one of 
Azerbaijan’s largest banks, loans to related parties were nearly 43 percent of bank capital, while 
deposits from shareholders and key management represented nearly 18 percent of the bank’s 
liabilities. This issue was flagged by the bank’s international auditors. The dominance of the 
state-owned bank has the potential to de-stabilize the banking system and the economy in the 
event of any worsening of credit and liquidity conditions. Furthermore, as in many emerging 
markets, external borrowings have grown sharply amongst Azeri banks; they are estimated at 
about $3 billion as of late 2008.  And whilst most borrowings are concentrated in a few banks, in 
the current global financial environment, the respective banks and the NBA alike have to ensure 
that adequate resources are available to fund such commitments and mitigate rollover risks.  
Systemic and Idiosyncratic Risk 
6.40. Azerbaijan’s systemic risk potential is low. Given the low level of the multipliers, high 
level of foreign exchange reserves, and comfortable fiscal position in the first part of 2008, the 
probability of systemic risk in Azerbaijan was relatively low for most of 2008. NBA’s foreign 
exchange holdings are nearly six times higher than deposits denominated in U.S. dollars and 
almost three times the monetary base. However, with the aforementioned collapse of world 
prices, along with the increased cost of capital due to the global credit crisis, there is no room for 
complacency going forward.  
6.41. Nevertheless, individual banks may face dire problems if the economy worsens.  As 
long as the economy continues growing at a very high rate, most loans are likely to continue to 
perform. However, it is quite likely that banks have not exercised adequate due diligence about 
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the creditworthiness, in an environment of staggering credit growth and limited human resources 
being devoted to risk management. Also, a number of banks are less well placed to deal with the 
negative external and domestic developments. The second largest bank was rated B1 by Moody’s 
in July 2008, which implies a probability of default close to 13 percent. It is estimated that the 
remaining banks could have ratings not higher than B1; consequently, the overall minimum 
expected probability of default could be close to 13 percent.130  
6.42. In both cases, idiosyncratic risk could be as high as 20 percent of total deposits, 
equivalent to 10 percent of international reserves. To sum up, it is quite clear that although 
the idiosyncratic risk could be as high as 20 percent, the systemic risk is extremely low, given 
the magnitude of NBA’s international reserves. This low systemic risk implies that any possible 
crisis could be successfully managed, but it does not deny that it could arise. Nonetheless, bank 
supervision and resolution should be strengthened regardless of the low systemic risk.  
                                                 
130 Differing views prevail on this type of analysis; while the analysis argues that –in the absence of system-wide 
information-- an estimate of the minimum default probability of the banking sector can be obtained by looking at a 
systemically important and better run bank, others argue that the default probability should be based on the 
sovereign rankling of the country.  
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CHAPTER 7.  
ENSURING A QUALIFIED LABOR FORCE AND BETTER USE 
OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
Although Azerbaijan became independent in 1991 with a well-developed educational system, its 
education system failed to subsequently meet the needs of the changing Azeri economy.  This is 
particularly true of tertiary education, due primarily to corruption and under-investment.  This has not 
only eroded the value of degrees earned from Azeri Universities but has also led to shortages of workers 
with training in agriculture and the service sector, where they are most in demand.   Most degrees are 
being granted in education, health, and manufacturing, where there has been little demand.  This has 
simultaneously led to labor shortages as well as increased unemployment.  In the long run, higher wages 
as a reward for higher productivity are critical for Azerbaijan to improve the standard of living of its 
citizens as it diversifies its economy away from oil.  By targeting tertiary education toward areas where 
workers are in demand, Azerbaijan will not only improve graduates’ job prospects, but also improve 
overall productivity in the non-oil economy.  Therefore, curricula need to be adjusted, ideally to meet 
the findings of a comprehensive study of current and future labor market needs.  Higher spending in 
tertiary education is necessary to build new universities and increase faculty salaries.  In addition, by 
developing a modern system of vocational education and adult training, Azerbaijan will equip workers 
with the skills that employers are currently demanding.  Furthermore, Azerbaijan should explore the 
possibility of attracting foreign universities or private training companies to educate students to meet 
future needs.  Azeri employers have identified inadequate training in Information Technology (IT) and 
English as shortcomings in the labor force.  In India, in the 1980’s, numerous private companies trained 
students in IT.  India’s booming IT sector in the 1990s led to its emergence as a major player in the global 
economy.  Moreover, Japan and China invited graduates of American universities to conduct English 
courses for their workers in the 1980s and 1990s respectively.  
A. A NECESSARY PART OF AZERBAIJAN’S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
7.1. Although economic growth has boosted Azerbaijan’s employment, productive job 
opportunities are still insignificant.  Between 2003 and 2006, economic growth enabled strong 
growth in employment (+ 18 percent). In 2006, unemployment was low at 6.8 percent of the 
population aged 15 and over. According to the 2006 Labor Force Survey (LFS), approximately 
64 percent of the working age population (15–64) was employed. This figure was slightly below 
the EU-15 average of 66 percent. It was less than in most successful transition economies, such 
as Estonia (68 percent) and the Czech Republic (65 percent), but higher than in other Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) transition countries. Azerbaijan’s growth in employment since 2003 has 
occurred primarily in less productive, lower paying sectors, and most new jobs have been created 
in the already large informal sector, especially in agriculture. The “new” private sector, 
consisting of de novo private, usually small, firms, is very small, and has not yet developed the 
critical mass to generate enough jobs to replace public sector jobs. Hence, facilitating the entry 
of new firms and the growth of SMEs is a prerequisite for faster private sector job creation and 
overall employment growth. 
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7.2. Azerbaijan has fallen behind in the quality and efficient use of its human capital, due 
mainly to the inadequacy of its education system and labor market policies. While Azerbaijan 
inherited relatively good education indicators from the Soviet period, the supply of qualified 
labor diminished significantly during the transition years, and the quality of education 
deteriorated. The Azeri education system suffers from corruption of professors and school 
administrators, which decreases the value of diplomas; under-investment (public spending on 
education decreased from 3.9 percent of GDP in 2000 to 2.7 percent in 2006, compared to 5.2 
percent on average in OECD countries); and a serious mismatch between graduates’ 
specializations and the current and future needs of the economy.  
7.3. As a result, Azerbaijan lags behind its comparators in the quality and quantity of human 
capital. While in 2007 the country had the 4th highest GDP per capita in the CIS, Azerbaijan 
ranked 23rd in ECA in the Knowledge Economy Index (KEI)131 of the World Bank Institute 
(2008), ahead of only Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan. Figure 7.1 also 
suggests that, given its level of GDP 
per capita, Azerbaijan’s performance 
in the KEI should be higher. The 
figure also emphasizes that this 
performance has actually worsened 
in the last decade, despite the rise of 
per capita income. In particular, 
Azerbaijan has the worst score in 
ECA for the “education and human 
resources” indicator,132 due 
especially to insufficient enrollment 
in higher education. In addition, 
labor market policies are not fully 
developed. Reforms are still needed, 
especially in active labor programs, including training and retraining, labor redeployment, and 
labor market institutions. In particular, although labor legislation is quite flexible, enforcement of 
labor laws is weak. 
7.4. Building human capital will be key to increasing productivity in both private and 
public sectors, and to reducing unemployment and poverty. Upgrading the skills of the labor 
force is essential to diversify employment opportunities away from the informal sector and to 
reallocate workers from low-productive into higher value-added jobs.  Upgrading skills will also 
result in individuals increasing their value in the labor market, thus enabling them to increase 
                                                 
131 The World Bank’s Knowledge Economy Framework organizes the determinants of innovation under four key 
pillars: (a) Economic Incentives and Institutional Regime (tariff and non-tariff barriers, regulatory quality, rule of 
law), (b) Education (adult literacy rate, secondary enrollment, tertiary enrollment), (c) Innovation System (royalty 
and license fees payments and receipts, patent applications granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
scientific and technical journal articles), and (d) Information Infrastructure (telephone, computer, and Internet 
penetrations). The framework ranks countries by pillar and an overall Knowledge Economy Index (KEI). 
132 Calculated as the simple average of the normalized scores on three key variables: adult literacy rate, secondary 
enrollment, and tertiary enrollment. 
Figure 7.1:  Relationship Between GDP Per Capita and the 
Knowledge Economy Index, 2007 
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their earnings and reduce poverty.133 Finally, human resources are a necessary part of capacity 
building in the public sector in order to create the conditions for sustained growth. As such, 
human capital is an essential part of the development strategy of Azerbaijan and a priority 
investment in its future. 
B. LABOR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 
Rapidly Growing Labor Supply 
7.5. Due to relatively high fertility rates in the past and a favorable age structure in the 
population, Azerbaijan’s working age population (15–64) has been growing rapidly. It 
soared from 4.99 million in 1999 to 5.77 million in 2006––or 16 percent (2.1 percent per 
annum). According to the medium-term scenario of the UN population forecast, the number of 
able-bodied individuals aged 15–64 will increase to 6.55 million by 2015. This population 
growth will stimulate competition for employment. On the other hand, in the 1990s, birthrates 
declined rapidly. Thus, as that generation of youth enters the labor force, the 15–24-year-old 
population will shrink from 1.74 million in 2006 to 1.54 million in 2015 and to 1.19 million in 
2020. The result will be an aging labor force.  
7.6. Population also is affected by migration. Unofficial estimates place the net 
emigration estimates rather high, close to 1 million people during the transition.134 Migrants 
headed mainly to Germany, Russia, and Turkey. In particular, for economic reasons, significant 
numbers of young people reportedly migrated temporarily to work in Russia, mostly in 
commercial and informal activities. When the economic situation and salary levels improve in 
Azerbaijan, some migrants may return, adding pressure to the labor market. 
7.7. Concurrently, the economically active population increased significantly. In 2006, the 
labor participation rate reached 66.4 percent of the population aged 15 and older (up from 64.7 
percent in 1999). Also in 2006, the economically active population hit 4.28 million, an increase 
of 25.8 percent from the 1999 census. In particular, the female participation rate rose from 57 
percent in 1999 to over 60 percent in 2006; the rate for males remained flat. Participation rates 
may increase further if women continue to enter the job market and some discouraged workers 
again job-hunt as the economy develops.  
Unemployment, Job Creation, and the Informal Sector 
7.8. Thanks to high job creation, unemployment has remained low, but it is of long 
duration. In 2006, despite the large increase in the economically active population, 
unemployment stayed low, at 6.8 percent of the population aged 15 and over (7.1 percent of the 
population aged 15 to 64). This was possible because of the rapid growth of employment; 
608,000 new jobs were created between 2003 and 2006.135 However, two-thirds of job seekers 
stay unemployed for more than 12 months. Data on labor force participation also show 
                                                 
133 For a quantitative analysis of the returns to education in Azerbaijan, see World Bank 2007. 
134 See European Training Foundation 2006. 
135 The 2003 and 2006 labor force surveys were conducted by the State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan with the 
technical and financial support of the ILO and UNDP. These LFSs can be considered the most reliable sources of 
information on Azerbaijan’s labor dynamics. 
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considerable disparity by region. There is almost no unemployment in Nakhichevan economic 
district. Unemployment also is much below average in Absheron, Aran, and Sheki-Zagatala 
districts. It is average in Baku City (6.8 percent). In contrast, the rate is very high in Kalbajar-
Lachin and Guba-Khachmaz districts (21.2 percent and 13.5 percent respectively). 
Table 7.1: Employment Dynamics, 2003 and 2006 (x 1,000) 
 Total employment Urban employment Rural employment
 2003 2006 2003 2006 2003 2006
Employed – total 3,377.8 3,985.9 1,715.2 1,984.2 1,662.6 2,001.7 
 Including:       
• Public enterprises and organizations 988.7 984.0 740.7 694.4 248.0 289.6 
• Non-public enterprises and 
organizations 
369.0 470.6 318.0 404.8 51.0 65.8 
• Agricultural farms 918.5 1,379.0 130.1 79.2 788.4 1,299.8 
• Self-employment; hired by physical 
persons and employed in production 
cooperatives 
1,101.7 1,152.3 526.4 805.9 575.3 346.4 
Source: State Statistical Committee (SSC)/Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population of Azerbaijan Republic 
(MoLSPP), Labor Force Survey 2003 and 2006. 
 
7.9. The recent upsurge in job growth was due mainly to the expansion of agricultural 
employment. Between 2003 and 2006, 76 percent of new jobs (465,000 jobs) were created in 
agriculture, predominantly in subsistence farming (Table 7.1). By type of employment, 
agriculture became the main “employer.” Non-public (non-state) enterprises also created 
approximately 100,000 new jobs. Self-employment and employment hired by individuals created 
approximately 50,000 new jobs. During the same period, employment in public enterprises and 
organizations did not change much. It accounted for 984,000 employees, approximately 25 
percent of the total.  
7.10. The distorted nature of the labor market can be judged from the contrast in 
employment, wages, and productivity among sectors. The sectors that generate GDP (and 
growth) are not the same sectors that generate employment (Table 7.2). While 52 percent of 
GDP is generated by the mining sector (which provides only 1 percent of employment), 39 
percent of employment is in agriculture (which generated a mere 7 percent of GDP in 2006), and 
50 percent of employment is in rural areas. Value-added generated by one worker in agriculture 
is less than one-sixth of that in manufacturing or construction, and less than 1 percent of value-
added produced by one employee in oil- and gas-extracting industries. Only 44,000 of the 
country’s workers gain access to high-productivity, high-wage jobs in the oil sector. The rest of 
the labor force is squeezed into low-productivity work in the non-oil sector and into 
unemployment. Thus, the main “sponge” sector, which absorbs the bulk of the labor force but at 
the cost of falling productivity, is agriculture. 
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Table 7.2: Contrasts in Employment, Wages, and Productivity Among Sectors (2006) 
 
 
 
Sector 
 
Total 
employment, 
(1000s)
Total 
employment 
(%) 
GDP 
(%) 
Value 
added/ 
employee 
(AZN) 
Average 
wage/ 
month. 
(AZN)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 1,558 39.1 7.1 854 52.5 
Non-oil manufacturing 195 4.9 5.8 5,567 140.5 
Mining  44 1.1 50.9 217,627 633.7 
Electricity, gas and water supply 
and distribution 
40 1.0 0.6 2,822 146.7 
Construction 223 5.6 7.7 6,467 298.7 
Public administration, defense 271 6.8 - - 175.4 
Education 339 8.5 - - 80.1 
Other services 1,315 33.0 - - 235.4 
Total 3,986 100.0 100.0 4,703 149.0 
Source: SSC 2007  
 
7.11.  The informal sector employment is sizable in Azerbaijan. Between 2003 and 2006, the 
share of workers employed without employment contracts increased from 45.3 percent to 59.5 
percent (Table 7.3). Informal employment within the 
formal sector is large as well. It is estimated by the 
MoLSPP that, for example, of 223,000 employed in 
construction, only one-fourth of the workforce had 
written labor contracts with their employers. This 
estimate tended to confirm the importance in the 
economy of unprotected forms of labor, informal labor, 
and work in precarious conditions. 
Wages 
7.12. Average wages have tripled since 2000. In 2000–07, the average real monthly wage 
increased at an annual rate of 17.5 percent and reached AZN 214 in 2007. Disparities in average 
wages also were enormous (see figure 7.2 for 2006 wage dispersion). In 2007, in the mining 
sector, the average monthly wage was AZN 846, or 6–10 times higher than in the lowest paid 
sectors: agriculture, health, and education. It is also important to note that a significant portion of 
wages and “top-ups”136 were not reported to authorities.137 
7.13. The government increased the minimum wage six-fold in real terms between 2001 
and 2007, but from a low base. In Azerbaijan, the minimum wage was kept low for a long 
period. Only since 2001 did minimum wage levels start to slowly increase but, by 2007, the level 
was still only 23 percent of average wages in the country (Figure 7.2). The November 2006 wage 
survey found that, during that period, only 1.7 percent of full-time employees earned salaries 
below the minimum wage of AZN 30 per month.138 This level is indeed too low to be binding, 
that is, to affect wage and employment decisions. 
                                                 
136 Salary “top-ups” refer to official cash payments or in-kind benefits that a civil servant receives above what 
colleagues in the same grade and pay scale receive. 
137 SSC 2007. 
138 SSC 2007. 
Table 7.3: Workers Without Labor 
Contracts in Total Employment, 2003 
and 2006 (%) 
 2003 2006 
Total  45.3 59.5 
Urban 18.1 39.1 
Rural 69.4 70.9 
Source: SSC/MoLSPP LFS 2006. 
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Figure 7.2: Monthly Wages in Azerbaijan, 1995-07 
Sources: Azerbaijan authorities and World Bank staff estimates.
C. INEFFICIENCIES OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 
Access to Education 
7.14. Azerbaijan inherited relatively good education indicators at independence but, 
during the transition years, the supply of qualified graduates significantly diminished. At 
independence, Azerbaijan inherited a relatively well-developed education system, with better 
education indicators than countries with a similar GDP per capita. The 1989 census indicated an 
overall literacy rate of 99.6 percent. At that time, virtually all children, regardless of gender, 
poverty level, or geographic location, completed a nine-year basic education. However, from 
1989 until the mid-1990s, for many reasons including economic depression, the admission, 
enrollment, and graduation of students, especially in secondary, specialized and vocational 
education establishments, dropped very significantly before recovering gradually. As a result, 
younger cohorts of employed individuals tend to have lower education levels (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4: Structure of Employed and Unemployed Population by Education Level,  
2006 (%) 
 
 
 
 
Age 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Including: 
 
 
 
Higher 
Incomplete 
higher and 
secondary 
specialized 
 
 
 
Vocational 
 
 
Secondary 
general 
 
Below 
secondary 
general 
25–34 100.0 18.3  9.2 4.2 64.1 4.2 
35–44 100.0 19.0 12.3 6.1 60.0 2.6 
45–54 100.0 24.0 15.2 6.8 50.7 3.3 
Source: SSC/MoLSPP LFS 2006. 
7.15. While access to general compulsory education is nearly universal, enrollment in 
higher education remains low. The general tendency of participation in schooling is as follows: 
very low enrollment in preschool, followed by nearly 100 percent enrollment in primary and 
secondary schools (most of them being in the public domain), and a precipitously declining 
participation at ages corresponding to higher education (in which the enrollment rate is 15 
percent). In other words, Azerbaijan’s continued commitment to equitable access is evident at 
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the primary and secondary levels, but disappointingly lacking at the preschool and higher 
education levels.  
7.16. Moreover, large disparities exist in access to higher education among populations, 
depending on their wealth and location. The enrollment rate for the richest quintile was twice 
as high as the one for the poorest quintile. Similarly, in 2005, higher education enrollment rates 
in rural areas were more than three times lower than in Baku and two times lower than that in 
non-Baku urban areas. It also is notable that there is a large and growing gap between the 
demand and number of places available in higher education institutions. While the number of 
applicants for higher education admission examinations has almost tripled since 1992, the 
number of places available has remained flat. In 2006, there were five applicants for each 
available place. 
7.17. Public spending on education as a percentage of GDP has fallen continually since the 
end of the Soviet era (from 7.6 in 1993 to 2.7 percent of GDP in 2006) (Table 7.5). While the 
level of education spending has been growing by double digits since 2003, it compares less 
favorably to the rates of increase in total public 
spending. Compared to the OECD countries, in which 
public spending on education averaged 5.2 percent of 
GDP in 2006, Azerbaijan’s spending on education is 
very low. Moreover, Azerbaijan spends less than 0.2 
percent of GDP on higher education––less than one-
fifth of the EU25 average of 1.14 percent. As public 
spending on education decreased, households assumed 
more roles in educational spending, which negatively 
impacted the participation of children from poor 
backgrounds, particularly at non-compulsory education 
levels. The richest 20 percent of the population consistently accounts for nearly 40 percent of 
private spending, while the poorest 20 percent spends only approximately 10 percent of the total 
private spending on education. Furthermore, this gap between the spending of the poorest and 
richest wealth groups has grown over time.  
Poor Quality of Education 
7.18.  The quality of education in Azerbaijan is worrisome. The OECD’s Program for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) study evaluates the quality and performance of education. 
PISA shows that Azerbaijan’s general secondary education system is performing poorly. The 
analysis of the performance of the 2006 high school graduates shows that, while their 
performance is close to that of Russia and the OECD average in mathematics, it is very low in 
reading and science (Figure 7.3). These results indicate that most Azeri graduates may lack key 
competencies to succeed in higher education. Moreover, most of the country’s tertiary 
educational institutions, public and private, are perceived as operating at below standards, 
despite the competitive university entrance examination. This disappointing overall performance 
is explained by, among other reasons, the absence of a comprehensive quality assurance system, 
poor quality teaching, and corruption. In particular, the quality of teaching personnel has 
deteriorated considerably due to sharp drop in relative real teacher salaries and deteriorating 
conditions of the school environment. These major disincentives have prompted many of the best 
Table 7.5: Total Public Expenditures on 
Education, 2000–06 (%)
Year GDP Total public 
expenditures  
Annual 
growth (%) 
2000 3.9 23.8 - 
2001 3.5 23.8 2.3 
2002 3.2 20.5 2.8 
2003 3.3 19.0 22.8 
2004 3.4 19.6 25.3 
2005 3.0 17.4 26.7 
2006 2.7 12.6 28.6 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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teachers to leave and have demoralized the remaining teaching staff. Low salaries also create an 
incentive for corruption among teachers, which is known to be widespread in education. This 
perhaps explains why diplomas awarded to students are a poor measure of competence.   
7.19. There also is an important 
mismatch between the 
specialization of graduates and 
the present and future needs of 
the economy.   In professional and 
higher education establishments, 
there is an overproduction of 
specialists in areas such as 
education and health, which provide 
relatively limited job opportunities 
in a chosen specialty, whereas very 
few graduates are specializing in 
agriculture and services, in which 
the bulk of employment is 
concentrated. For instance, half of 
the graduates of higher education 
establishments are specialized in 
education, a sector that provides only 8.6 percent of employment plus unattractive wages. 
Moreover, there is an “excess supply” of workers with general secondary education and no 
vocational skills.139 They represent 70 percent of the unemployed population, whereas only a 
maximum of 60 percent of all jobs require general secondary education. This mismatch leads to a 
higher unemployment rate among workers with general education. Lack of vocational/technical 
skills severely limits workers’ employment chances.140  
7.20. This mismatch is perceived by employers. For instance, while SMEs find it very easy to 
find unqualified laborers (which constitute the bulk of recruited employees),  they have 
difficulties finding available qualified crafts and related trade personnel, technicians, employees 
with computer proficiency, and managers.141 At the November 2007 Baku Job Fair, no suitable 
candidates could be found for 50 percent of the 7,000 jobs offered.142 The General Employment 
Department under the MoLSPP gives as a reason for this relative failure is that many of the jobs 
had high requirements for key competencies that are not usually well developed in Azeri 
education curricula, such as personal computer skills and English. As mentioned before, this 
difficulty in finding qualified workers is also experienced by the public sector, and by foreign 
investors, who often must train every Azeri operational employee, both in-house and abroad. For 
instance, for the first time in its world experience, British Petroleum (BP), the key investor in the 
oil sector, was compelled to establish from scratch a large training center in Azerbaijan to deal 
with the low competence levels. 
                                                 
139 World Bank 2008. 
140 Rutkowski 2007.  
141 See the results of the 2007 IFC survey on the business environment for SMEs in Azerbaijan, and Kuddo and 
others 2005. 
142 World Bank 2008. 
Figure 7.3:Average Student Performance in PISA 2006 
International Comparison 
Source: PISA 2006 (OECD) 
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D. IMPROVING LABOR MARKET POLICIES AND THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 
Government’s Strategy 
7.21. The government has recognized the need to tackle human capital issues to improve 
its long-term economic prospects. This recognition is reflected in the new SPPRED (2006–
2015), which chose poverty reduction, diversification of the economy, and regional, social, and 
economic development as its overriding objectives. A National Employment Strategy was 
adopted in 2005, and its operationalization has begun through the National Action Plan adopted 
in 2007. The “substance” of the strategy is that it is not the role of government, but of the private 
sector, to create jobs.  
7.22. The National Employment Strategy identified multiple priorities. They include 
reforms in labor market institutions and policies; modernization of vocational education and the 
introduction of life-long learning; improved social protection of job seekers and unemployed 
citizens; and promotion of employment of youth, women, disabled, internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), and refugees. To address the youth employment challenge, the government, in 2003, 
volunteered to be a lead country of the UN Secretary General’s Youth Employment Network 
(YEN). In cooperation with the International Labor Organization (ILO), the government also 
developed the “Decent Work Country Program 2006–2009” to promote opportunities for adults 
to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and human 
dignity. In 2004, the government approved the State Program for Socio-Economic Development 
of the Regions (SPSEDR) to create 600,000 new jobs over five years (2004–08), a goal that has 
been achieved, according to official statistics, although approximately half of the jobs created are 
temporary. 
7.23. Some progress has recently been made on the regulatory side. After ranking 
Azerbaijan 67 in employment practices in Doing Business 2008, Doing Business 2009 ranked 
Azerbaijan 15, while ranking Armenia 19 and Russia 54.  This ranking was based on: (i) the cost 
of firing, in terms of weeks of salary; and (ii) an employment rigidity index, which averages the 
difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours and difficulty of firing.  Although Azerbaijan’s cost of firing 
remained unchanged at 22 weeks, the rigidity index dropped from 31 to 3.3  in the last year due 
to labor reforms.  Not only are there no government mandated restrictions on fixed-term 
contracts, but the “minimum wage” also does not exceed the average worker’s value added.  This 
absence of government interference in the efficient allocation of labor resources will contribute 
to the development of the private non-oil economy. 
Reforming the Education/Training System 
7.24. Large improvements in the education system are urgently needed if all Azeris are to 
have opportunities to develop the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required to prosper in a world 
increasingly based on technology and the rapid exchange of information. Achieving these key 
competencies should be the core objective of the education system. Investment in human capital 
indeed will be the critical factor to improve the employment prospects of the population and the 
increase in non-oil productivity.  
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7.25. The government needs to invest more in education, particularly at the tertiary level. 
It is essential that the government revise public spending priorities to make education a top 
objective in order to ensure quality and improve enrollment rates in higher education (Chapter 
3). On the one hand, an important effort to increase r wage is necessary to recruit better teachers, 
as well as give them appropriate incentives and limit corruption. This effort might be financed 
partially through raising the very low student-teacher ratio in secondary education (9.4, 
compared to the OECD average of 14).  And it should be linked with measures to reduce 
corruption in the education system so that diplomas regain real value. On the other, public 
spending on higher education also should gradually increase to 1.1 percent of non-oil GDP to 
create new universities (especially outside of Baku) and increase the number of places available 
in tertiary education institutions. Azerbaijan also could explore attracting foreign universities and 
private training companies.  
7.26. Education and training must be linked to today’s labor market needs. Increasing 
employment opportunities means intervening in the mismatch between graduates’ specializations 
and the structure and needs of the economy. Such interventions entail increasing cooperation 
between the labor and education ministries. This can be done: (i) through career counseling, 
offering better information to students on recruiting sectors and wages offered; and (ii) revising 
the curricula of public universities and professional schools based on communication with the 
private sector and a comprehensive study of current and future labor market needs.  
7.27.  Concurrently, there is a need to develop a modern system of vocational education 
and training (VET) as well as adult training (lifelong learning) that will equip workers with the 
skills required by employers and the global economy. This system restructure and modernize and 
subsequently expand the network of regional training centers and VET schools, as well as create 
a Common Quality Assurance Framework and a standardized, competence-based qualification 
system. In doing so, Azerbaijan can benefit from the recent experience of certain OECD 
countries such as Hungary. 
Improving Labor Policies 
7.28. While there are relatively few 
complaints among the employers in 
Azerbaijan with respect to the rigidity of 
labor legislation, social security 
contributions and informality remain 
high. The 2005 BEEPS survey of local 
employers found that only 8 percent of them 
listed labor regulations as a problem to 
doing business. (Figure 7.4). This was 
confirmed by the 2008 IFC survey (only 1 
percent of the respondents mention the labor 
code as one of the three major obstacles to 
doing business). The current weak 
regulation of the labor market may have 
helped employment flexibility. However, weak regulation also appears to have had trade-offs by 
promoting informalization of the economy, lower worker productivity, and reduced worker 
Figure 7.4: Labor Relations as a Problem for  Doing 
Business BEEPS Survey (% of Respondents) 
Sources: EBRD and World Bank 
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welfare, such as low wages, growth of in-kind substitutes for remuneration, and wage arrears. 
Informality might also be spurred by the relatively high level of social security contribution (25 
percent in Azerbaijan compared to 20 percent and 18 percent, respectively, in Georgia and 
Armenia).  
7.29.  Given its scope in Azerbaijan, the issue of undeclared work should be addressed. 
The size of undeclared work reduces social security contributions and leads to a high tax burden 
on registered labor. As discussed in Chapter 5, effective strategies to reduce undeclared work 
require a combination of “carrots” (reforms and actions to facilitate, reduce the costs, and 
increase the benefits of formalization) and “sticks” (enhanced, even-handed enforcement of such 
improved laws and regulations). 
7.30. Insufficient enforcement of existing labor laws has led to the deterioration of work 
conditions and occupational safety. A number of enterprises have been, to a great extent, 
neglecting labor safety standards. In addition, in recent years, very few investments were made 
in new technology or in improving existing ones. The depreciation of machinery, therefore, has 
been very quick, and some machines have even become dangerous. In many cases, new 
technology was purchased by an enterprise, but training was not sufficient to manage it, resulting 
in increased work-related accidents. Although not all cases of industrial accidents have been 
reported and some have been “paid for” by employers, official statistics show that between 50 
and 80 workers die annually from accidents in industry alone. Therefore, enhancing the capacity 
of the Labor Inspectorate to enforce the labor laws is a critical reform of labor market 
institutions. 
7.31. The MoLSPP/General Employment Department (GED) could develop active labor 
market policies. Strategies to “activate” the unemployed with the help of high-quality 
employment services can help ensure that benefit recipients and other job seekers have better 
opportunities to find employment. In Azerbaijan, this requires improving initial job counseling, 
job fairs, training programs, and public works projects, through better assessment of previous 
programs and better tailoring to the needs and characteristics of the beneficiaries and of the labor 
market. It also entails networking with social and health services, the housing sector, and 
communities. 
7.32. Labor market policies would benefit from modern occupational classifications and 
standards, as well as from improved labor market monitoring. Azerbaijan lacks modern 
occupational classifications and standards as key factors to refer to in setting requirements in 
employment (for example, at entry level; skilled worker level; middle technician level) within an 
industry sector, or in particular jobs. For example, there is no international 
compatibility/transparency of occupational standards with reference to ISCO-88/ISCO-08 
standards. As a result, workers do not have a means of communicating to employers and 
employment agencies any skills learned through informal and formal channels.  Also, employers 
do not have a means of defining skill requirements by occupation or evaluating the skills of 
individuals presenting themselves for employment. Regarding labor market monitoring, labor 
force surveys and wage statistics need further improvement. It would also be useful to 
complement them with employer-based surveys of current and projected labor market conditions 
(actual and planned job creation and job destruction, key determinants of hiring and firing) and 
with studies aimed at keeping track of graduates to analyze the links between education and the 
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labor market.143 Such surveys and studies would help policy-making and facilitate adjustment of 
policies to current and future change of labor market conditions.  
E. ATTRACTING, RETAINING, AND MANAGING PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES 
7.33. Azerbaijan’s public sector is experiencing two challenges: rising wages and poorly 
qualified employees. Azerbaijan’s high public sector spending is creating a need for greater 
numbers of more qualified public sector employees. Yet, rising disparities between public and 
private sector pay are making it more difficult for the government to attract and retain well-
qualified public sector employees. In 2006, for instance, wages in the private sector were 118 
percent and 65 percent higher in health and education respectively (Table 7.6), and twice as high 
on average, compared to the public sector. Figure 7.2 also suggests that the gap between average 
wages in largely government-funded sectors (public administration, health, and education) and 
average wages in largely privately-run sectors (mining, construction, financial services, 
transport) increased through 2007. Ideally, the government would like to pay its top public sector 
employees more, but it needs to find a way to link additional pay to performance. Azerbaijan’s 
16 salary grades for public sector employees have a compression ratio of only 1.56, although this 
ratio increases to 3.6 when including grades 17–19, which were reintroduced in early 2007.  
Linking Pay to Performance: Too Difficult? 
7.34. Significant reforms in 
management practices have been 
deemed prerequisites to link pay with 
performance. Improving pay policies 
and practices is not, by itself, a 
meaningful strategy to improve the 
quality and cost-effectiveness of service 
delivery. Underlying managerial 
incentives also need to be properly 
aligned. In turn, to properly align 
management incentives, the government 
must first establish and ensure 
continuous monitoring of performance. 
In short, performance management 
requires organizational units to figure 
out precisely what progress would look 
like and how to measure it. 
Subsequently, organizational units 
actually need to measure the indicators that would provide systematic evidence of what is being 
accomplished. 
7.35. Experience has shown that linking pay to performance is difficult to manage... OECD 
countries that have made significant progress on performance-focused reform agendas have 
                                                 
143 See World Bank 2008. 
Table 7.6: Comparison of Average Wages Between the 
Public and Private Sectors, 2006 (AZN) 
  Public 
Sector 
Private 
Sector 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 52.5 52.3 
Fishing 55.4 35 
Health and social work 65.1 142.4 
Education 77.5 128.1 
Wholesale and retail trade 102 125.9 
Manufacturing 116.7 124.3 
Electricity, gas and water supply 128.7 271.8 
Public administration and defense 132.4 55.9 
Hotels and restaurants 161.1 164 
Transport, storage, communications 164.5 270.6 
Construction 189.6 406.1 
Real estate 199.6 869.7 
Financial intermediation 228.1 511.1 
Mining and quarrying 349.1 1269.7 
Average 109.4 220.9 
Source:  Statcom. 
 141 
 
found the process of developing and measuring performance (whether it be activities, outputs, or 
outcomes) to be extremely challenging and to require a considerable gestation. Based on the 
results of such reforms, the empirical literature on performance-based pay reforms is 
discouraging144. U.K.145, New Zealand146, and Chile147 provide, perhaps, a few of the more 
significant and extensively researched examples. The discouraging results from empirical 
research on these countries is an especially telling finding, given that most of this literature 
examines reforms in quite sophisticated OECD countries, rather than in the more challenging 
management environments found in countries such as Azerbaijan. 
7.36. ...and that it may provide the wrong incentives for managers or organizational units. 
Conditioning budgets on organizational and unit performance also is not a very good idea 
because it poses the very real risk that organizational units facing more difficult external or 
demand-driven circumstances (such as schools facing poorly prepared or qualified students) will 
face budget cuts due to factors outside their direct control. In short, it is risky and problematic to 
use performance information as triggers for either budget adjustments or individual performance 
bonuses. Rather, information on organization or unit performance is generally better used to 
inform management actions aimed at encouraging particularly productive behavior by 
organizational units and their staff, and to encourage such units and staff to consider adjusting 
their behaviors when they are not achieving the desired results (outputs, outcomes). 
Linking pay to Promotions: the “Old” New Idea 
7.37. A more promising approach to pay reform than performance bonuses focuses on 
establishing a competitive remuneration structure (to attract and retain qualified staff), 
coupled with promotions practices that promise salary improvements primarily through 
promotions based on performance. This approach requires, among other things, reducing the 
extent to which seniority brings with it automatic increases in pay, and instead using these 
resources to finance greater salary increases through performance-linked promotions. 
7.38. Under a promotion-performance linkage strategy, pay should be viewed primarily as 
a means to attract and retain qualified staff. This view makes it all the more important to get 
right the structure of overall remuneration (all elements of pay) across positions to ensure 
roughly consistent competitiveness (with respect to the relevant domestic comparators) across all 
positions. Most public administrations in developing countries fail to accomplish this. Instead, 
they tend to pay more competitive salaries for low-skilled positions (gardeners, drivers, day 
laborers) than for high-skilled positions (professionals, managers). This pattern poses at least two 
major problems: 
• It makes it progressively more difficult to attract and retain qualified staff as the skill 
requirements of positions rise;  
                                                 
144 See, for example, OECD 2005a.  
145 See, for example, AUT 2003 and Office of Manpower Economics 200, and the literature cited therein for 
examples. 
146 See Perris 1998 and its bibliography for examples. 
147 See Thorn and others 2004 and its bibliography for examples. 
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• It undermines incentives for staff in the higher-skilled ranks to try to make a career in 
the public administration, since the more skilled they become through work 
experience, the less competitive is the remuneration. 
7.39. One of the major difficulties with annual performance-related payments (either one-
off bonuses or increases in core salary) is to get supervisors to reliably assign annual 
bonuses on the basis of performance. Managers are under significant pressure to keep all their 
staff happy, so they tend to give roughly the same bonuses to everybody. Worse, they may assign 
bonuses on the basis of non-performance factors, such as being a good friend or member of the 
same ethnic group. Such patterns are difficult to counteract, since such decisions must be made 
each year and there are too few incentives to build enough checks and balances to keep the 
annual performance-related pay process honest. If the primary means of rewarding performance 
with pay increases is through the promotions process, those responsible stand a better chance of 
being able to build sufficient checks and balances on these promotions processes. It is not easy 
but, compared to the options above, the odds of success are better: 
• This route is more promising because the employer must invest resources on 
reviewing such decisions only every several years for any given employee, rather 
than every year.  
• It is easier to establish expectations that promotions are not automatic than to 
establish expectations that annual pay increases (or bonuses) are not deserved by all 
or most staff. 
7.40. Finally, to make promotions the primary vehicle for linking performance to pay, it is 
essential to make sure that the annual personnel performance assessment process reliably 
sorts staff according to performance. Fortunately, it is possible to systematically track data 
that give at least some sense of whether performance is the measure being used by tracking the 
fraction of performance ratings falling in the top or top two rating categories. Excessive 
concentration of ratings in these top two categories is a signal that the annual performance 
appraisal process is not working well. In addition, it is possible to impose various constraints on 
the annual performance appraisal process that can help to ensure that it does reliably sort staff on 
the basis of performance.148 
Monitoring Impact is Still Relevant, but for Management Purposes 
7.41. Developing information on the objectives and performance of organizational units is 
important to improve management, not for other purposes. The primary use of monitoring 
information is to improve management, rather than to condition either budgets or bonuses on 
performance. Such information can improve management in two distinct ways: 
• It can provide feedback to managers, who can use that feedback to continuously 
adjust course and encourage and nudge their staff to either keep doing what is 
working or adjust their efforts where the feedback is less encouraging.  
• It can be used by central authorities to manage their managers in exactly the same 
way that this information can be used by managers to manage their staff.  
                                                 
148 See, for instance, Reid 2003 and 1999. 
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The point is that the information gained from monitoring allows for the timely flow of 
information to management.  
F. CONCLUSION: THE RETURNS TO INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL 
7.42. Investment in human capital must be regarded as an essential pillar of Azerbaijan’s 
medium-term development strategy. Building an education system with higher tertiary 
enrollment, better quality of teaching, more reliable diplomas, specialization in accordance with 
present and future needs of the economy, and improved lifelong training would ensure a more 
qualified labor force.  Building an educated workforce also would create the foundation and 
potential for important productivity gains, facilitate the diversification of the economy, and 
accelerate the technological catch-up process. All of these are necessary elements to foster 
sustained growth in Azerbaijan beyond the oil windfalls.  
7.43. Concerning the labor market itself-- addressing the issue of undeclared work; improving 
work conditions and safety; and developing modern, active labor policies are crucial for 
increasing workers’ welfare while reducing structural unemployment.  
7.44. Finally, an enhanced public sector pay— and management strategy— will help develop a 
more efficient and adaptable government. 
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